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Abstract 
 
 
The present criminal justice systems face challenges in the modern world 
characterized by the development of new technologies, fast communication, and 
the interconnection of different and distant parts of the world; in simple terms the 
challenges of the Earth becoming “a global village.” This causes crime to be more 
complex and to grow, and consequently criminal justice systems are being 
burdened with new types of problems. In this context, systems are forced to try to 
deal with criminal cases in a more efficient and faster way, to define priorities and 
look for alternatives to the classical trial which requires significant time, effort 
and resources. One of these alternative ways is plea agreements, or as is more 
commonly said plea bargaining. This legal instrument is present in its different 
forms in a number of national legal systems, as well as in international law. This 
work deals with its development, application and potential future in Montenegro. 
 
First, the key features and principles of plea bargaining as a legal institution are 
presented in this work, demonstrating its strongest and most complex presence in 
the United States as the country of its origin, but also in other countries and in 
international law. After that, the thesis deals with the development, regulation, as 
well as the extent of the presence of plea bargaining practices in Montenegro, at 
the same time providing a comparison with two neighboring counties, Serbia and 
Croatia. Furthermore, through a number of interviews conducted with 
Montenegrin prosecutors, defense attorneys and judges as the main actors in this 
process, the thesis focuses on discovering how the practice functions in reality, 
and what hides behind the relatively simple legal provisions that regulate this 
issue. After identifying the key, very interesting, issues that emerge from practical 
experience, the thesis presents the relevant implications for the future, and a 
number of related conclusions and recommendations.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Plea Bargaining – A Special Tool 
 
The main topic of this work concerns the legal institution of plea bargaining or as 
it is often called plea agreements or agreements on the admission of guilt. The 
origin of plea bargaining is in the United States (U.S.) and the first forms of plea 
bargaining in that country appeared in the early nineteenth century. There is no 
universally accepted single definition of plea bargaining and there are many forms 
which it can take, depending on the legal system and tradition of the country, the 
approach taken by national legislators, as well as the position and attitude of legal 
professionals and society in relation to this issue. Some authors define plea 
bargaining “as a process through which a defendant pleads to a criminal charge 
with the expectation of receiving some consideration from the state.” (Neubauer, 
1979, p.308, cited by Wisharaya, 1995, p.96).  As Maynard states (1984, p.77) by 
referring to a number of American, Canadian and English authors (Alschuler, 
1968:50; Baldwin and McConville, 1977:23; Bottoms and McClean, 1976:123; 
Feely, 1979c:185; Grosman, 1968: Chapter 7; Klein, 1976: Chapter 1; Miller et 
al., 1978: xxi): “Researchers agree that plea bargaining refers to courtroom 
transactions in which there is an exchange between prosecution and defense in 
criminal cases.” As this author concludes, defendants receive some 
“consideration” from prosecutor for pleading guilty, while the prosecutor gets a 
guaranteed conviction and a shorter procedure. Within the framework of a 
criminal proceeding, plea bargaining enables the defendant to admit guilt and thus 
to get better legal treatment from the prosecutor. Most commonly, this includes 
negotiations on an admission of guilt, and it is always achieved with the final 
consent of the court.  
Plea bargaining represents a legal institution of criminal law which is essentially 
an alternative to the classic criminal court procedure i.e. a trial; it contributes 
greatly to procedural efficiency and cost reduction. On the other hand, it is often 
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said that it takes away from the quality and fairness of the criminal proceeding. 
According to Fisher (2003, p.1) plea bargaining may be “as some chroniclers 
claim, the invading barbarian.” This wording may lead to the conclusion that, for 
many authors, a regular criminal trial is seen as the standard path while any 
shortcut on this common path represents an exception or even a violation of a 
principal rule. A question which is often asked, particularly by the general public 
is: How can you bargain about guilt? This question represents the essence of the 
criticism directed towards plea bargaining; it targets its ethical and judicial 
elements.  
Plea Bargaining in Montenegro and Identified Research Questions and Goals 
 
The possession of both of the above described characteristics makes plea 
bargaining somewhat controversial, and therefore generally fruitful grounds for 
academic elaboration and discussion. It becomes even more interesting when it is 
introduced and applied in countries where negotiation on guilt is not part of legal 
history and tradition, and where it represents a complete novelty. This is exactly 
the case in Montenegro, as well as in all the neighboring countries of the Balkans. 
The specific and interesting nature of the plea bargaining itself, the indisputable 
practicality of this legal tool, its current existence but historical absence from the 
legal systems of Montenegro and countries in the region are the main reasons for 
devoting my research to this particular criminal procedural instrument. 
Additionally, as a Montenegrin lawyer with experience of working in the biggest 
first instance criminal court in the country, I was able to witness the inefficiency 
of the Montenegrin criminal procedure. By providing legal assistance to 
investigative and trial judges, and by drafting key judicial documents, I was also 
able to detect failing in the procedure, such as its long duration and strict 
formality, but also opportunities for improvement. Additional years working as 
the director of the key national judicial training institution enabled me to directly 
contribute to the drafting of all the major judicial training laws and the judicial 
training curriculum, as well as to participate in the work of the relevant Council of 
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Europe (CoE) bodies as Montenegro’s representative. Through this work, I gained 
additional knowledge not just about criminal law and procedure itself, but also 
about Montenegrin criminal justice officials, their working mentality and habits, 
as well as the relevant international legal standards. By the later completion of 
Masters studies at the Karl-Frenzens University of Graz in Austria in the area of 
European Integration and European Law, I was able to expand my educational 
experience, as well as my knowledge of international legal standards and 
particularly their importance in the context of Euro-Atlantic integration. The 
efficiency of the procedure, procedural rights guarantees and the usage of 
alternative methods of case resolution, to which plea bargaining belongs in a 
wider sense, crystalized as major points of interests when it comes to my further 
professional legal growth. Following these priorities, I positioned myself in the 
core of the national rule of law reform processes by becoming a Legal Specialist 
at the U.S. Embassy in Montenegro, which is my current job. Apart from the 
political aspect of my work, regular reporting, legal analyses and interpretation of 
various court cases, laws and legal issues in the country, through the large 
Embassy legal assistance programs in the area of criminal law, I am also involved 
in legislation development, and the continuous and dynamic training of criminal 
justice officials. I have the opportunity to directly communicate with criminal 
justice members on a daily basis, and discuss criminal law matters. A major part 
of these assistance activities concern improving criminal procedure efficiency and 
the usage of plea bargaining as a legal institution which originates from the U.S. 
My participation in such training activities where I can directly hear relevant 
discussions, opinions and experiences, but also regularly visit American criminal 
justice institutions and observe their relevant practices, continuously grew my 
interest in this topic. From my personal experience I have concluded that plea 
bargaining has its benefits and potential, that there is a general openness to it in 
the legal community of my country, but that it has still not found its way into the 
daily life of prosecutors, advocates and their defendants, and judges. An 
additional motivating factor for my work is the evident lack of any significant 
academic work in this area in Montenegro and even the region. As an active 
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member of the Montenegrin Association of Lawyers and an author published in 
the oldest Legal Journal of the country, established in 1933, I was additionally 
motivated to contribute to the legal community by dealing with this topic. Bearing 
in mind all the above, insider research concerns did exist to some extent, and this 
issue will be discussed later in Chapter II.  
In this context, researching relevant existing legislation, as well as the views and 
opinions of main actors of the process is the very first step that will enable me to 
get a deep insight into the level of usefulness and productiveness of plea 
bargaining in Montenegro. This will lead to concrete conclusions based on 
research findings which will be a useful reference for the future implementation 
of this practice by Montenegrin criminal justice actors. 
As a first research question, I will primarily examine the motives of Montenegrin 
legislator in introducing plea bargaining into the Montenegrin national system. 
What were these motives? The motives for using this legal instrument are 
universally mainly related to improving efficiency and reducing the costs of 
criminal proceedings, so this was also the case with Montenegrin legislator. 
However, a question which can initially be asked when it comes to Montenegro 
is: Were these motives followed up and supported by proper preceding analysis of 
the realistic potential for the application of plea bargaining in the country? In my 
work I will look at: the elements which should inevitably be taken into account 
before importing such a specific legal institution, such as the possession of 
relevant skills and knowledge of all the actors of plea negotiations; procedural, 
legal and other motives of defense attorneys, accused and prosecutors to enter and 
successfully complete plea negotiations; the sentencing policy of courts; and 
others. The historical, cultural and social ambience of the country, as well as the 
opinion and position of legal professionals and the community in relation to plea 
agreements are also significant factors to be taken into consideration when 
deciding on whether or not to make such agreements part of the national legal 
system.   
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I will further focus on reviewing the relevant legal provisions in force and will 
answer the research question of how plea bargaining is legally defined and 
incorporated into Montenegrin criminal procedural laws. Specifically, the 
Montenegrin Criminal Procedure Code (CPC)1 from 2009 contains provisions 
related to plea agreements. These provisions are not numerous, but are clearly 
aimed at providing a solid basis for the application of this institution in practice. I 
will examine the relationship and link between these provisions and other 
provisions and chapters of the law. In addition, the compatibility of the named 
provisions with the general spirit and nature of Montenegrin criminal proceedings 
will also be discussed. Incorporating alien and sometimes entirely inadequate 
legal instruments into national laws is not unknown in countries which are in the 
transitional process of the development of their democracies through deep reforms 
of their legal systems and judiciaries. Such endeavors, on one hand, always 
represent a risk which can disrupt the main concepts and principles of existing 
legislation and which can potentially lead to the creation of the hybrid laws that 
are hard to implement. On the other hand, it can lead to significant improvements 
when it comes to the quality and efficiency of criminal proceedings, as well as 
positive changes in the quite often historically closed mindsets of the criminal 
justice elites of those countries. 
I will then transfer the research to the practical field and review the current 
situation with plea bargaining. I will answer the research question: How are the 
above described provisions being implemented in the daily work of prosecutors, 
defense attorneys and judges? Recognizing, consolidating and examining the 
problems and challenges that all actors in plea bargaining regularly face is a 
particularly important part of this research. It will be conducted from different 
angles through direct interviews, and taking into account the arguments of all 
sides involved. My main motivation to deeply and systematically analyze the 
relevant law provisions and clearly recognize the problems which occur in their 
application, comes from a fact that plea agreements are obviously not widespread 
in Montenegrin legal life. On the contrary, is seems like the use of the tool in 
practice is sporadic and done on an ad hoc basis without strategic and visionary 
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reasoning behind it. At first glance it can be presumed that the probable causes of 
such situation are various, starting from the quality of legal provisions and the 
sentencing policy of courts, to a lack of an innovative and versatile approach in 
interpreting and applying the law, or better to say the existence of exactly the 
opposite approach, one that is traditional and quite strict. Apart from that, the 
cultural aspect and mentality quite often seem to be neglected in the elaboration 
of legal issues in Montenegro; to the extent possible I will tackle this research 
question as well: Whether there is a link between culture and mentality and the 
application of plea bargaining in Montenegro? Based on findings and taking into 
account a variety of available information and factors, I will offer an answer to 
the research question: What are the possible solutions to the identified problems 
in the application of plea bargaining in Montenegro? I will provide grounded 
solutions to recognized problems, and identify formulas of success in the 
application of plea agreements in Montenegro. Both positive and negative 
elements, both the challenges and successes in the application of plea bargaining 
by Montenegrin prosecutors, defense attorneys and judges will be the focus of this 
research. They must be considered the basis and guidance for the building and 
further development of this legal instrument in Montenegro.  
In line with all the above, and by answering the identified research questions, the 
final key goals of this research are: analyzing the quality of the legal regulation 
of plea bargaining in Montenegro; investigating the level of use, usefulness and 
productiveness of plea bargaining institution in the criminal justice system of 
Montenegro; identifying the problems, as well as success schemes, in the 
application of this practice in the country; discovering the causes of challenges 
and factors of success in the implementation of the practice; and providing 
adequate conclusions and recommendations which can be useful in the further 
development of the practice and study of this issue in Montenegro. 
Comparative Experiences 
The conducting of adequate comparative analysis will be one additional goal of 
the research which deserves a special view. My ultimate motivation for 
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conducting a comparative analysis is to answer the research question of whether 
there are some plea bargaining experiences of neighboring countries which can 
be useful for Montenegro to adopt or to learn from. Identifying the best 
approaches when it comes to the implementation of plea bargaining in 
Montenegro is very useful and important, and all this bearing in mind the need to 
improve the efficiency of criminal proceedings on one hand, and keeping their 
quality and fairness on the other.       
The most relevant comparison when it comes to Montenegro and plea bargaining 
is the one with countries in the region like Serbia and Croatia. The existence of 
the same legal tradition and very similar legal systems; a joint history as former 
Yugoslav republics; a similar culture; and the existence of the same language, 
particularly legal terminology, make a general comparison of Montenegro with 
these countries natural and valuable. Additionally, just like Montenegro, both 
Serbia and Croatia have recently introduced plea bargaining into their legal 
systems; in Serbia it happened in 2009 and in Croatia in 2008. For all three 
countries, it can be said that this is a “foreign” legal institution not historically 
present in their legal systems. Furthermore, the countries also share the same key 
reasons for the introduction of plea bargaining. They are linked to joint problems 
which these countries and their legal systems have started to face ever since the 
period of the Yugoslav war in the 1990s and the collapse of the legal, economical 
and values system; those are the inefficiency of criminal proceedings, and the 
growing number and complexity of criminal cases. The introduction of plea 
bargaining practice was aimed at improving the efficiency of criminal procedures 
in these countries.     
Every comparative analysis enables studying the issue from various angles and in 
a wider context. In my research it can help in identifying good and functional 
solutions to the common plea bargaining problems of the countries involved, as 
well as learning from either the successes or failures of other judiciaries. The 
overall initial impression of the slightly greater success of Serbia and Croatia in 
the application of plea bargaining in comparison to Montenegro represents yet 
18 
 
one more additional motive for making a comparative analysis. When talking 
about success, it primarily means a larger percentage of cases resolved by plea 
bargaining which by definition in all of these countries involves the consent and 
satisfaction of all sides involved: the accused and her/his defense attorney, the 
prosecutor and the judge. An application of this institution which receives the 
firm approval of all the sides involved, surely leads to procedural efficiency and 
cost reduction, and a smaller workload for courts and prosecution lawyers; it can 
be considered a success of the criminal justice system in that sense.   
Specifically, when it comes to both countries being compared, I will study how 
the practice is legally regulated in these systems. A special focus will be put on 
identifying and elaborating differences in comparison to Montenegrin law. I will 
also provide statistics i.e. present the extent to which this institution is applied in 
practice in these countries in comparison to regular criminal trials.  These 
different segments analyzed and presented together will demonstrate the 
functionality of plea bargaining in these countries in comparison to Montenegro, 
whether there are major differences in legal regulation and in the level of 
implementation. Comparative analysis will particularly show whether there are 
certain legal solutions that seem to be the main catalysts of a larger application of 
the practice in the compared countries, and whether they should therefore be 
potentially implemented in the Montenegrin system.2  
Why should Plea Bargaining be researched in Montenegro? 
 
There are two main general reasons why I choose agreements on guilt and their 
application in Montenegro to be topic of my research. 
 
The first reason is that agreements on guilt represent an entirely new concept in 
the Montenegrin legal system. Due to this fact it is an almost completely 
unexplored area within the legal professional and academic community in 
Montenegro. There are number of articles and comments; however this is much 
less than this topic actually deserves, taking into account realistic circumstances 
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and potential of this practice. There is no major, in-depth analysis of the reasons 
which cause the agreements not to be used or analysis that offers concrete 
proposals on how to improve the situation in this area. As regards regional 
authors, the situation is somewhat better. This is probably because this legal 
institution has been applied in some of the neighboring countries for a little bit 
longer time, and also the fact that these countries have larger populations and 
consequently larger legal communities. However, logically, none of these regional 
studies focuses on Montenegro and the specificities of this small society and its 
legal and judicial system. Through my work I will present issues that are specific 
to Montenegro in this area, while taking into account the relevant research efforts 
of local, regional and international legal professionals and academic community 
members.  
The second reason for choosing plea bargaining as the topic of my research 
concerns the very specific period of time that Montenegro is going through at 
present. To be specific, in December 2010 it received candidate country status for 
membership of the European Union (EU). In parallel, in 2015 it received 
invitation to become a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), and the process of formalizing membership of this organization is 
ongoing. Ever since 2012 when the governments of all the EU countries 
unanimously agreed, the Montenegrin Government has been in the process of 
intensive EU membership negotiations. This has generally been done through 
continuous communication and exchange of information between the 
Montenegrin Government, on the one hand, and the EU on the other. Through this 
intensive and dynamic process the conditions and timing of the adoption, 
implementation and enforcement of EU law i.e. Acquis Communautaire (acquie) 
are being negotiated.3 In this context, some of the strongest requirements of the 
EU are directed towards strengthening judicial independence and improving the 
efficiency of court proceedings and the judicial system in general. One significant 
part of these complex integrative processes is the adoption and implementation of 
new laws and regulations, and large and extensive changes and amendments to 
the existing laws and practices in accordance with EU and international standards. 
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In light of the described massive reforms, I believe that my work has the potential 
to contribute to a better understanding of one of the legal institutions which is 
already a part of the Montenegrin legal system, and which is an alternative to 
classical criminal proceedings. This legal institution indubitably works in favor of 
the efficiency of the criminal justice system in general. The specific conclusions 
and recommendations presented in this work have the potential to be taken into 
consideration in the process of reforming the Montenegrin criminal justice system 
into a more functional and efficient one. 
Overview of Chapters that follow 
In accordance with what is presented above, this work will be divided in the 
following chapters: 
Chapter I – A Review of the Literature 
In this chapter, I will elaborate on the plea bargaining literature consulted during 
the research process. The focus will be on critically analyzing the existing works 
of international authors, bearing in mind the lack of relevant Montenegrin and 
regional authors. I will present the historical path of plea bargaining, the reasons 
and motives for its creation and development, as well as current observations and 
analyses related to this legal institution and its practical implementation. Both 
critical and positive views will be taken into account in order to provide an 
objective picture and the larger context when it comes to this practice.   
Chapter II – Methodology 
In this chapter, I will present and discuss the research approach and methods used 
in my work with a specific focus on the motives for choosing them, their special 
values in relation to the topic and the goals of my research, and why they have 
priority over other available methods. I will also present the process of the 
practical application of the chosen methods in the framework of my research.  
Chapter III – Plea Bargaining in Montenegro with some Comparative Practices 
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This chapter will contain findings on how and why plea bargaining was 
introduced into the Montenegrin legal system, how it is regulated in Montenegro, 
to what extent it is applied in practice and in what way. In line with this, this 
chapter will also contain a comparative component. I will give an overview of the 
present plea bargaining legal regulation and the practice of neighboring countries, 
Serbia and Croatia, which have similar legal systems. I will identify differences 
between the countries when it comes to plea bargaining, and determine which of 
the solutions and approaches that exist in Serbia and Croatia could eventually 
contribute to more fruitful plea bargaining implementation in Montenegro. Such 
analysis and overview will enable the detection of the right solutions and 
providing final recommendations for Montenegro in this field. 
Chapter IV – Analyses of the Results - The Interviews with Judges, Prosecutors 
and Defense Attorneys in Montenegro  
This chapter will include an analytical presentation of the results of interviews 
conducted with Montenegrin judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys in relation 
to plea bargaining practices. The interviews with five judges, five prosecutors and 
five defense attorneys were conducted so as to reveal the general perceptions and 
positions of the interviewees in relation to plea bargaining, discovering the 
motives that hide behind positive or negative opinions about it, finding out about 
their practical experiences in this regard being either successful or challenging, 
and getting suggestions related to future of plea bargaining in Montenegro. Those 
directly involved in the process are the ones who can provide valuable and unique 
practical input that can contribute to a better understanding of the reality of plea 
bargaining in Montenegro and defining useful conclusions and recommendations 
in this regard.  
Chapter V – Discussion of Key Findings 
In this chapter, key research findings will be presented and discussed. These 
findings will be based on the interviews results analysis. Together with the results 
of document analysis presented in Chapter III and discussions from other 
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chapters, they will serve as the basis for formulating relevant recommendations 
for the future. 
Chapter VI – Conclusion 
In this chapter, concrete recommendations related to plea bargaining in 
Montenegro will be provided. They will be based on research findings, and all the 
discussions and elaborations presented in the previous chapters. The 
recommendations will be targeted at improving the legal and practical framework 
of plea bargaining in Montenegro in line with such obvious tendencies of 
Montenegrin legislators and practitioners. 
In summary the aims of this study are: analyzing the quality of the legal 
regulation of plea bargaining in Montenegro; comparing plea bargaining practice 
in Montenegro with the practice in the neighboring countries of Serbia and 
Croatia; investigating the level of usage, usefulness and productiveness of plea 
bargaining institution in the criminal justice system of Montenegro; identifying 
problems in the application of plea bargaining in Montenegro, as well as 
successful schemes in the implementation of this practice; discovering the causes 
of challenges in the application of plea bargaining in Montenegro, as well as 
factors in the successes in implementation of this practice; and in line with these 
goals, providing adequate conclusions and recommendations which can be useful 
in the further development of the practice and study of this issue in Montenegro. 
These aims will be achieved primarily through the analysis of numerous relevant 
documents, and interviews with actors in plea bargaining practice in Montenegro. 
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CHAPTER I  
PLEA BARGAINING: PAST AND PRESENT   
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
This chapter will critically examine the literature on the definition and nature of 
plea bargaining; the relationship between plea bargaining and the concept of 
justice; a historical perspective of its application; its present status in the U.S. as 
its country of origin, as well as in a number of other countries which have 
different legal systems and traditions; supporting and opposing views on this 
practice; and finally the application of this legal instrument in international law.  
1.1. What is Plea Bargaining? 
When thinking about the definition of plea bargaining it is inevitable that we 
focus on the U.S. where this institution was born and is now present as the 
dominant way of resolving criminal cases. As already stressed in the Introduction, 
there is no single definition of plea bargaining. Various forms and definitions of 
the process called plea bargaining or negotiation on guilt or agreements on guilty 
plea or guilty pleas exist in different settings i.e. states, countries and at the level 
of international law; some are more and some less complicated, some are wide 
and others are quite narrow. However, many, if not most of them, include some 
form of negotiations between the prosecutor and the defendant in relation to the 
charges or sentence or even facts as a way to avoid a long and expensive trial with 
an uncertain ending, and with a mostly supervisory and controlling role of the 
court which makes sure that process is not misapplied. Many definitions stress the 
compromise in plea negotiations in which both sides have to give up their initial 
expected goal; for the accused this goal is not to be sentenced at all, while for the 
prosecutor it is to get a conviction with a fully adequate sentence.4   
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Plea bargaining generally anticipates charge bargaining and sentence bargaining. 
There is one more type of plea bargaining present in the U.S. which is called fact 
bargaining where the prosecutor and defendant basically bargain about the facts 
of the case. Unlike charge and sentence bargaining which are widespread and 
prevailing practices, fact bargaining is not but it does exist. In this form of 
bargaining the prosecutor and defendant are “stipulating…to facts or to 
applications of factors” (King, 2005, p.295) which ultimately affects sentencing. 
Purdey’s (1996) citing of the Probation Officers Advisory Group’s report (p.331) 
which says that “plea agreements do not always represent the true facts of the 
case” clearly refers to the existence of fact bargaining. The same can be 
concluded from the U.S. Supreme Court dissenting opinion of Judge Stevens in 
the case the U.S. v. Booker to which King (2005, p. 297) refers in his work: 
“…fact bargaining is ‘quite common under the current system’.”         
 
Two additional main sub-types of plea bargaining, also typical of the U.S., are 
worth mentioning for the purpose of illustrating the richness and complexity of 
this practice in this country. Those are the so-called nolo contendere and Alford 
pleas. The first refers to situations when defendants “refuse to admit guilt but 
accept punishment as if guilty.”, while the second refers to situations where 
“defendants plead guilty while simultaneously protesting their innocence.” (Bibas, 
2007, p.1363). The complexity of such practices are further explained by Bibas 
(2007) writing about the U.S. North Carolina v. Alford (1970)5 case in which 
Henry Alford, who was charged with first-degree murder and faced strong 
evidence, pled guilty to second-degree murder and a non-capital crime while at 
the same time protested his innocence. The U.S. Supreme Court supported such 
practice and in this case it “….held that defendants may knowingly and 
voluntarily plead guilty even while protesting their innocence if the judge finds 
‘strong evidence of [the defendant’s] actual guilt’”. (p.1372). The mentioned sub-
types of plea bargaining that are applied both at federal and states level, clearly 
demonstrate the obvious need for extreme procedural efficiency and practicality 
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present in the U.S. legal system which is quite often questioned by historical, as 
well as contemporary U.S. authors.  
 
Even though typical for the U.S., different forms and variations of plea bargaining 
exist in many other countries on different continents and with different legal 
systems and traditions.6  It is used for all types of crimes, from misdemeanors 
through more serious crimes or felonies and all the way to war crimes. The most 
obvious universal reasons for using it are, on the one hand, the efficiency and 
lower cost of proceedings, as well as a guaranteed conviction for the prosecutor, 
and, on the other, the criminal’s certainty of a less severe charge or shorter 
sentence. 
 
As already mentioned, Montenegro is one of the countries which did recognize 
the need to have plea bargaining as part of its legal system. The regulation of this 
practice in Montenegro will be discussed in more details later. Essentially, the 
Montenegrin legal system limits plea bargaining to sentences only, without the 
opportunity to bargain about charges. On the other hand, sentence bargaining is 
allowed in Montenegro for all crimes except war crimes and terrorism related 
offences. 
 
Even though there is general agreement and understanding about essence of this 
institution and its purpose, it has always had its strong promoters and opponents. 
This ongoing dispute and rivalry is present not just in the academic sphere, but 
also at the practical level. Most interestingly, the dispute is very much present in 
the U.S. itself, whose criminal justice system practically relies on negotiated 
guilty pleas and functions thanks to this way of resolving a majority of criminal 
cases.  
 
1.2. Situating Plea Bargaining in the Theoretical Framework of Justice  
Before going into a further elaboration of plea bargaining, there is one primary 
question that naturally arises when talking about this practice and inevitably 
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represents a starting point: Can we bargain about guilt, and is it justice? As 
already stressed, in a broader sense this question represents the core of any 
criticism directed towards the plea bargaining practice; it targets its ethical and 
judicial elements which are actually its weakest and most controversial parts. 
When we are faced with the concept of justice as such, this is a completely 
understandable and justified question asked by many authors, as well as members 
of the general public who are in the end also the final users of the existing 
advantages of this legal instrument. Issues of moral correctness i.e. ethics, 
fairness, equality and rationality, generally linked to the perception of justice, are 
rightfully raised when talking about providing lenient treatment and lower 
sentences to somebody who  did actually commit a crime, because of the fact that 
person promptly pleads guilty and by such action contributes to the efficiency of 
the whole process. Raising these issues becomes ever more justified in those 
cases, that I will discuss further in the text, when a crime is admitted by 
somebody who did not actually commit it, again for the reasons of the efficiency 
and practicality of the criminal proceeding.  
 
Therefore, when talking about plea bargaining the issue of justice is inevitable. 
Essentially, the assumption is that the main purpose of the criminal process as of 
any other judicial process is to reach justice in a fair procedure. I will start from 
this assumption without discussing the other possible goals of the criminal justice 
system, like the claims that the main goal of the criminal justice system is actually 
the protection of the interests of the powerful, who are the ones who create the 
definitions of good and bad behavior in line with their own interests. This issue is 
nicely discussed by Reiman (2016).  
 
In the context of the criminal justice system’s goal of reaching justice, it may be 
said that plea bargaining represents a shortened way of reaching justice with 
negotiations about guilt involved. The main questions one may ask are: Does this 
represents justice at all, or rather a kind of deviation from justice?; and also, Is 
that acceptable and for what reasons? The answers largely depend on how one 
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defines justice, and what the way to reach it in the existing reality and given 
framework of the criminal and penal law is. If we consider Aristotle’s thinking 
about “natural justice” or “universal law” that is based on natural rules and 
supersedes “conventional justice” created by community (Thomson, 1953, cited 
by Vieru, 2012, p. 117), it is clear that bargaining over guilt as a product of 
socially created law can be questioned in most cases since it is not in line with a 
natural feeling for justice. Simply, it is not in accordance with the rules of nature 
to bargain about guilt, at least when the most serious crimes are in question.  
 
The main critique of the plea bargaining process, however, may derive from 
theories of retributive justice which concern “punishment for wrongdoing”. They 
are based on theories of natural law and order; and are a relevant part of all 
present legal systems and societies. By proper punishment for wrongdoing, the 
natural order of things is restored and the harm done is compensated for. In line 
with this, when discussing elements of justice in the context of penal law Kant 
(1999, p.138) says: “…The law concerning punishment is a categorical 
imperative, and woe to him who rummages around in the winding paths of a 
theory of happiness looking for some advantaged to be gained by releasing the 
criminal from punishment or by reducing the amount of it…”. Even though 
extreme forms of punishment theories that follow the principle “an eye for an 
eye” are outdated and not part of modern criminal law, if you ask any ordinary 
citizen, or perhaps better a potential victim of crime, whether s/he agrees with the 
above statement, there is a great likelihood that the answer of the majority would 
be in some way positive. Most would possibly support that old retributivist Hegel 
who called a criminal a “breaker” and “a heated, disarmed and cast-down enemy” 
(Hegel, 1897, cited by Materni, 2013, p.276) who deserves social punishment. A 
retributive theory of being punished for a committed crime by a sentence adequate 
to the seriousness of crime is a key barrier that can always be placed in front of 
the plea bargaining practice since this practice by itself implies a non-adequacy of 
sentence. However, as Lippke says, when discussing the relationship between 
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retributivism and plea bargaining, “contemporary plea bargaining practices 
diverge significantly from retributive requirements” (2010, p. 15).  
 
Some research participants that I interviewed, for example judge J4 (for 
participants’ coding please see Chapter IV) openly express worries about the 
sanction’s adequacy to the crime committed, and even ask the question:  “Who 
guarantees that what the accused said is true?”  While discussing retributive 
justice, particularly the role of vengeance in sentencing, Materni (2013, p. 288) 
who is not supporter of revenge as the main principle which “shapes” the criminal 
justice system, cites in his work a number of modern authors whose retributive 
theoretical arguments may be used against plea bargaining as an “unjust” practice. 
Specifically, Materni (2013, p. 278) cites Primoratz (1989) who says that “justice 
is to treat offenders according to their deserts, to give them what they deserve”, or 
Robinson (2010) who claims that “doing justice [is] punishing offenders for the 
crimes they commit.” These understandings of justice are clearly opposite to the 
process of bargaining over guilt in which the criminal obviously gets either a 
sentence for a less serious crime than the one s/he actually committed, or s/he gets 
a lesser sentence just because s/he pled guilty for the crime s/he did commit, and 
in both cases it is not “natural” and deserved sentence.7  
 
Furthermore, the utilitarian theory of deterrence examines the benefit to the whole 
society in the context of justice and criminal and penal law i.e. "it is the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong" as 
founder of utilitarianism Bentham said (Burns, 2005, cites Bentham, 1776, p.46). 
The deterrence theory which in its simplest form was established more than 2000 
years ago by Plato is focused on the preventive character of sentencing and the 
demotivation of the perpetrator to repeat the crime. Plato suggests looking into the 
future and “punishing for the sake of prevention.”(Jowett, 2009, cited by Materni, 
2013, p. 289) unlike the retributivists whose focus is on a crime committed in the 
past and its consequences. The contemporary form of deterrence theory that 
includes both general and special, i.e. individual aspects of the prevention of 
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crime, is very much part of modern criminal law as well. General prevention is 
achieved through “threatening” society with sanctions defined by law, while 
special prevention is realized through the incarceration and rehabilitation or 
“healing” of a specific criminal. However, one everlasting question regularly 
posed by many authors is how large the actual deterrence effect of criminal law 
and sentencing is. This is especially so considering that almost everywhere the 
prison population is quite large and that the there are many repeat criminals who 
are evident proof of the questionability of taking exclusively this approach. Even 
though, for example Materni (2013, p.291) refers to a number of studies which 
specifically show small positive effects especially when it comes to special i.e. 
individual crime prevention8, this question still remains open.  
 
If we link this theory with plea bargaining practice, in a broad sense, this practice 
does serve society as a whole by contributing to the efficiency of the criminal 
justice system which makes everybody “happy”. The results of the interviews I 
conducted during my research demonstrate exactly this, an obvious satisfaction 
with the social benefit the practice brings, but it is less likely to serve as a general 
prevention of crime. The question of whether this can be at least slightly changed 
though larger public exposure of this legal institution, which is suggested by some 
interviewed participants, may be a justified one though.9 Based on the results of 
his study, Smith concluded that the plea bargaining practice is “neutral” when it 
comes to the “deterrence effect of law”, it rather “allows prosecutors to pursue 
more cases than otherwise would be possible” by which the practice contributes 
“to the general deterrent effectiveness of legal sanctions” (1986, p. 966). We can 
still ask: Is this practice just, or it is just practical? From an individual oriented 
perspective, it can be said that plea bargaining “favors” a specific criminal for the 
sake of efficiency, and perceived in this way, it may have effects of crime 
prevention when it comes to the specific individual involved in the process. 
Exactly this is stressed by the interviewed attorney A3 (for participants’ coding 
please see Chapter IV). Generally, however, the discussed deterrence theoretical 
approach is questionable in the context of plea bargaining. As Niggli (2012, p. 6) 
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stresses, all preventive theories are detached from the principle of guilt and 
individual justice. This makes them not fully “compatible” with plea bargaining, 
which is dominantly focused on the issues of individual guilt. From the viewpoint 
of preventive deterrence theories, it is probable that plea bargaining cannot serve 
general crime prevention purposes, even though to some extent it may be 
effective when it comes to individual prevention; however, the main issue of plea 
bargaining fairness still remains. 
 
When discussing justice in the context of plea bargaining, another modern 
theoretical perception of justice which is relevant is so-called restorative justice, 
dating from the second half of the 20th century. It is focused on restoring the 
harm that was done by a crime, but with a primary view on those involved i.e. the 
criminal and the victim. One of the known promoters of the restorative justice 
theory, Howard Zehr (2003, p.40), defines it “as a process to involve…those who 
have a stake in a specific offense to collectively identify and address harms, needs 
and obligations” with the purpose to “heal and put things as right as possible.” 
Zehr stresses that unlike retributive justice whose primary focus is on the 
“violation of law”, the focus of restorative justice is on the “violation of people 
and relationships” (Zehr, 1990, cited by Gavrielides, 2007, p. 24).  
 
One of the problematic issues when it comes to plea bargaining practice is 
actually related to the marginal role of victims in the whole process. As I will 
discuss later, this represents a concern for some participants in my research as 
well who called for greater involvement of the injured party in the whole process. 
In the U.S., for example, the role of the victim in the process is minimal i.e. non-
existent. Some authors see the victim as someone who basically “lost participation 
in his own case” (Christie, 1977, p. 7). Restorative justice theories put the focus 
on the relationship between perpetrator and victim in the framework of the 
criminal procedure, with the goal of “correcting the situation”.  
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On the one hand, plea bargaining is very fruitful grounds to apply restorative 
justice mechanisms when it comes to less serious crimes or financial crimes. For 
example, very often a financial restitution is part of plea agreements related to 
financial crimes. Some of the interviewees involved in my research praised the 
practice exactly because from their own experiences it brings “settlement between 
parties”. On the other hand, one would expect that the restorative justice concept 
and plea bargaining would be least acceptable for the most serious crimes, like 
war crimes for example. The concept of natural justice seems the prevailing one 
here. However, restorative justice and guilty pleas have found their way into this 
area as well. When Combs writes about the restorative justice approach and guilty 
pleas in international law (2007, p.154) she concludes that a defendant’s guilty 
plea, when functioning on a restorative justice model, provides information to the 
prosecutor, the victims and society about atrocities which would otherwise not be 
possible to know about, and it also enables the greater involvement of victims in 
comparison to typical criminal cases where guilty pleas are used. According to 
this author, plea bargaining is a way to reach restorative justice in such cases.10  
 
In most of the theoretical and practical discussions, reaching justice is seen as the 
primary goal of the criminal proceedings. This should be continuously present in 
the minds of all of those who decide about justice, regardless of the ways they 
perceive and understand it. In some cases, plea bargaining might be taken into 
consideration as a helpful tool in this complex process.    
  
1.3. Historical Overview 
Some logical questions that the one would ask about plea bargaining before 
examining the current situation, include how old this practice is, where it 
originates from, and why and how it was developed. In answering these questions 
is it again necessary to focus on the U.S. where this legal institution was 
established and where it has the longest history. While in the other common law 
countries plea bargaining does not have a strong formal basis, in the U.S. it has a 
long history of firm formal existence as well. On the other hand, when it comes to 
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civil law countries, including Montenegro, it is obviously not a legal instrument 
inherent to such legal systems which by their nature give the judge a major role in 
the criminal process and do not naturally allow “bargaining” between the parties. 
If it exists, this practice is a true novelty in the legal systems of these countries. 
Regardless of the long American history of plea bargaining, it is still not easy to 
answer all the legitimate questions mentioned above. The obvious problem that 
every plea bargaining researcher faces when dealing with the historical 
perspective of this practice is unfortunately a lack of proper evidence and 
documentation. Friedman (1979, p.247-248) says that “the history of plea 
bargaining is a fairly blank chapter in the history of criminal justice”. He further 
suggests that “there was some sort of plea bargaining in the nineteenth century, at 
least in certain places”, but that there were no systematic studies before 1880. 
According to him there were only some sporadic allusions to this practice in the 
1860s. In order to illustrate this, he mentions two specific cases. One concerns the 
United Kingdom11 where Friedman cites a letter from the Home Office12 to a 
magistrate in Southwark complaining about offenders who were pleading guilty to 
a charge of "stealing from a person" in order to avoid a charge of robbery which 
carried a heavier penalty. The other case concerns the U.S; by citing Miller 
(1977:80) Friedman describes a case from the same historical period when the 
New York District Attorney “encouraged defendants to plead guilty to lesser 
offenses”, but stresses that such bargains were "always under the table".  
 
The very first information which most of the historical plea bargaining research 
will provide is that it appeared in the U.S. in the nineteenth century. However, 
different authors approach the issue of the time of its foundation in different ways. 
To some extent it is indicative that opponents of plea bargaining consider it a 
relatively new phenomenon in legal history, originating from the nineteenth 
century, and claim that it “was essentially unknown during most of the history of 
the common law” (Alschuler, 1979, p.4). However, those who are in favor of plea 
bargaining stress its longer history. For example, Justice William Erickson of the 
Colorado Supreme Court wrote that “charge and sentence concessions to secure 
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pleas of guilty are, and always have been, part and parcel of our criminal justice 
system."(Erickson, 1973, cited by Alschuler, 1979, p.2).13 The conclusion which 
can be drawn is that the time which one considers the beginning of plea 
bargaining largely depends on how we treat the informal plea bargaining practices 
which have obviously existed for quite a long time. Evidently, some authors see 
these informal practices as “real” plea bargaining, while some do not, probably 
depending on their own general personal attitudes and feelings about the practice. 
 
Furthermore, the differences between pleading guilty, i.e. confession as such, and 
plea bargaining as a process that includes negotiation on guilt, are also very 
important in the historical observation of plea bargaining processes. Interestingly, 
this differentiation between the two also arose amongst the Montenegrin 
participants of my research who discussed it for different reasons, some claiming 
that the whole process is much more simple when a standard confession is in 
question, while others stressed that those who plead guilty in the framework of 
plea bargaining are essentially better treated than those who regularly just confess 
a crime. When this differentiation is put into historical perspective, Dervan writes 
(2012, p.58) that “while the right to plead guilty dates back to English common 
law traditions, a new phenomenon began to appear in America shortly after the 
Civil War.” By referring to Aschuler (1979) he further explains that in this 
historical period the state courts in the U.S. started to receive a great number of 
appeals that were related to “apparent bargains” between prosecutors and 
defendants. It is evident that the bargains were appealed and that this was not a 
widely welcomed practice. On the other hand, it is also interesting to learn about 
the courts’ response to these appeals and forms of plea bargains. Dervan (2012, 
p.58-59) again by referring to Alschuler (1979, p. 20) explains that “with 
resounding frequency, these early experiments with bargained justice were 
rejected by the judiciary.”, and he further quotes the relevant court wording of 
that time. 
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However, regardless of the evidently quite long existence of such informal types 
of bargaining over guilt and the negative initial attitude of the judiciary towards 
this process, a big rise of the plea bargaining practice essentially similar to its 
present form happened in the 1920s. Fisher (2003, p. 6-11) who is one of the most 
well-known contemporary plea bargaining authors, in his famous book about the 
history of plea bargaining in America entitled Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, talks 
about “three waves of historical scholarship”. All three strongly reflect the 
realities of the three major periods of the development of the plea bargaining 
practice.  
 
According to Fisher (2003, p. 6) the first wave in the 1920s and early 1930s 
“marked the true age of plea bargaining discovery.” The practice at that time was 
found to be informal, but pretty regular and widespread. According to Fisher, 
Miller (1927) and Moley (1928) were the authors who most contributed to the 
discovery of unofficial plea bargains which existed in the prosecutorial practice of 
that time. Their contribution was not important just from the angle of revealing 
the practice, but also from the point of clarifying the leading motives that stood 
behind it. Through their works Miller and Moley reached the conclusion that the 
key factors for the initial establishment of this practice were the efficiency of the 
judicial procedure, and the “easy victories” which prosecutors would reach this 
way.14 These factors seem to remain obvious and universal key catalysts for the 
introduction of the practice everywhere, including in Montenegro, which will be 
discussed later. One of Moley’s main findings of that time which Fisher calls 
striking (2003, p.7) is “that of 13,117 felony prosecutions begun in Chicago in 
1926, only 209 ended in convictions by a jury. He [Moley] declared that the worst 
aspect of the already dominant plea bargaining regime was its invisibility." Fisher 
(2002, p.7) further refers to Miller (1927) who also talked about the invisibility of 
the practice, and particularly the easiness of prosecutors’ “indulgence” in 
bargaining with the absence of any public interest. Led by such a surprising 
discovery, Moley further investigated the specific reasons which stood behind the 
practice; and he concluded that it was happening due to “caseload pressure” 
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(Fisher, 2003, p.8).15 Fisher finds Moley’s conclusions related to “caseload 
pressure” a particularly relevant contribution to plea bargaining research in those 
early times. Many would agree with him, and would see these findings as crucial 
for the further study of the previously mentioned “practicality” of the U.S. legal 
system which, as it seems, was born out of necessity.  
 
According to Fisher, the second wave of plea bargaining scholarship happened in 
the 1970s, and its main representatives are Heumann (1975), Langbein (1978), 
and Friedman and Percival (1983). They all focused their research on the motives 
that stood behind the obvious growing trend of plea bargaining practice of that 
time. Heumann was devoted to the further examination of the relationship 
between plea bargaining and caseload pressure. Fisher concludes (2003, p. 9) that 
with his work Heumann “opened the gates to a flood of new theories of plea 
bargaining’s rise.” Specifically, Heumann conducted research which included 
analysis and comparison of data and statistics related to guilty pleas and caseloads 
in different counties of the State of Connecticut. His research resulted in the 
conclusion that “the notion that plea bargaining and case pressure go together 
must be reexamined… It should now be evident that guilty pleas will be proffered 
and accepted for reasons other than case pressure…  (Heumann, 1975, p.527). By 
this Heumann did not completely exclude the influence of caseload pressure on 
plea bargaining, but stressed the existence of other factors as well. His study 
marked the beginning of an intensive scholarly examination of the various 
potential reasons for the significant development of this practice at that time. 
When writing about this new direction that scholars took while researching plea 
bargaining Fisher (2003, p.9) further refers to Langbein who“…argued that plea 
bargaining arose because trial rules had grown so complex…”.16 In order to 
illustrate his claim Langbein17 (1978, p.15) used the case of North Carolina v. 
Alford which I have already discussed18. When it comes to other authors of the 
“second wave” Fisher noticed (2003, p.10) that Friedman and Percival, “looked to 
the role that increasingly sophisticated policing and evidence-gathering 
techniques may have played in the development of plea bargaining.” However, he 
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sees no proven link between the two, and further refers to McConville and Mirsky 
(1995) who also did not find a direct link between the development of policing 
and investigative techniques, and rise of the guilty pleas in the empirical study 
they conducted.  
 
Finally, according to Fisher (2003, p.10) third wave representatives from the 
1990s include Vogel (1999) and Ferdinand (1992), as well as the already 
mentioned McConville and Mirsky (1995). The research of contemporary authors 
in comparison to the work of  earlier, particularly “first wave”, authors has been 
clearly done in quite a different realistic setting when it comes to the phenomenon 
they examine i.e. plea bargaining. Over the last decades this practice has 
represented the dominant way of resolving criminal cases in the U.S.; this will be 
discussed later in more detail. It is practically the model of functioning of the U.S. 
criminal justice system, which is continuously being developed, but at the same 
time questioned, analyzed and discussed. The need for continuous discussion 
arises, on the one hand, from the relatively controversial nature of this legal 
institution which imposes the justice dilemmas described earlier in my work, and 
on the other hand from the constant development of innovate approaches to its 
practical implementation. The ethical aspect of plea bargaining, and procedural 
issues in relation to its application, are the main focus of modern discussions in 
this area. In his work Fisher concludes (2003, p.11) that all the named authors 
agree about the three major issues crucial to the proper and reliable study of plea 
bargaining practice: any conclusions in relation to the factors which cause an 
expansion of plea bargaining must rely on analysis of the actual cases;  “this 
empirical undertaking … must embrace both statistical overviews and individual 
case histories”; and any such analysis must include not just courts i.e. actors in the 
process, but must take into account  “larger political and social realities, including 
community attitudes toward plea bargaining.”.19  However, he further notices that 
all the modern authors to a great extent neglect to research the role of judges in 
this process, and judges were the ones who actually took the long road from strict 
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rejecting of the practice in the past to generally strong supporting plea bargaining 
at present. 
 
Bearing in mind the nature and scope of my own research, I found Fisher’s 
general conclusions related to researching plea bargaining useful, particularly 
when it comes to incorporating actual cases, statistics and the individual 
experiences of those who participate in the process. Only after all the named 
elements are taken into account can a reliable picture about the practice be 
created, which can actually serve as solid historical material for future plea 
bargaining researchers.  
 
1.4. Plea Bargaining at Present – The U.S.A. 
 
Some Statistics for Illustration 
 
Regardless of all the barriers and challenges that plea bargaining has faced on its 
historical path in the U.S., it has survived. Today it is definitely the prevailing 
way of resolving criminal cases in this country. A large majority of cases are 
resolved by plea agreements which include bargaining between the prosecutor and 
the accused. In relation to the research conducted on plea and charge bargaining 
in the U.S., Devers writes (2011, p. 1-3): “While there are no exact estimates of 
the proportion of cases that are resolved through plea bargaining, scholars 
estimate that about 90 to 95 percent of both federal and state court cases are 
resolved through this process…The overwhelming majority…of cases result in 
plea bargaining.” Taylor Shannon (2007, p. 1) concludes similarly: “Most 
criminal cases in federal courts are resolved not by trials, but by plea bargains.” 20 
The American courts’ statistics clearly demonstrates such a prevalence of plea 
bargaining practice in comparison to a classical trial. 
  
From 1990 to 2013, 89% of all the cases in front of the Federal U.S. District 
Courts ended with a plea of guilty. For example, the U.S. District Courts annual 
38 
 
statistics say that in 2014 out of 76,835 convicted and sentenced people, 75,035 
pleaded guilty and the rest went to trial.21 The statistics of different states are 
similar. In one of the smallest and one of the biggest U.S. states, Delaware and 
California, the situation is similar in this sense. The Delaware Judiciary Statistical 
Annual Report for 2014 says that 70.2 % of all the criminal dispositions in front 
of the Superior Court ended in a guilty plea.22 According to California Courts 
Statistics Report for 2014, in a fiscal year 2012-2013, out of 241,238 felony 
dispositions, 195,389 felony cases were disposed with a guilty plea before the 
trial.23  
 
Regardless of the fact of whether they are in favor or against plea bargaining, 
many modern authors primarily stress the extremely high percentage of criminal 
cases resolved this way. It is simply a reality.   
 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s Affirmation of and Support for Plea Bargaining 
 
In its relatively long history it is to be expected that plea bargaining practice has 
been challenged in front of the U.S. Supreme Court as the last instance, the 
Constitutional Court in the U.S. judicial system. However, it survived such types 
of barriers too, and at present it is a fully constitutional practice strongly 
supported by the U.S. Supreme Court. This Court started to deal with the 
constitutionality of plea bargaining quite long after it had actually been practically 
established and implemented. There are a few decisions of this Court from recent 
history which should be mentioned in this context, and which represent true 
milestones in the application of this institution. They all contributed not just to its 
formal verification, but also to the further strengthening of its position in the U.S. 
criminal justice system and its complex development.  
 
The very first issue that was challenged in the Supreme Court concerned the 
voluntarism of the expressed plea of guilty in the famous case of Brady v. the U.S. 
24 (1970). In this case, the defendant, Brady, claimed that his guilty plea was made 
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due to fear and that it was coerced by the fact that prosecution could have asked 
for the death penalty if he went to trial and did not plead guilty. The Court dealt 
with three major points in its judgments. First of all, it used the opportunity to 
fully support the plea bargaining practice as such which is the historical outcome 
of this case. By defining plea bargaining as a practice “inherent in the criminal 
law and its administration”, for the first time the Court openly favored the practice 
and cleared the path to its further development. Furthermore, when it comes to 
checking the way in which the guilty plea was expressed i.e. whether it was 
expressed voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly, the Court introduced a 
standard to review a whole set of circumstances in which the guilty plea was 
made in order to make a final judgment about the quality of plea.  It stressed that 
“the voluntariness of … plea can be determined only by considering all of the 
relevant circumstances surrounding it.” And finally, the Supreme Court expressed 
its trust in the courts’ estimation of the quality of expressed guilt whenever the 
defendant is “competent” and has “adequate advice of counsel”. In defending its 
position, the Court stressed that in Brady’s case the defendant had testified twice 
in front of the relevant courts that he was voluntarily pleading guilty; bearing in 
mind his determined competence and adequate defense this was found to be 
enough of a guarantee of the good quality of his will.  
 
After this judgment was adopted, it initiated a series of other decisions by which 
the Supreme Court further supported plea bargaining practice and “set its position 
in stone” when it comes to the U.S. criminal justice system.  Alchuler (1979, 
p.40) refers to Brady v. the U.S., as well as the case of Santobello v. New York25 
(1971), and writes that “by 1970” the Supreme Court “…in a series of decisions 
which implied that any other course would be unthinkable … upheld the propriety 
of plea bargaining.” By Santobello v. New York, the Supreme Court not only 
reaffirmed plea bargaining as a legal institution, but also entered into a deeper 
discussion of the issue of plea agreement withdrawal, and the consequences of 
such an action. To clarify, in this case the issue of using a legal remedy was 
indirectly questioned in situations when a plea agreement was reached through 
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negotiations and then not respected by the prosecution in later stages, as happened 
to the defendant Santobello in this case. In its judgment, first of all, the Court 
again stressed the importance of plea bargaining. It clearly said that if “Properly 
administered [plea bargaining], it is to be encouraged.” This time it additionally 
advertised the general reasons for its strong support, and identified case pressure 
as the main one. As the Court said: “If every criminal charge were subjected to a 
full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by 
many times the number of judges and court facilities.” Finally, it answered the 
question of the non-respect of the reached plea agreement and explained that 
“…when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the 
prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, 
such promise must be fulfilled.” Those were more than clear guidelines which 
provided additional “shot in the arm” to the plea bargaining practice.  
 
This was, however, just the beginning. All the future Supreme Court practice was 
obviously in favor of plea bargaining; as Casper (1979, p.568) says by referring to 
cases of Brady v. the U.S. (1970), Santobello v. New York (1971), North Carolina 
v. Alford (1970), and Bordenkircher v. Hayes26 (1978), “The Supreme Court has 
rejected several constitutional challenges to the practice and endorsed it as an 
appropriate and legitimate means of handling criminal cases…” 
This Court has been dealing, and still does deal, with the various aspects of plea 
bargaining in its decisions. Each new plea bargaining Supreme Court case has 
contributed another affirmative dimension and has enriched the practice. Some 
cases are very illustrative in this sense. For example, in the mentioned 
Bordenkircher v. Hayes (1978) case, the Court decided that it is not unreasonable 
for a prosecutor to ask for an enhanced sentence when the defendant refuses to 
take guilty plea. In other words, the Court’s position is that the prosecutor has a 
legitimate interest to persuade the defendant to plead guilty. Other, more recent 
and well-known examples are the cases Lafler v. Cooper27 (2012) and Missouri v. 
Frye28 (2012). As Work writes (2014, p.486), “The Supreme Court’s 
acknowledgement in Frye and Lafler” is ‘that plea bargaining is the primary way 
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that the criminal justice system functions’.” As he further explains, in these cases 
the Court reiterated defense attorneys’ existing ethical responsibilities to properly 
inform the defendants about plea offers and their merits, so that they can make 
informed and voluntary decision about their plea.  
 
These cases have been briefly presented in order to illustrate the continuous and 
dynamic development of the affirmative practice of the U.S. Supreme Court when 
it comes to plea bargaining. Through its cases a clean and wide road of plea 
bargaining implementation in the U.S. was opened a long time ago, and, as can be 
seen, this road is still being strongly protected by the highest judicial institution of 
this country.   
 
Ongoing and Everlasting Discussions - Opponents and Supporters of Plea 
Bargaining in the U.S.  
 
Despite the fact that guilty plea negotiations have conquered the legal system of 
the U.S., there has always been a significant number of not just those who 
promote and worship this institution, but also not a small number of strong 
opponents and major critics. Gazal (2005, p.4) writes that “Very few issues in the 
American criminal justice system generate such fierce controversy as plea 
bargaining…” The main points of the debate in this area focus on the issue of the 
constitutionality of this practice in the context of constitutionally guaranteed 
rights like the right to trial and the right against self-incrimination; the issue of 
innocence i.e. the possibility of innocent people being convicted; the issue of the 
coercive nature of plea bargaining imposed by the government; the issue of the 
nature and quality of negotiations i.e. the equality of arms in this process and 
prosecutorial sentence manipulation; the issue of the contractual nature of the plea 
agreement and the will expressed by the parties in this context; the issue of the 
balance between criminal procedure efficiency and the right to trial; the issue of 
the power which is given to a prosecutor by this institution and the position of the 
judge in the process, and other similar issues. Most of the arguments against plea 
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bargaining can be narrowed down to a care for the defendant’s rights and 
innocence, and for the overall purpose of the criminal justice system which is 
seeking the truth and reaching justice. Most of the arguments in favor of plea 
bargaining focus on increasing the efficiency and reducing the costs of the 
criminal proceedings; the impossibility of the criminal justice system to function 
without plea negotiations; the defendants’ benefit in avoiding a harsher sentence, 
and the prosecutors’ and judges’ benefits of reducing the caseload and saving 
time. 
 
The sensitive issue of innocence is naturally the first one that evokes harsh 
reactions from the opponents of plea bargaining. When it comes to plea 
bargaining this issue can be generally observed from two perspectives: from the 
perspective of innocent people being convicted, or guilty people being minimally 
punished. As many believe, in both of these cases the requirements of justice are 
not fulfilled. In their discussion many authors start from the obvious and existent 
U.S. practice of innocent people pleading guilty with the purpose of avoiding the 
severe sentence that they could potentially receive if they go to trial. The already 
mentioned Alschuler who calls the whole process “ inherently unfair and 
irrational” (1981, p.652) was particularly focused on the question of innocence. 
He believed that the danger of convicting an innocent person was much larger 
with plea bargaining then with a regular trial (1981, p.716). He interestingly 
describes a person who pleads guilty as “half-guilty” since the person “…can 
properly receive half the penalty that he would receive if he were really guilty.”  
(1981, p.706). Another author who dealt with the innocence issue in the 
framework of bargaining over guilt is Schulhofer, a major opponent of plea 
bargaining practice. He directly and openly calls for the abolition of the practice, 
describes it is as a “disaster” and claims that “plea agreements…deny defendants 
the benefits of a vigorous defense and inflict undeserved punishment on innocents 
who could win acquittal at trial.” (1992, p. 2009). More recently Podgor (2010, 
p.77-78) has also discussed the relationship between plea bargaining and 
innocence and claims that there is a problematic “message being sent today…that 
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trials carry enormous risk, and even if innocent, the best route may be to proceed 
with a finding of guilt or deferred prosecution.” Furthermore, Dervan and Edkins 
(2013, p.48) point out the innocence problem hidden behind plea bargaining and 
even propose rechecking the constitutionality of the practice in light of the large 
number of innocent defendants who plead guilty. In this context, they believe that 
the plea bargaining of the present time is nothing like plea bargaining in the 1970s 
which was the Supreme Court’s starting point in the Brady case. These arguments 
are obviously related to the U.S. legal system. It is, however, interesting to view 
them from the perspective of civil law systems. These systems do not have a 
prevailing practice of plea agreements; on the contrary, the trial remains the key 
way of resolving criminal cases. In that context, the argument that a great number 
of innocent people plead guilty by logic is far from the reality of civil law 
systems.29   
 
A logical following question some would ask, particularly those coming from 
civil law systems in which the determining of truth by the court is a founding 
principle of the criminal procedure, is: Why would (presumably) innocent 
defendants plead guilty? This question is especially legitimate when we know that 
the earlier described nolo contendere and Alford pleas30 exist in the U.S. legal 
system. It is justified to think that a constructed criminal justice system as such 
“forces” the defendants to do this for the purpose of efficiency and certainty, at 
least in some cases. Obviously when one is faced with an extremely severe 
threatened sentence and not a small potential to be convicted at trial where a jury 
decides on guilt, then perhaps admitting guilt and receiving a significantly lower 
sentence looks more attractive. When discussing the general purpose of the 
criminal procedure and the position of plea bargaining in relation to that, 
Alschuler focuses on the effects of the criminal justice system on plea bargaining 
practice. He claims (1981, p.705) that the U.S. criminal system is designed in a 
way to influence behavior by the extremely severe sentences it imposes.” As he 
describes, “the purpose of this system certainly is not to make everybody 
happy…Indeed, in most nations of the world…American plea bargaining 
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apparently is regarded as a reductio ad absurdum of our nation's commercial 
mentality." He claims that plea bargaining is not consistent with the “objectives of 
the criminal law and with the distinctive technique of social control that it 
embodies.” He finally suggests (1982, p.690) that it is important to ensure that the 
interests of defendants and the state are not “subordinated” to the interests of the 
criminal justice system. Lynch (2003, p.24) is an author who also elaborates on 
this coercive force of plea bargaining and puts it in the context of 
constitutionality; he claims that it is true that plea bargaining contributes to the 
speediness of a trial, but in an unconstitutional way. He explains that “the truth is 
that government officials have deliberately engineered the system to assure that 
the jury trial system established by the Constitution is seldom used.” He sees plea 
bargaining as “the primary technique used by the government to bypass the 
institutional safeguards in trials”.   
 
The issue of the coerciveness of the criminal justice system can be directly linked 
with the powerful role which is obviously given to prosecutors as Government 
representatives in the whole process, and which was clearly approved as such by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in its Bordenkircher v. Hayes31 decision. Prosecutors are 
the ones who essentially direct the plea bargaining process in the U.S. and who 
have significant maneuvering space when it comes to the sentences proposed in 
the framework of plea negotiations. Some authors find exactly this role of 
prosecutors very problematic. Burke (2007, p.183-211) generally criticizes the 
significant power that is given to prosecutors in the plea bargaining process since 
they are the ones who decide whether to bargain or not based on many motives 
starting from those related to reducing caseload and enlarging conviction rates, to 
those related to their passion for prosecutorial work and the type of cases they 
deal with. Some authors even believe that there is a disparity between the two 
sides, the defendant and the prosecutor, in the process of plea bargaining. 
O’Keefe (2010) analyses plea bargaining agreement as a type of contract. By 
referring to Alschuler (1981) he writes that (2010, p. 260) the “most common 
contract-based arguments against the practice of plea bargaining are acceptance 
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under duress, information disparities, disparate bargaining power, and the 
prohibition on enslavement contracts.” When it comes to the issue of the unequal 
positions of the two sides in this process and the enslavement character of the 
contract, Alschuler claims that there is even a limitation of will expressed by the 
defendant in negotiating a guilty plea agreement. When explaining this limitation 
(1981, p.697) by referring to Mill (1951) he adds that “The principle of freedom 
cannot require that [a person] should be free not to be free.” Alschuler believes 
that “It is not freedom to be allowed to alienate [one's] freedom.”  
 
Far from criticizing the practice, many scholars praise plea agreements as an 
efficient and constitutional means of resolving cases. They are focused on 
answering the key points of criticism when it comes to plea bargaining: the 
problematic issue of innocence and the fairness of the practice, criminal justice 
system coerciveness which is blamed for causing a larger application of plea 
bargaining, the inequality of the sides in the process, and the enslavement 
character of plea agreement. In line with this, they primarily elaborate on the 
legitimate reasons for replacing a trial with a plea agreement. A justified question 
that can be asked where the U.S. legal system is concerned is:” What if a 
defendant does not want to take the risk of receiving a severe sentence at the 
trial?” Realistically, some defendants probably rather opt for agreements in order 
to avoid such a risk. Easterbrook (1992, p.1975), who strongly defends plea 
bargaining, when talking about the usage of plea agreement instead of a trial 
claims that there are legitimate reasons for a defendant to opt for the former. He 
stresses that “Defendants can use or exchange their rights, whichever makes them 
better off.” He believes that plea agreements actually help the defendants, and that 
any force being put on them to use their rights at trials “…means compelling them 
to take the risk”.  From the perspective of, for example, the Montenegrin legal 
system as a civil law system, on the contrary, a trial is mostly seen as not that 
much of a risk, but rather an opportunity to present and discuss all the evidence in 
a fair environment and before a competent and impartial judge who will make 
final decision. Bearing in mind the country’s generally lenient sentencing policy, 
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this “risk factor” is one of the key differences between the two systems. Based on 
the civil law legal system construction itself, the existence of a lower risk linked 
to trial may be seen as a factor which reduces the application of plea bargaining in 
this system.   
 
One of the least disputable elements of plea agreements is their huge contribution 
to the efficiency and cost reduction of criminal proceedings. Many modern day 
criminal justice systems are faced with an increasing number of crimes that are 
characterized by a high level of complexity, an international element, a large 
number of perpetrators, and very fast and modern methods of their commission. 
The resolving of such criminal cases in any system takes time, the activation of 
the whole criminal justice apparatus, and significant budget funds. This is where 
plea agreements can help.  Easterbrook (1992, p. 1975) discusses the time and 
efficiency components of plea bargaining. He claims that by using plea 
agreements defendants “get the process over sooner”, and “solvent ones save the 
expense of trial”. He further claims that plea agreements are beneficial not just to 
defendants, but also to prosecutors and “society at large”. As he writes: “In 
purchasing procedural entitlements with lower sentences, prosecutors buy that 
most valuable commodity, time. With time they can prosecute more criminals.”  
 
Defenders of plea bargaining also deal with the issue of the coerciveness of the 
criminal justice system in relation to plea bargaining. They do not see the 
construction of the U.S. system as the main incentive for a larger application of 
plea bargaining. When discussing this issue, those known supporters of plea 
bargaining, Scott and Stuntz, explain (1992, p.1919-1921) that the significant 
difference between the sentences that are the result of a trial and those sentences 
that are the result of plea agreements “does not imply coercion a priori”. They 
believe that in a situation when the accused has several bad choices, and such a 
situation is actually seen as coercion, it does not mean that her/his final choice is 
not a voluntary one. As they say: “So long as the post-trial sentences have not 
47 
 
been manipulated by the prosecutor, the coercive elements of the plea bargaining 
environment do not corrupt the voluntariness of the plea agreement”.  
 
Another critique of plea bargaining practice which was largely discussed by 
supporters of this practice is the inequality of the sides in this process. Defenders 
of plea bargaining are strongly against the claim that there is an inequality 
between the sides when this practice is concerned. Remembering the general 
critique directed towards the unfairness of the process, as well as inequality of the 
two sides, Church (1979, p.509) defends plea bargaining by stressing four major 
features of this practice. As he claims: “the defendant always has the alternative 
of a jury trial at which both verdict and sentence are determined solely on the 
merits”; the defendant is represented in this process by a competent defense; both 
sides in the process “have equal access to relevant evidence’; and “both possess 
sufficient resources to take a case to trial.” According to him, these things make 
plea bargaining a fair process and exclude the inequality of the sides.  In 
contesting the inequality critiques, Church is joined by Scott and Stuntz (1992, 
p.1922). In their work they deal with the issue of the disparities of the two sides in 
having information. They believe that this argument is simply not applicable to 
plea bargaining. As they explain, plea agreements are not standard contracts with 
lots of terms and conditions that are hard to understand for a regular “consumer”; 
with plea bargains the defendant has a knowledgeable lawyer to help him and 
therefore there is no inequality between the parties in this sense.  
 
When it comes to critiques related to the contractual nature of plea agreements 
and the prohibition of enslavement in that context, unlike Aslchuler who was very 
firm about the impossibility for one to freely decide about their own freedom in 
the framework of a contract, Scott and Stuntz (1992, p.1910) believe that 
“Properly understood, classical contract theory supports the freedom to bargain 
over criminal punishment.” In their work, where they widely discuss the 
contractual nature of plea agreements, they deal with the argument of the 
prohibition of enslavement. Scott and Stuntz argue that it is not the liberty of the 
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defendant that is being traded for something else, but the risk of enslavement i.e. 
prison is being traded for the “certainty of somewhat less enslavement.” They 
stress that if it is forbidden to the defendant to bargain s/he will bear the risk of a 
very serious sentence.  
  
Many authors are somewhere in between when it comes to this legal institution. It 
is obvious that this practice is helpful, and even necessary, when it comes to 
efficiency and the cost of the criminal procedure. In cases of complex organized 
crime and other forms of serious crime, this practice can be also valuable for 
getting additional information from those who sign plea agreements, which can 
consequently lead to the “higher social goals” of bringing higher ranked criminals 
to justice. However, critiques related to major “natural justice” and the practice’s 
unfairness remain valid. Many authors do agree with the above mentioned 
objections of the criticizers of plea bargaining, but still think it is a worthy 
practice which should be kept and reformed, particularly when it comes to the 
procedure itself. When making comparison between settlements in the civil cases 
on the one hand, and the process of plea bargaining in criminal cases on the other, 
Bibas writes (2004, p.2546-2547) that in the civil settlements it is more like a 
“business decision” where parties agree how to split money, while “criminal 
negotiation involves higher stakes”, less information and adequate funding, “more 
variable representation, and more structural and psychological distortions.”  He 
concludes that the “huge edifice of plea bargaining” cannot be neglected, but 
suggests reform of “its flaws and inequities.” Furthermore, Sandefur writes (2003, 
p.28) that even though plea bargaining quite often does include unfair 
prosecutorial tactics, it is “not unconstitutional, nor does it necessarily violate a 
defendant’s rights.” He believes that problems lie in the regulation of the trial and 
plea negotiations, not in the right to make such a contract itself. He suggests that 
plea bargaining “flaws are procedural, not constitutional, and it needs reform, not 
abolition.” An interesting proposal concerning plea bargaining reform comes from 
Gazal (2005, p.2) who proposes not a total, but a partial ban of plea bargaining in 
cases when “the concession offered to the defendant in return for his guilty plea is 
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large.” He believes that this would cause those defendants with “relatively high 
chances of acquittal at trial” not to enter into plea bargains. 
 
The debate over this issue is not typical only for academics in the U.S. It is deeply 
rooted in the reality of this country’s criminal justice system. A few of the 
specific, largest practical attempts to abolish this practice in the U.S prove that 
U.S. legal practitioners are, similarly to academics and theorists, not always in 
favor of this practice.  
 
Specifically, in 1975, the Alaska Attorney General Avrum Gross banned plea 
bargaining in Alaska including both sentence and charge bargaining, and 
including all felonies and misdemeanors. The motives of Attorney General Gross 
for such step, as Rubinstein and White write by citing Gross (1979, p.368) were 
the following: “He has said that the purpose of his policy is to ‘return the 
sentencing function to the judges,’ and to eliminate the former practice under 
which the courts acted as ‘rubber stamps’ for sentences negotiated in advance by 
the parties.” The ban naturally produced some effects in terms of reducing plea 
bargaining practice. In 1988 Judicial Council of Alaska conducted a re-evaluation 
of the ban on plea bargaining. In relation to the findings of this re-evaluation 
White Carns and Kruise write (1991, p.29-30) that the Council concluded that the 
“original ban caused substantial decreases in both sentence and charge 
bargaining.” The Council also concluded that the ban remained the official policy 
of the Attorney General’s office, and that charge bargaining became common 
while sentence bargaining “remained infrequent”. Finally, the Council’s report 
also concluded that over the past fifteen years the percentage of people convicted 
to prison sentence increased, and that length of prison sentences became longer. 
Even though the results were to some extent negative for plea bargaining the 
practice has been present and far from non-existent in the years that followed. 
Specific, clear evidence for this was the 2009 Alaska case when the accused killer 
Jerry Active got a very soft plea bargaining agreement where prosecutors failed to 
recognize that he had already been convicted for a felony. This case lead to 
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rethinking the ban on plea bargaining and to a new Alaska Department of Law 
policy in this area in 2013. The new policy actually bars plea bargains involving 
sentences for the most serious felony cases, as well as all cases involving sexual 
assault, sexual abuse of minor and domestic violence.    
 
It is also worth noting that in 1973, the National Advisory Commission on 
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals which was part of the at that time existing 
DOJ Law Enforcement Assistance Administration even called for the abolition of 
plea bargaining in all states by 1978.32  
 
Even though such attempts did have some influence, at the general level they did 
not stop or significantly affected the practice. One of the DOJ Bureau of Justice 
Assistance’s latest plea bargaining studies illustrates this (Devers, 2011). It 
showed an undisputable need for using this institution in the U.S. criminal justice 
system, but also a need for reforms in this area.33 At the very end of the research it 
is concluded that the plea bargaining process is “ingrained in the way cases are 
processed.” Any future reforms and research need to address the “disparities 
within the system and to find a practical solution for all participants involved.” 
Unlike the U.S. legal system, it can be concluded, based on the evident existing 
experiences, that plea bargaining is far from being “ingrained” in civil law 
systems. This is important to take into account when analyzing this practice in 
Montenegro, as predominantly a civil law country. 
 
1.5. Plea Bargaining at Present – Other Countries  
 
Plea bargaining is most often linked with the U.S., but, as has already been 
stressed, it is not exclusive to this country. Its different forms can be seen in many 
countries throughout the world, which differ between themselves to a greater or 
lesser degree in terms of their legal systems, history, traditions, social 
background, level of democracy and other factors. The difference between two 
major types of legal system, the civil law system and the common law system, 
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seem to affect the implementation of plea bargaining. It is evident that this 
practice is much more present in the common law countries, characterized by 
court precedents as the main source of law. The civil law legal system, unlike the 
common law one, is based on Roman law; in this system, written laws are the 
primary source of law and the judge is the central figure who leads the trial, 
determines the truth and decides on justice.  
 
Some authors link the different attitudes towards plea bargaining with the 
preferences of the societies and their legal systems when it comes to innocence 
issues. Givati (2011) interestingly answers the question as to why different 
countries have different policies regarding plea bargaining. He (2011, p.21) used 
cross country data on crime prevalence and on social preferences when it comes 
to judicial mistakes related to the innocence of the accused, and he also analyzed 
the legal regulation of plea bargaining in those different countries. Based on the 
analysis, he concluded that different policies reflect different social preferences 
for the two types of innocence mistakes: punishing the innocent and not punishing 
the guilty. As he says: “Lower concern for punishing the innocent leads to greater 
use of plea bargaining”, or in other words, a greater concern about the guilty not 
being left unpunished leads to the lower use of plea bargaining. Furthermore, his 
research also shows that higher levels of crime lead to greater use of plea 
bargaining.  
 
It is clear that civil law systems in which the trial is an opportunity to “reveal” 
everything by a neutral, third party, and make sure that evidence about the 
accused’s guilt is properly presented and discussed, do not easily accept plea 
agreements which include “play” with the evidence and guilt. Canivet (2003, p. 
940) explains that the right to a fair trial and the right of due process “are absolute 
and inalienable; they cannot be negotiated or traded off” regardless of the 
expected benefit for their holder or third parties.   
 
52 
 
However, even though civil law systems seem less open to plea bargaining, the 
fact is that some countries which are major representatives of this system like, for 
example, Germany, do have certain forms of plea bargaining. Or the opposite, 
England and Wales, the core of the Anglo-Saxon legal system, do not formally 
recognize plea bargaining. The joint modern reality in which all the countries of 
the present world function, however, may be one of the reasons for spreading plea 
bargaining practices throughout the world. Modern societies with different legal 
systems, faced with the influx and pressure of new types of crime look for new 
approaches to fighting it, and new forms of procedural treatment. Canivet (2003, 
p. 940-941) discusses exactly these problems and stresses that “Even though 
difficulties are peculiar to each legal culture, the challenges that face justice 
nowadays are universally common…”. He explains that “…more and more judges 
conceive of their job as managing the flood of cases rather than rendering justice 
solemnly.” Plea bargaining, as a tool which speeds up the trial, reduces its cost, 
which has a potential to assist prosecutors with other cases, and still to a great 
extent reveals the truth, finds its place in many different legal systems.    
 
Some of the different forms of plea bargaining or plea negotiations that can be 
found outside the U.S. are briefly presented in Appendix A. The plea bargaining 
mechanisms of the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Russia and India are 
presented for the purpose of illustration of the variety of practices. The chosen 
countries represent those which have different legal systems, and more or less 
different historical circumstances, traditions and cultures. From the brief 
comparative presentation, it can be seen that plea bargaining practice can be 
adopted in different systems and surroundings. It illustrates a “hybridization” of 
the criminal procedure which to a large part results in a mixture of the two main 
legal systems, those of civil law and common law. When explaining 
“hybridization” Canivet says (2003, p. 941) that a “procedural or substantive 
hybridization … results in an original construction mixing elements of both great 
families of legal systems.” It can be said that the Montenegrin criminal procedure 
does represent exactly the “hybridized” civil law criminal procedure that Canivet 
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writes about. While keeping the classic civil law trial as the central “place” of 
truth determination, plea bargaining was introduced into this country’s legal 
system as a means to avoid this central stage of the civil law criminal process. In 
practice, the clash of the two may open up space for different challenges that will 
be discussed later in my work, and that are reflected in the answers given by the 
participants in my research. For example, when talking about plea bargaining one 
Montenegrin judge, J4, said (for participants’ coding please see Chapter IV): “I 
am for the truth and justice. Americans and Anglo-Saxons started this due to 
practicality.” This is the expected answer of a civil law judge who decides about 
truth in this legal system.   
 
The previously mentioned Appendix A refers to just some examples of the 
variations of plea bargaining practice that exist worldwide. Amongst other things, 
they illustrate, on the one hand, that this method of resolving criminal cases is 
definitely most developed and used in the U.S., but on the other, that in one way 
or another plea bargaining has become part of the criminal justice systems of 
many countries. All of them have the joint goal of seeking solutions to the 
problems of overburdened courts, and complex and long trials. This can be 
applied to Montenegro as well. 
 
1.6. Plea Bargaining in International Law 
 
One more interesting proof of the truly offensive nature of plea bargaining is its 
application in international criminal law and before the international criminal 
courts. I will briefly touch upon this modus of plea bargaining practical 
implementation. 
 
Specifically, this legal institution has been used before the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR).  As of 25 May 2016, 81 accused have been sentenced by the 
ICTY out of which 20 pleaded guilty.34 According to the official statistics and 
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documents that Ferioli analyzed (2013, p.3): “The ICTR had convicted forty-six 
defendants, of whom eight had pleaded guilty.” Currently available statistics show 
that there are 62 convicted in total.35  
 
Another international court, the International Criminal Court (ICC) also envisages 
plea bargaining in its statute known as the Rome Statute36. Article 65 of the 
Statute of Rome defines “Proceedings on an admission of guilt”. However, it has 
not yet applied plea bargaining in its practice. It should also be taken into account 
that the ICC practice has been very limited so far. Additionally, many legal 
authors have already posed the question of the application of plea bargaining in 
ICC cases.  
 
When discussing international law and courts we must inevitably consider the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECoHR) and its position in relation to plea 
bargaining and notably the right to a fair trial - Article 6 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).  TO be precise, on 29 April 2014, the 
ECoHR announced a first decision, which became final on 8 September of the 
same year, where it directly treated plea bargaining practice in the context of 
Article 6 of the ECHR. It is in the Natsvlishvili and Togonidze v. Georgia37 case. 
In this judgment. the ECoHR gave its view of the plea bargaining practice:  “The 
Court noted that plea bargaining between the prosecution and the defense was a 
common feature of European criminal justice systems and not in itself open to 
criticism”. The Court stressed the benefits of plea bargaining in terms of the 
“speedy adjudication of criminal cases and alleviating the workload of courts, 
prosecutors and lawyers”. It added that, if applied correctly, plea agreements 
could also be a very good tool for fighting corruption and organized crime, and 
could also “contribute to the reduction of the number of sentences handed down 
and as a result to the number of prisoners”. Furthermore, the Court considered the 
effects of plea bargaining in relation to waiving of a number of procedural rights. 
“This cannot be a problem in itself, since neither the letter nor the spirit of Article 
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6 prevents a person from waiving these safeguards of his or her own free will”, 
the Court explained. 
 
Finally, the Recommendation R (87)1838 of the CoE Committee of Ministers 
Concerning the Simplification of Criminal Justice demonstrates that the CoE 
considered the issue of negotiated justice even back in 1987. In Part III entitled 
Simplification of ordinary judicial procedures it provides recommendations to 
member states and calls on them to introduce “the procedure of ‘guilty 
pleas’...wherever constitutional and legal traditions so allow…”.  
 
Even though plea bargaining has become part of international criminal law and 
the practice of the international criminal courts, it has many critics among 
professionals and academics who do not see it as an appropriate part of 
international criminal law. Many authors stress the specific role and tasks of the 
international criminal tribunals as completely contrary to plea bargaining.  
 
Burens writes about truth seeking in criminal proceedings and stresses that it has a 
much larger significance in the international courts than the domestic ones 
because of the wider set of objectives the international criminal court trials have. 
When writing about these courts she says (2013, p.324): “Next to rendering 
justice for alleged wrongs it is also about national reconciliation, restoration, 
reparation, peace-building, prevention and deterrence of future violence, re-
establishing the rule of law and also the creation of a historical record.” She 
believes (2013, p.322) that: “…practices of plea bargaining by the ICTY and the 
ICTR have shown that to a certain extent truth-seeking is sacrificed for efficiency 
when courts use this procedural mechanism.” 
 
Rauxloh (2010, n.p.), for example, believes that international criminal trials, 
among other things, serve to reach “accurate historical record of the atrocities“.  
However, she has concerns (2010, n.p.) that: “…although plea bargaining can 
encourage admissions of guilt, which serve the historical record and 
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reconciliation, it can also undermine both aims if the incentive of the bargain is so 
strong that it triggers non insincere admissions.” In this context she refers to the 
previously mentioned Plavsic who, right after serving the sentence and being 
released from prison, said that she pleaded guilty only for tactical reasons.   
 
Historically, the ICTY did not immediately accept plea bargaining.39 It was even 
openly criticized by the court. Rauxloh (2010, n.p.) and Clark (2009, p.417) refer 
to Morris and Scharf (1995) and write that the First President of this tribunal 
Antonio Cassese in his statement given to the members of the diplomatic missions 
in 1994 was directly reluctant to use plea bargaining in the ICTY proceedings due 
to the extremely grievous nature of the crimes this court is responsible for.  
 
After this practice was introduced in the ICTY in 2001 and potentially bearing in 
mind critiques like the ones presented above, the Court itself gave general 
guidelines about how to properly use this legal institution. This was probably also 
the result of quite an intensive plea bargaining period for the Court from 2001 to 
2003. In the case Prosecutor v. Momir Nikolic40 the Court gave a special view on 
charge bargaining: “In cases where charges are withdrawn, extreme caution must 
be urged. The Prosecutor has a duty to prosecute serious violations of 
international humanitarian law. The crimes falling within the jurisdiction of this 
Tribunal are fundamentally different from crimes prosecuted nationally. Although 
it may seem appropriate to ‘negotiate’ a charge of attempted murder to a charge of 
aggravated assault, any ‘negotiations’ on a charge of genocide or crimes against 
humanity must be carefully considered and be entered into for good cause.” 
 
1.7. The Concepts of the “Law-in-Books” and the “Law-in-Action”  
 
When discussing and researching the regulation and application of any legal 
practice, including plea bargaining, it is useful to refer to the concepts of the 
“Law-in-Books” and the “Law-in-Action” in order to better understand the 
process. The difference and link between the two is well explained by the 
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Wisconsin Law School in the U.S., known for its Law-in-Action approach to 
teaching law: “Knowing the rules is like learning to play scales when you study a 
musical instrument. Playing scales is essential, but it isn't music. And knowing the 
rules is essential, but it isn't being a lawyer.”41 In other words, it is always 
important to observe and analyze the existing legal norms in the sociological 
context. As Silbey says (2002, p.860) “Law, legal practices, and legal institutions 
can be understood only by seeing and explaining them within social context.” 
Furthermore, a Law-in-Action approach in research, as Davis describes, has the 
“opposite direction” (2017, p.3): “The researcher begins with an observed, real-
world problem or phenomenon and then seeks to explain it.”  
 
This is very much applicable when it comes to researching plea bargaining in 
Montenegro and that it why one major focus of my research is on the practical 
implementation of the existing legal norms. There is an immediately visible 
situation, not necessarily a problem, in the real world and that is the absence of a 
widespread application of plea agreements in the practice of the country, even 
though the relevant provisions have been in existence for a number of years. 
Through this research, I will try to reveal the reasons for that which are, in any 
case, expected to partly or even largely depend on the social perceptions of this 
legal institute.   
 
The existence of plea bargaining provisions in the criminal legislation of the 
country does not necessarily match reality i.e. the practical social relationships, 
needs and attitudes. Possible differences between what legal norms say and what 
they produce or what kind of reactions they cause in practice become even more 
interesting when they concern legal practices not inherent in the legal system in 
question. This is exactly the case with plea bargaining in Montenegro. It is to 
expect that the application of such provisions largely depends on the attitudes of 
the actors in those legal transactions towards them. It is also to expect that society, 
including lawyers, generally finds it difficult to accept practices which are not 
familiar and are somewhat contrary to previous experiences and the established 
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system of beliefs and values. Halperin explains this issue by referring to 
Tocqueville (Tocqueville, 2004, p.302-11, cited by Halperin, 2011, p.63): “By 
identifying the reluctance of lawyers to accept legal change, we highlight the 
conservative bias of jurists… because they…do not like to see changes in the law 
they have learned.” Furthermore, when analyzing the large-scale reforms of the 
Turkish legal system which took place at the beginning of last century Watson 
concludes (2006, p.13): “Much law in the books reflects the conditions, needs and 
desires of the society in which it operates. But likewise much is accepted because 
it was borrowed often without much thought...”   
 
A need for taking into account social reality when creating and amending the 
“law-in-books” is particularly important in the modern world which is 
continuously and dynamically changing. Halperin (2004, p.76) discusses legal 
change in this context and says: “Every lawyer who tries to write the ‘law in-
books’ must be innovative in proposing new ideal-types and attentive to the 
possibility of checking these constructions by confronting them with empirical 
reality…” He further claims that the “law-in-books…should continuously strive 
to identify, measure, track…,and ‘understand’ …changes in normative facts.” 
 
When it comes to studying of  legal systems and the necessity of analysing the 
social context in this process, Macaulay (1994, p.10) from the Wisconsin Law 
School talks about seeking justice and says: “…We know that we must look for it 
not only in doctrine but in police cars, courtroom, lawyers’ offices and lives of 
ordinary people as well.” He illustrates this linkage between the law and social 
reality in the following way: “I found that contract law becomes real when the 
machine is not delivered on time or when it doesn’t perform exactly as promised 
and engineers and business executives want to do something about it.”  When it 
comes to plea bargaining, it is generally up to the prosecutor and the accused and 
her/his attorney whether they will choose this option for ending their case. Even 
though the legal provisions allow the use of plea agreements in quite a large 
number of different situations in Montenegro, it is obvious that the prosecutor and 
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the accused and her/his attorney will not use this option every time, and most of 
them will never use it. Their decision surely does not depend exclusively on legal 
norms, but it might be significantly influenced by social factors, such as whether 
this is seen as a socially acceptable practice, whether they see this solution as a 
fair practice, whether it is immanent in the culture and tradition of their society, 
and so on. Simply, lawyers can neither create nor apply and interpret the law by 
being isolated from their social circumstances and relationships. The law-in-books 
needs to follow and rely on society. As Halperin says (2004, p.53): “…the best 
avenues to understand the law are those dealing with practices…”  
 
My research deals with some elements of the society related influences on plea 
bargaining in Montenegro, such as the reasons for introducing and accepting the 
plea bargaining practice, the influence of public opinion and the media on the use 
of plea agreements, and mentality and cultural influences. A further elaboration of 
these issues, however, would require a larger-scale and even separate form of 
research. It is undisputable though, that the social setting everywhere, and such is 
the case in Montenegro as well,forms an unbreakable link with both the creation 
and the implementation of legal norms in practice.   
 
1.8. Conclusion  
 
Whatever one thinks about plea bargaining, reality leads to a few conclusions 
about this practice which illustrate a lot: it has a long history; it managed to 
became part of legislation and case-law; it has developed and taken new forms 
over the years; it has “invaded” many countries to the smaller or larger extent; it 
has also entered international criminal law; and finally it has always had its 
supporters and opponents, as it has today. 
 
It did become a part of the Montenegrin legislation and practice, too. How plea 
bargaining functions in Montenegro and what is to expect from it in this country 
will be the topic of my research in the chapters that follow. Before going into 
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those more specific issues, however, in my next chapter I will present and 
elaborate on the methodology used in plea bargaining research in general, as well 
as the methodology that I used in my own research.  
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CHAPTER II  
METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter will discuss: the approach to research that I opted for and why that 
was my choice; the research methods I used and the reasons for that choice; the 
process of applying the selected methods in the framework of my research; and a 
small scale overview of the research methods generally used by plea bargaining 
researchers.  
 
2.1. The Research Approach Chosen  
 
A Few Epistemological Thoughts  
 
When talking about social research, the very first idea that generally comes to 
people’s minds is examining something and collecting information about it, 
analyzing it, learning about it, and disseminating the gained knowledge further. 
For me the research was primarily learning and gaining knowledge about the topic 
of research, but also about the research process itself. These parallel learning 
processes were equally interesting. Research related learning is naturally best 
reflected in this chapter of my work which deals with my research methodology. 
The process of examining and identifying the research approaches and methods 
that best suit my research and its goals was a revealing experience. It made me 
better understand the complexity of the research process, the almost unique 
character of every item of research, and why it is said that you learn about 
research by doing it.    
 
Through the obvious need to identify and examine my research methods, I was 
“brought into” the science or philosophy of knowledge, the nature of knowledge 
and the ways of gaining it i.e. epistemology, and the different directions or 
branches of this philosophical sphere. Hamlyn (1995), cited by Crotty (1998, p. 8) 
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explained that “Epistemology deals with 'the nature of knowledge, its possibility, 
scope and general basis'”. For someone like me who deals with legal issues at the 
practical daily level, examining philosophical theories like empiricism, 
rationalism, idealism, constructivism, positivism, anti-positivism, post-positivism 
and others was very interesting. The interconnection of many concepts and the 
existence of various different definitions and approaches provided by numerous 
authors made this process quite challenging as well. Regardless of that, I did find 
it very interesting and inspiring. Bearing in mind that, quite often, it is hard for 
researchers to position themselves in only one strict epistemological sub-
philosophy, when it comes to the general ways of learning and gaining knowledge 
what attracts me is the human, experience-related and “wider picture” post-
positivism dimension of gaining knowledge. Additionally, the lack of a strict 
obligation to provide a solution to a given problem seems attractive as well. As 
Hammersely (2000), cited by Ryan (2006, p. 19) says: “Research can have an 
open-ended, exploratory character. This reflects the fact that problems sometimes 
have to be discovered. Furthermore, obvious problems should not always be taken 
at face value. Discovering the right way to formulate a problem is often as 
important in the advance of knowledge as hypothesis-testing.”   
 
The Qualitative Approach – The Right Choice for My Research Goals 
 
In order to be able to identify most adequate methods for my research, it was 
necessary for me to primarily review the given goals of the research, and in line 
with that, to decide how I would approach it. Opting for an adequate research 
approach was a precondition for natural identification of the particular research 
methods, and therefore for the start of the concrete research work. The goals of 
my research which were elaborated in more details in the Introduction of this 
work include: analyzing the quality of the legal regulation of plea bargaining in 
Montenegro; investigating the level of use, usefulness and productiveness of the 
plea bargaining institution in the criminal justice system of Montenegro; 
identifying problems in the application of plea bargaining in Montenegro, as well 
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as successful schemes in the implementation of this practice; discovering the 
causes of challenges in the application of plea bargaining in Montenegro, as well 
as factors of success in the implementation of this practice; comparing plea 
bargaining practice in Montenegro with the relevant practice of neighboring 
countries which have similar legal systems; and finally, in line with the previous 
goals, providing adequate recommendations and conclusions which can be useful 
in the further development of the practice and study of this issue in Montenegro.  
 
Armed with such goals, I started to search for an adequate research strategy. 
Naturally, the main, basic division which immediately occurs to every researcher 
is the one between a qualitative and quantitative research approach. As a first time 
doctoral level researcher, I faced many dilemmas and traps which distracted me 
when it came to the final choice. One of these traps is typical and Gray (2014) 
writes about it. He explains (2014, p. 34) that “Novice researchers may be 
tempted to begin with the design, say, of a questionnaire, so that data can be 
gathered without delay…” He then refers to the existence of other elements, like 
epistemology, the theoretical perspective and the research approach, which must 
be considered first. The elaboration of these elements actually naturally leads 
researcher in the right direction towards the fulfillment of the research goals. In 
this context, in order to be sure that the start of my leaning towards qualitative 
approach was the right one, and bearing in mind the given goals and the 
epistemological foundation, I examined this issue further.  
 
In a simple way Bell (2005) primarily deals with the division of research 
approaches into qualitative and quantitative ones, but further stresses and explains 
other typologies of research approaches that can commonly be seen with many 
other authors like action research, case study, survey, ethnographic approach, 
experimental approach, and finally narrative inquiry and stories as forms of 
research approach.  
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A similar division of research approaches that is very clearly presented can be 
found in Denscombre (2003) who provides a very good overview of, as he called 
them, “research strategies”. Apart from discussing the approaches already 
mentioned, like action research, surveys, ethnographical and experimental, he 
further elaborates on internet research, phenomenology and grounded theory 
research strategies. Denscombe’s explanation of the phenomenology approach, as 
an interpretivist inductive but primarily qualitative research strategy, assured me 
that the qualitative approach is the right one for me. This is primarily because of 
his description (2003, p. 105-106) of the phenomenology research strategy as one 
which allows the researcher to deal with the complexity of a social reality. He 
describes it as a research strategy which is adequate for “small scale research 
where the budget is low and the main resource is the researcher him/herself.”, and 
which “carries an aura of humanism.” He further explains that this research 
strategy, which is based on the “lived experiences of people in the everyday 
world…represents a style of research that is far removed from any high minded 
abstract theorizing.”  
 
My idea of reaching the research goals without any doubt anticipates digging into 
the reality which is hidden behind the legal norms that regulate plea bargaining 
and pure plea agreements statistics. The relevant legal norms can be perfect and 
can create an impression of the existence of fully regulated, functioning legal 
processes and relations, but at the same time the reality could be non-functional 
and confusing. Even the opposite is possible, for norms to be very “modest”, 
barely existing or widely defined, but in parallel the real processes could still 
function well. The first scenario is more applicable to Montenegro as a country 
which is going through overall legal reforms, and is in the transitional period of 
establishing a functional democratic society. While reading Denzin and Lincoln’s 
(2005, p. 3)  explanation of how  “… qualitative researchers study things in their 
natural settings, attempting to make sense of…phenomena in terms of the 
meanings people bring to them”, the typical comments of Montenegrin judges, 
prosecutors and defense attorneys that I hear in my regular professional 
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interaction with them ran through my head: “Yes, the provisions say that, but in 
practice we face this situation that causes huge problems and misunderstandings.” 
or “Yes, that would be great if prosecutors acted differently and changed their 
practice and attitudes.”. Crotty’s position that “Our interests in the social world 
tends to focus on exactly those aspects that are unique, individual and qualitative” 
can be applied to my research (Crotty, 1998, cited by Gray, 2014, p.23).42   
 
Being aware that the selection of exclusively one research approach is quite often 
not made, I still opted for a qualitative approach only. In my research, I did gather 
statistical data in relation to plea bargaining agreements; it was a small part of the 
research and for the purpose of numerical illustration of the level of factual 
presence of this practice in a certain country during a certain period of time. 
However, my focus when it comes to plea agreements was predominantly on their 
content and its analysis.  
 
Many researchers find that different methods, being qualitative or quantitative, 
have their own limitations, and that valid results can only be reached by 
combining the two. As Cresswell (2003, p. 15) explains “Recognizing that all 
methods have limitations, researchers felt that biases inherent in any single 
method could neutralize or cancel the biases of other methods.” However, my 
main choice was still the qualitative approach, primarily bearing in mind goals of 
the research, but also its scope, as well as the length limitation.  
 
2.2. Research Methods Used  
 
The next methodological task which was put in front of me in the process of 
research, and which was much easier once the main direction of research was 
taken was the identification of specific adequate qualitative methods of data 
gathering. A very good description of the core elements of every qualitative 
research was provided by one of Silvermen’s (2010, p.14) explanations of the 
complex and somewhat chaotic character of qualitative research: “…data 
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collection, analysis and writing are virtually inseparable in qualitative research … 
Doing qualitative research is in many respects no different than doing everyday 
life: it is complex and sometimes downright chaotic.” It is clear that the 
possession of good quality data is a primary and extremely important factor when 
it comes to research quality. Only having enough proper and relevant data 
provides reliable and useful results; and the way to reach such data is through the 
selection of adequate research methods. 
 
Before elaborating the process of using the specific methods in my research, I will 
briefly present a general typology of research methods. Marshall and Rossman 
(2006, p. 97) distinguish four typical qualitative research methods: “participating 
in the setting, observing directly, interviewing in depth, and analyzing documents 
and material culture.” Similarly, Cresswell (2003, p.17) created a chart where he 
enumerated four types of data sources linked to qualitative research. According to 
him, in qualitative research data can be reached through interviews with open-
ended questions, in documents, from audiovisual sources and by observation. 
These divisions are with slight biases predominant in most of the authors, with 
semi-structured in-depth interviews having a leading role when it comes to their 
practical application in qualitative social research.  
 
While describing “in-depth or unstructured interviews” as one of “the main 
methods of data collection used in qualitative research”, Legard, Keegan and 
Ward (2003, p. 138) cite Rorty (1980) and say that the interviewing method “as 
such…reproduces a fundamental process through which knowledge about the 
social world is constructed in normal human interaction.” Regardless of the 
obvious qualities of qualitative social research, some concerns still stand when it 
comes to this approach and the predominant use of interviews as the research 
method used in the framework of this approach. This is particularly in relation to 
the significant time-consumption and cost, as well as skillfulness in interviewing. 
“While qualitative methods can examine social processes at work in particular 
contexts in considerable depth, the collection and especially the analyses of this 
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material can be time-consuming and therefore expensive”, Griffin says (2004, 
p.9). She further stresses another worry when it comes to this research method: 
“…qualitative research requires training and experience.” (2004, p. 9). Boyce and 
Neale (2006, p. 3-4) talk about the disadvantages of specific in-depth interviews 
as research method and enumerate four key worrisome aspects: interviews “can 
be time-sensitive” i.e. can take long time; “The interviewer must be appropriately 
trained in interviewing techniques”; interviews are “Not generalizable: When in-
depth interviews are conducted, generalizations about the results are usually not 
able to be made because small samples are chosen and random sampling methods 
are not used”; and finally, participants’ “interview responses might be biased”.  
 
However, regardless of these limitations and remembering the fact that the choice 
of research method largely depends on the research questions and topic, 
interviews are definitely the only choice in some situations. Accordingly, due to 
their purpose of “obtaining description of the life world of the interviewee” 
(Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009, p. 3) and bearing in mind goals of my research, semi-
structured interviews were my natural choice. However, even though this method 
had a central role in my research, document analysis as another method 
extensively used in my research also provided important information and 
findings. As Merriam (1988), cited by Bowen (2009, p. 29) says: “Documents of 
all types can help the researcher uncover meaning, develop understanding, and 
discover insight relevant to the research problem”, which was exactly the case in 
my research. The use of semi-structured interviews as the dominant method and 
the one most relevant for my research was combined with document analysis.  
 
In the following paragraphs, more details on the process of interviewing 
conducted in the framework of my research will be presented, with a view of the 
relevant document analysis.    
 
 
 
68 
 
2.3. Semi-structured Interviews 
 
Interview Questions 
 
In line with the research goals and the selected research approach, I drafted 
questions that made a semi-structured interview template. The questions were 
open-ended and rationalized with the intention of providing original answers to 
the primary research questions, in a format that is familiar to the specific target 
groups. All the questions were clear, relatively simple and non-misleading. As 
Bryman stresses (2012 ,p. 90), interview questions should be 
“clear…researchable…have some connection(s) with established theory and 
research…linked to each other…hold out a prospect of being able to make an 
original contribution - however small  - to the topic … neither too broad…nor too 
narrow.”  
 
The interview questions followed a certain logic which I identified as most 
productive in terms of the potential richness of answers and keeping in mind 
research questions. Specifically, they were drafted in a way that they supervene, 
one after another. The questions start with general ones focusing on plea 
bargaining institutions and practice as such, and then they are followed by those 
which concern the roles and experiences of all the actors involved. After that 
come questions that touch on specific aspects or segments of the researched 
practice that may potentially have practical significance and influence. Questions 
which concern the position of plea agreements in the context of the whole 
criminal procedure were also included. Finally, the participants were given a 
chance to provide proposals for the future which they consider important and 
useful. Key questions were followed by additional questions and possible 
questions for the sake of further clarification or providing more details. Each 
group of interviewees had its set of questions: judges, prosecutors and defense 
attorneys (templates of the interview questions for judges, prosecutors and 
defense attorneys are attached as Appendices B, C and D). There were slight 
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differences between the questions for different groups which was caused by the 
specific role of each group in the plea bargaining process.  
 
I used the very first interview as a “testing interview” with intention not just to get 
answers, but also to check the quality, usefulness and validity of the research and 
interview questions, and being ready to ask for a modification of the interview 
questions if needed. However, it proved that questions were shaped well. They 
were a good starting point for all the participants due to their open-ended 
character which enabled elaboration on relevant issues with a truly inside “look”. 
Since Chapter III is primarily focused on legal regulation and a general overview 
of plea bargaining practice in Montenegro (and to a smaller extent in two other 
countries), the interviews were a unique opportunity to supplement this, and 
discuss other angles of this practice which “shed light on real life”. It was an 
opportunity to get insightful perspectives on the practice that lies behind the 
visible legal provisions, and statistical and other manifestations of its practical 
implementation. 
 
Participants 
 
When it comes to the target groups i.e. the participants in my research, in line 
with the research goals and approach, purposive recruitment was the natural way 
to go. “Purposive recruitment is both deliberate and flexible. It is deliberate, as the 
name suggests, be selecting ‘on purpose’ people who are ‘information-rich’ on the 
study topic…Purposive recruitment is also flexible, as researchers can refine the 
types of participants selected during data collection, rather than following a rigid 
recruitment procedure from the outset.” (Hennink, Hutter & Bailey, 2011, p. 85). 
In line with this, I decided to take into account a few different participant 
selection criteria: 
 
a) Profession and experience – the main criteria: Those needed to be 
legal professionals who have practical experience with plea 
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bargaining. Logically those are prosecutors, defense attorneys and 
judges, each dealing with the practice from different angles and each 
having different role in the process. I decided to interview 15 of them 
in total, out of which 5 are judges, 5 prosecutors and 5 defense 
attorneys. A number of 15 interviews in total was reached taking into 
account the total numbers of judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys 
in Montenegro which are the following: 26443 judges, 10544 
prosecutors and 77745 defense attorneys. Out of the total numbers, very 
few of them have practical experience with plea agreements. For 
example, through an analysis of the judgments on the acceptance of 
plea bargaining agreements in Montenegro (until August 2015 there 
was 6246 such judgments in total), out of 264 judges only 36 or 
13.64% judges have experience with agreements on the acceptance of 
guilt, as they are called in the Montenegrin law (an analysis of these 
judgments from different aspects is provided in the next chapter). By 
analogy, similar percentages can be applied to prosecutors and defense 
attorneys.47 Additionally, five of the selected interviewees from each 
category were those who had seen the largest number of agreements 
concluded or approved. For example, interviewed judge J5 (for 
participants’ coding please see Chapter IV) had five approved 
agreements out of total of 16 agreements concluded in her/his court. 
The theoretical principle of saturation (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, 
referred to by Hennink et al., 2011, p. 88), as the guiding principle in 
determining sufficient number of participants for gathering a variety of 
information and experiences, in my case showed that this initially 
chosen number 15 was a proper number. In fact, information or data 
gathered during interviews started to gradually repeat already from the 
second interview onwards, up to thirteenth interview i.e. participant. 
Simply, no major new issues were tackled after the thirteenth 
participant. However, each and every interview added some more or 
less significant information to the previously recognized key issues 
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which slowly grew into a number of main subjects for future 
elaboration and discussion. This practical experience of mine was fully 
in keeping with the statement of Strauss and Corbin: “Theoretical 
sampling is cumulative.” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, cited by Thomson, 
2011, p. 48).  
 
b) Regional representation: The north, south and central regions of 
Montenegro had to be included in the research. The reason is simply 
for all the regions of the country to be represented. There are 
significant differences between the northern, on the one hand, and the 
central and southern parts of the country, on the other. These 
differences reflect in the north being less developed and less 
economically progressive, with a higher rate of unemployment and 
characterized by a more traditional society. 2 participants were from 
the north, 3 were from the south, and 10 were from the central part of 
the country where the busiest courts, prosecution and defense attorney 
offices are located, so it was naturally reflected in the highest number 
of plea bargaining agreements being concluded in this part of the 
country.  
 
c) Gender balance: For the purpose of the similar representation of 
different genders, out of 15 interviewees, 8 were men and 7 were 
women. In total, out of 264 judges in Montenegro, 112 or 42.42% are 
men, and 152 or 57.58% are women. With the risk of being confuted 
by possible existing researches, I believe that gender potentially does 
not have, or possibly has a negligible effect in relation to the attitude 
of the interviewees in relation to the topic; however I still included this 
criterion in order to satisfy general gender non-discrimination 
requirements.   
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d) Representation of different courts, prosecution offices and defense 
attorney offices: Keeping in mind that by Montenegrin law, at the time 
of research, plea bargaining agreements could have been concluded 
before the courts of the initial, first instance – Basic Courts (which 
have jurisdiction for less serious crimes), but also for a certain number 
of crimes before the courts of higher instance – High Courts (which 
have jurisdiction for more serious crimes), I wanted to have all of them 
represented.48 (For reasons of clarity and for the further better reading 
of the research, a brief overview of the Montenegrin legal system and 
a diagram of the Montenegrin courts with jurisdictions in criminal 
procedure is in Appendix E).  Prosecutors act based on courts’ 
jurisdictions, so I included those prosecutors who act before both types 
of courts. When it comes to defense attorneys, I included attorneys 
from different attorney offices; in Montenegro there is no legal barrier 
for any adequately registered defense attorney, who is a member of the 
Bar Chamber of Montenegro, to represent before any court in 
Montenegro. In line with this: 3 interviewed judges are from the Basic 
Courts; 1 judge is from the High Court; 1 judge has recently been 
elected to the Appellate Court of Montenegro, but this judge was still 
interviewed because s/she has significant experience with plea 
bargaining agreements at her/his previous position as a High Court 
judge; 3 prosecutors are those who act before the Basic Courts; 2 
prosecutors are those who act before the High Courts; and all the 
defense attorneys are from different law offices. 
 
Once I defined the selection criteria, I started with the process of contacting 
potential participants. 
 
Process of Interviewing 
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When it comes to the procedure of contacting participants, arranging interviews 
and holding the interviews, it went very smoothly and fast, even though this was 
my primary concern when the whole process started. My concern was based on 
the presumption that all the potential participants are generally very busy, and in 
principle not all of them have time or affection towards academic or even 
professional work outside of their daily routine job. However, it proved that my 
fears were totally unfounded. I directly contacted specific judges, prosecutors and 
defense attorneys whose names were in the judgements on the acceptance of 
agreements. In only two cases, with the Basic Prosecutor’s Office in the capital 
city, Podgorica, and the High Prosecutor’s Office in Bijelo Polje, I first contacted 
the heads of the offices who then nominated the most adequate prosecutors for the 
interviews. The reason is that through judgment analysis it was not possible to 
easily identify who the acting prosecutors from the mentioned offices were in the 
relevant cases. Here I also relied on earlier successful personal and professional 
communication with the two heads of these offices.  
 
All the contacted participants, except one, were very open to giving interviews 
and showed a high level of interest in the matter. The mentioned exception was a 
defense attorney who kindly refused to participate in research, by e-mail, with the 
explanation that s/he believes s/he cannot provide relevant information and be 
useful for my research since s/he does not have enough experience and knowledge 
in relation to plea bargaining. In this case I believe it was more a question of 
general personal attitude towards the research type of work and the signing of a 
consent form49 than a question of experience since s/he stressed that s/he was not 
willing to sign a form. During the process of interviewing the participants, this 
defense attorney was replaced by another one who was willing to be interviewed. 
With every participant I was able to schedule the interview in a very short time. 
The fact that it was a quiet period of year for trials, August and September, was in 
my favor. Most of the interviews were held in the offices of the participants with 
only 3 being held at other jointly selected appropriate locations. Each interview 
lasted approximately 1 hour with the exception of two which lasted approximately 
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1 hour and 30 minutes. I recorded the interviews myself by typing the content of 
answers up on the computer. The reason why I did not opt for the audio recording 
of interviews is that, while making arrangements for the interviews, I felt a 
discrete or in some cases even explicit reluctance towards such a way of 
recording. After talking to participants, my estimation in all the cases was that I 
would get much better, more extensive and even more honest answers if I typed 
them directly as participants spoke. Practically, this was not hard since I type very 
fast. In addition, I had an answer sheet and a sort of check list prepared in 
advance. I believe that such form of recording the interviews even contributed to a 
longer and more detailed elaboration of answers, since participants did have a 
little bit more time to thoroughly think about their answers. In addition, they felt 
very relaxed. Eye contact and attentive listening were also key. With some of 
participants, there was a need to track them back to questions. As an interviewer, I 
did my best to keep my personal opinions, findings and biases related to the 
subject-matter out of the interview process. During the interviews, I would never 
ask leading or any kind of manipulative questions, but rather simple and objective 
ones which asked interviewees for an explanation, elaboration and description of 
their own opinions and experiences. I would let the interviewees fully express 
themselves and ask follow-up questions only when I needed further clarification. 
Such an approach proved to be successful and enabled the interviewees to feel 
motivated and free to answer in the way that best suited them, but still stick to the 
topic. Immediately after the end of each interview, I checked and technically 
corrected all the interview transcripts, as well as translating them into English.50 
Apart from the transcripts, after each interview I additionally made my personal 
notes which were a way to memorize or additionally stress some specific issues, 
behaviors or observations.  
 
Interview Data Analysis 
 
The next, final and quite often hardest step when it comes to interviews was data 
analysis. Out of many explanations of the complex process of data analysis and its 
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final result, Bogdan and Biklen (1982) provide a very simple and clear definition 
cited by Simon (2011, p. 245); they see it as “working with data, organizing it, 
breaking it into manageable units, synthesizing it, searching for patterns, 
discovering what is important and what is to be learned, and deciding what you 
will tell others”. However, this definition, even though it explains the process in a 
simple way, does not “warn” about its complexity. This phase was luckily not the 
hardest one for me since I believe that all the actions I took in advance in all the 
previous stages, particularly the formulation of questions, as well as the selection 
of participants and document analysis, made this process a manageable job. 
Another thing that made this phase much easier was that it was extremely 
interesting in terms of the issues and themes that were analyzed. The additional 
notes which I took immediately after each interview and in addition to the 
interview transcripts, also helped in the data analysis process. It was a list of my 
personal key “things”, impressions and observations promptly “caught” on paper, 
starting from unusual words used by participants to their body language which 
was a manifestation of certain opinions, and so on. Those were the issues that 
“popped-up” at each interview and which were later a great supplement in 
creating a “final big picture”. By good preparation and absolute devotion to the 
interview process I believe I avoided the typical post-interview question: What 
should we do with all this raw information now? 
 
Bearing in mind that the number of interviews was not that large, 15 in total, I 
decided to start data analysis once all the interviews ended. Even though the 
preparatory activities helped and the interviews were not numerous, the 
transcripts did include pages and pages of information which required a 
systematic and careful analytical approach. The main fear in this phase was 
whether I would miss something important i.e. make a proper selection in terms 
of what is relevant out of all these data, and whether I would be able to properly 
present the results in a condensed way. Reading the complete materials many 
times helped in this sense. Roulston says: “During the reduction and/or coding 
phase, the analyst must become well acquainted with the data set as a whole in 
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order to select appropriate examples to support assertions.”  (2014, p. 306). 
Through the process of intensive and repeated reading of all the transcripts first, 
and then the coding and thematic categorizing of information for which I used an 
Excel program, I reached the results which are analytically presented in Chapter 
IV. This is followed by a relevant results discussion in Chapter V, and it ends 
with concluding recommendations in Chapter VI. For the sake of better 
understanding the experiences and opinions of the interviewed participants and 
better quoting, in the analyses itself codes J1 to J5 are provided for judges, P1 to 
P5 for prosecutors, and A1 to A5 for defense attorneys. The participants’ age and 
length of working experience do not have any effect in terms of their attitude or 
approach to the plea bargaining institution and practice, so due to their irrelevance 
they are not elaborated at all.   
 
Insider Research Issues and the University Ethical Review Process 
 
One of the general ethical concerns before starting the process of interviews was 
related to my professional relationship with the potential interviewees, and how 
that would affect the research. Gibbs and Costley (2006, p. 246) write that 
“Practitioner researchers find themselves in various different contexts within 
particular professions and/or communities where there are likely to be ethical 
implications that they have a responsibility to recognize and understand.” As a 
former court legal assistant and Director of the key judicial training institution in 
the country for a number of years, I had the opportunity to meet and spend time 
with almost every judge and prosecutor in Montenegro. This was less applicable 
to defense attorneys, but still occurred, bearing in mind the small size of the 
country and number of training activities where attorneys participate as well. My 
present position of Legal Specialist at the U.S. Embassy in Montenegro also 
creates grounds for this type of concerns, remembering the long lasting criminal 
justice assistance programs of this Embassy in Montenegro. My starting dilemma 
was whether I could be considered a “real” insider researcher, bearing in mind 
that the research is not related to my specific workplace/employer nor my direct 
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colleagues. According to Griffith’s (1998, p. 361) definition, an insider is 
“someone whose biography…gives her a lived familiarity with the group being 
researched‟ while an outsider is “a researcher who does not have any intimate 
knowledge of the group being researched, prior to entry into the group‟. Even 
though such definitions might be too strict and exclusive, they essentially provide 
proper explanations. Mercer (2007, p. 6) writes that the “power relationships 
within which the researcher and the researched co-exist; the personalities of the 
researcher and specific informants; and even the precise topic under discussion” 
are important elements for understanding the insider/outsider researcher concepts. 
Considering these definitions and elements, I found myself to be somewhere in 
between as an “indirect” insider researcher since the participants of my research 
come from the same profession, and are potentially my regular professional 
contacts. In line with this, the key questions of concern were: whether the 
participants would feel comfortable talking about their professional experiences 
with me, whether they will be worried about anonymity, and whether they will be 
honest. Starting from the Gibbs and Costly notion of the “ethic of care where the 
researcher needs to consider ‘self’ as an ethical being within the community of 
practice being researched” (2006, p. 248), and taking into account the 
University’s required ethical review process my initial concerns were 
minimalized. The lack of any subordinate relationship between me as a researcher 
and participants; no particular sensitivity of the research topic; guaranteed 
anonymous status; and formal consent for interviews given by participants’ 
supervisors in the framework of the University ethical review process led to 
minimal chances for any ethical concerns. On the contrary, the conditions for 
good, dynamic and relaxed interviews which provided lots of usable information 
were created.     
 
When it comes to the University ethical review, in accordance with the relevant 
regulations I prepared the following documents: a consent form (for participants); 
ethics self-assessment; interview questions; an invitation letter for participants; a 
participant information sheet; a protocol (of the relevant Research Ethics 
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Committee); and letters – a requests for approval to conduct interviews (for the 
heads of the judiciary, prosecution and the Bar Chamber of Montenegro). 
 
They were all reviewed and awarded a favorable ethical opinion by the University 
of Portsmouth – Research Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Humanities and 
Social Sciences (Appendix F, and related to that Appendix G – UPR16 form). For 
informative reasons I have also attached: the consent form as Appendix H; the 
invitation letter for participants as Appendix I; the participant information sheet as 
Appendix J; and letters-requests for approval to conduct interview as appendices 
K, L and M. All the documents which were intended to be used or sent to 
participants were translated into Montenegrin by me.51     
 
Before I started the interviews I first requested and received general permission to 
organize interviews from the President of the Supreme Court of Montenegro, the 
Supreme State Prosecutor of Montenegro and the President of the Bar Chamber of 
Montenegro who are heads of the relevant judicial, prosecutorial and defense 
attorneys structures. Besides receiving written consent from them, they also 
kindly offered any kind of support in relation to my research. As already stressed, 
the received written consent did serve as an important stimulus for the 
interviewees to enter the whole process.  
 
Through the mentioned documents, over the phone and during face-to-face 
meetings each participant was: thoroughly informed about the research itself and 
was given the opportunity to ask questions about it; told why s/he was invited to 
be an interviewee; introduced to the process of conducting the interview and what 
is expected from her/him; informed about the confidential character of the data 
gathered by the interview; given possibility of being quoted without name; told 
about the recording of the interview; told about the interview data access given to 
relevant University of Portsmouth representatives and regulatory authorities; and 
given information about the voluntary character of interview and the opportunity 
to withdraw from participation up to a certain time. Each interviewee was also 
79 
 
given the opportunity to ask me (as a researcher) any questions, but also to 
consult my primary mentor. Finally, each participant offered the opportunity to 
formally complain to the relevant Department Head in case s/he had any concerns 
in relation to the research (contacts details for all were provided).    
 
All the interview related documents and notes, as well as transcripts are kept on 
my personal computer and password protected. 
 
The Interviews: A Reflective Account 
 
Even though I have already touched upon the reflective view of my research 
under 2.3. Process of Interviewing and Interview Data Analyses, I believe that the 
additional brief reflection that follows will be useful for a better further 
understanding of the research process, the research results and the theme of the 
research in general. As McClure (2002, p.3) states, citing Boud, Keogh and 
Walker (1985): “Reflection is a forum of response of the learner to experience” 
and we use it as “a form of mental processing…to fulfil a purpose or to achieve 
some anticipated outcome.” (Moon, 2006, p. 37). As is expected from every 
researcher, particularly first time doctoral researchers, a reflection on research or 
some of its segments represents a way of learning about the research process itself 
and the research topic, and a way of discovering “tricks” for doing things better in 
the future. As Moon concludes “’learning’…is deemed to be an outcome of 
reflection in its own right…” With the experience of living through this research I 
am sure I would be more successful next time. My stress level would be lower, 
the lived experiences and previously gained knowledge about the whole process 
would enable even better preparation, more relaxed interviews, and richer 
interviews results, analysis and conclusions.    
 
In line with the above, I can generally say that conducting interviews was quite 
stressful, but an extremely interesting experience for me. It required significant 
preparation in terms of creating interview questions, the identification of proper 
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interviewees, arranging the interviews, preparing a personal check list to be used 
during the interviews, and other elements. Special skills were needed to adapt to 
each participant and their style of communication, and based on that to “get the 
most out of the person”. It enriched me not just from the perspective of the 
research process and the subject-matter of my research, but also from the 
perspective of communication skills. Finally, one of the things that I found helpful 
in preparation for the interviews was attending the Course on Communication 
Skills organized by my employer in March 2015. The course equipped me with a 
certain number of “tips” in relation to both business and private communication 
that were useful during the process of interviewing, like those related to body 
language and tone of speaking, the way of asking questions, the purposeful usage 
of certain terms for the sake of establishing closer and trustworthy contact with 
the interlocutor, and so on.  
 
2.4. Document Analysis  
 
A very important segment of my research was conducted by the analysis of 
relevant documentation. In my case this method was supplemental to the semi-
structured interviews, as it is quite often the case with this type of research. As 
Bowen writes (2009, p. 28) citing Denzin (1970): “Document analysis is often 
used in combination with other qualitative research methods as a means of 
triangulation—‘the combination of methodologies in the study of the same 
phenomenon’.” In my research it predominantly served to enable a 
comprehensive elaboration of the legal regulations and existing practice 
concerning plea bargaining at the national and international level. This was seen 
as necessary for a better understanding of practice itself and getting a “complete 
picture”. As Corbin and Strauss say: “Document analysis requires that data be 
examined and interpreted in order to elicit meaning, gain understanding, and 
develop empirical knowledge.” (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, cited by Bowen, 2009, 
p. 27). I found this method very useful, for the reasons that Bowen further defines 
(2009, p. 30-31): “…documents provide background and context, additional 
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questions to be asked, supplementary data, a means of tracking change and 
development, and verification of findings from other data sources.” Contrary to its 
usefulness, however, it seems to me that less attention is given to this research 
method in the academic world than is the case with other methods like, for 
example, interviews. 
 
In the process of analyzing, the first step was to identify documents that will be 
the subject of analysis, and to categorize them based on their content and purpose. 
Bearing in mind the practice I am researching and wishing to provide context and 
make a link with the interviews results, the laws and bylaws that regulate plea 
bargaining were the very first choice. They were followed by court case files i.e. 
primarily judgments based on the agreements on guilt. In order to examine and 
present the practice from different angles including the legislative, practical, 
national, international, developmental, historical and so on, it was necessary to 
have insight into a large number of other documents as well. They include a series 
of official reports, guidelines, rules, manuals, press releases, newspaper articles, 
recommendations, and other documents which were also categorized during the 
analytical process52. The analysis of these documents, together with the semi-
structured interviews was seen as a way to provide a complete picture and reach 
the research goals. 
 
The documents analysis was mainly done by reading, and describing/presenting 
the read material. In this process, the identification of issues that are most 
relevant, informative and illustrative was a primary goal. All the interrelated and 
interconnected information gained by this method was then categorized and 
presented in a systematic descriptive way, remembering the key research goals 
and interview results. When it comes to legal provisions, their analysis included 
not just informative and descriptive but to a limited extent an interpretative 
segment as well. It was focused on revealing the ratio legis i.e. the purpose of 
existing legal norms, and motives of the legislator.  
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This analytical process was extremely time-consuming, both in terms of 
recognizing the most relevant documents, as well as in terms of reading, the 
proper identification, abstraction, classification and presentation of the main 
issues. Additionally, it required a very cautious approach, particularly in relation 
to some typical risks related to the authenticity, reliability and incompleteness of 
some documents. However, the interesting content of most of the documents 
made this process much easier. 
 
To conclude, for this type of plea bargaining research, interviews, combined with 
some other typical qualitative research method(s) seem to represent the best 
choice and have the potential to provide good quality results. As support to this 
statement a brief overview of the research methods used by other plea bargaining 
authors is presented in Appendix N. This additionally assures me of the 
correctness of my choice of methods.  
  
2.5. Conclusion 
 
The process of writing about the methodology of my research, and particularly 
practical application of the research methods was a revealing experience. It was 
not easy, but it was worthwhile. This segment of my research work will have life-
long effects on my understanding of knowledge and the ways of gaining it. 
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CHAPTER III  
PLEA BARGAINING IN MONTENEGRO   
AND SOME COMPARATIVE PRACTICES  
 
With the purpose of providing context, background and support for my research, 
this chapter will discuss: how and why plea bargaining was introduced into the 
Montenegrin legal system, how it is regulated, to what extent it is applied in 
practice and in what way. It will also provide a comparative overview of the plea 
bargaining practices of two neighboring countries, Serbia and Croatia. Finally, it 
will identify which of the solutions and approaches of these countries could 
potentially represent good models for Montenegro.  
3.1. Plea Bargaining in Montenegro – Legislation and Practice 
 
Plea bargaining was introduced for the first time in Montenegro in 2009 by the 
adoption of the new CPC. The 2009 CPC is the first Criminal Procedural Code 
that was adopted in the country after regaining its independence in 2006. Before 
that, different criminal procedural laws were applied in the country in the periods 
when it was a constitutive part of other countries53. All of these countries were 
countries with a federal political structure, and had legislation at both federal and 
republic levels. The criminal procedure before 2009 was a classical civil law 
inquisitorial criminal procedure characterized by the dominant role of the judge. 
The investigative judge lead the investigation, while a trial judge presided at the 
trial. This process was characterized by the quite passive role of the prosecutor 
who represented the charge based on the investigation conducted by investigative 
judge. The trial was managed by a trial judge, and s/he or a panel of judges 
together with the lay judges (all depending on the seriousness of crime) made 
decisions based on the evidence presented by both sides. After the 2009 CPC, 
Montenegro kept this typical civil law criminal procedure but with added 
elements of the adversarial system when it comes to the investigation. The most 
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significant change was related exactly to the investigation phase of the process 
which is now fully led by a prosecutor, not an investigative judge. The trial on the 
other hand remained a typical civil law criminal trial presided over by a judge or 
panel of judges (depending on the seriousness of crime) with no lay judges or 
jury. In this type of trial, the judge has a leading role, s/he presides the trial and 
makes decisions based on the evidence presented. There is no cross-examination, 
and the judge has judicial discretion in deciding about the facts and sentence 
based on the evidence provided and in accordance with the CPC and the Criminal 
Code (CC) rules. Plea bargaining is allowed in all the phases before the actual 
trial starts. 
 
The fact of Montenegro becoming an independent country in 2006 required the 
raising of a young democracy after the extremely turbulent and challenging 
Yugoslav conflict and post-conflict periods of history. A need for the (re)adoption 
of not just this law, but practically all the other laws emerged. Additionally, 
Montenegro needed to (re)enter the international community as a new subject. 
The burdens of the old traditional criminal procedure were present and have been 
causing problems in a changing society with various forms of new and complex 
crime appearing each day. The old system was characterized by the slowness and 
inefficiency of the criminal procedure particularly in the investigative stage, 
which was causing unacceptably long criminal trials and a significant case back-
log. The obvious opening up of the country which brought intensified 
international communication and a sudden influx of large foreign investments 
were factors which additionally created the need for change in this and many 
other areas. These issues were recognized by the Government of Montenegro 
through its official policies and activities. The two main issues which were clearly 
identified by the Ministry of Justice as the crucial ones when it comes to reform 
of the criminal procedure were: “the creation of a normative basis for more 
efficient criminal proceedings and securing the complete protection of freedoms 
and rights of people guaranteed by the Constitution and international 
documents”54.  This huge undertaking of reforming the criminal procedure 
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resulted in adoption of the new CPC in 2009 which introduced a completely new 
concept of investigation now led by the prosecutors instead of the investigative 
judges. Many other changes and new legal institutions were introduced including 
plea bargaining.55 Naturally, the criminal justice reform process did not include 
just the CPC, but also a substantive CC, as well as all the other laws linked to the 
criminal procedure and criminal justice system as a whole. Since its adoption, the 
2009 CPC has been amended four times due to the challenges that real life and the 
law’s practical application generated. As is the case with any reform undertaking, 
the criminal procedure reform is a long lasting process which is expected to 
identify problems and crystalize their best solutions. The plea bargaining 
institution will be the focus of attention of both Montenegrin legislators and 
practitioners for quite some time. This is due to its huge potential, but also due to 
its somewhat controversial character in the civil law system, such as the 
Montenegrin one. Later in this chapter I will focus on plea bargaining provisions 
and their development since 2009. As a former court legal assistant and the 
Director of the Judicial Training Center of Montenegro, and currently holding the 
position of Legal Specialist at the U.S. Embassy in Montenegro, the application, 
analysis, interpretation and discussion of the criminal law provisions is an integral 
part of my job. Through providing legal analysis and comments, work on specific 
cases, and participation in criminal law training events for national, regional and 
international criminal justice officials both as speaker and participant, I 
continuously follow Montenegrin legislative developments and case-law, and 
have the opportunity to learn and discuss the experiences of both Montenegrin 
and regional academics and practitioners.  
 
Legal Provisions 
 
As already said, plea bargaining was introduced into the Montenegrin criminal 
justice system by the 2009 CPC. In July 2015, these provisions were amended and 
a number of changes took place. For the purpose of better elaboration and bearing 
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in mind that the 2015 amendments are not numerous, I will firstly present the 
original 2009 provisions and then the later 2015 amendments.56  
   
The Criminal Procedure Code from the Year 200957 
 
Articles 300 to 303 (the full text is in Appendix O) of 2009 CPC regulate plea 
bargaining and make up Chapter XX of the law. The total number of law articles 
is 517.58   
 
Article 300 deals with concluding agreements on the admission of guilt, as they 
are named in the law, and primarily defines crimes for which plea bargaining is 
allowed and who can actually propose the conclusion of the agreement. Plea 
bargaining is possible for crimes where the envisaged prison sentence is up to 10 
years. The prosecutor or the accused and her/his attorney may propose concluding 
the agreement.59 The legislator, though, does introduce some limitations when it 
comes to who can enter negotiations on guilt. Apart from, naturally, the 
prosecutor being one proposer, the other can only be the accused and her/his 
attorney, not a suspected person.60  
 
Article 301 defines the subject-matter of agreements on the admission of guilt and 
clearly defines the issues that prosecutor and accused and her/his defense attorney 
can agree on. The article allows bargaining about the sentence i.e. the criminal 
sanction. Any possibility of bargaining about the legal qualification of the crime 
or the facts of the case is excluded. The main precondition, however, for 
bargaining and agreement itself is for the accused to fully confess the crime or the 
concurrence of crimes that s/he is accused of.61 Taking into account that the 
Montenegrin legal system is predominantly a civil legal system and that 
bargaining over guilt represents a novelty for this system, such solutions are to be 
expected.   
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Article 302 defines the process of deciding on the agreement on the admission of 
guilt, and allows for three options in this sense: the dismissal, rejection or 
acceptance of the agreement by the court. At the same time the article defines the 
conditions for each of the three possibilities.62 
 
Article 303 is related to judgment as the final form of deciding on the acceptance 
of the agreement on the admission of guilt. It states that the court will adopt the 
judgment in three days from the moment when its ruling on accepting the 
agreement becomes final. From the perspective of court’s forms of deciding, the 
dismissal and rejection of agreement are done through regular court decisions i.e. 
rulings, while the court’s acceptance of an agreement must be additionally 
validated through the relevant judgment as well.63  
 
Before presenting the previously mentioned 2015 CPC amendments, it is worth 
noting that in July 2010 the Judicial Training Center of Montenegro issued a 
publication entitled The Manual for Application of the Criminal Procedure Code 
of Montenegro - Explanation of Basic Institutions, Court Practice and Practical 
Forms.64 It was published with the main purpose of being a tool for the better 
implementation of the new law, and was prepared by a group of authors 
composed of two judges, a prosecutor and a defense attorney. When it comes to 
plea bargaining, apart from a brief explanation of the institution, the publication 
includes eight model forms that are to be used by actors in the process in its 
different stages. Those include the following sample forms needed for each case 
where a plea agreement is being concluded: the invitation for the accused to 
discuss the possible conclusion of the agreement; records of the negotiations; 
records of hearing the accused in the framework of the negotiations; the plea 
agreement; records of deciding on the plea agreement; the decision of the court to 
adopt the plea agreement; the delivery of the plea agreement in the investigation 
phase, and the judgment based on the plea agreement. Each document is between 
one and three pages long (as an illustration, one of those eight documents – the 
suggested form of the plea agreement, is provided in Appendix T).  The question 
88 
 
of whether it was good to follow such recommendations, and the question of the 
forms’ quality, are being asked by some Montenegrin legal professionals, and that 
will be discussed later in this chapter.    
 
Amendments to the CPC Plea Bargaining Provisions from the Year 2015  
 
As will be presented later in this chapter, plea agreements statistics clearly shows 
that this mechanism for resolving criminal cases has not been widely used in 
Montenegro since its introduction in 2009. Through regular monitoring 
mechanisms related to CPC implementation, after a little bit more than two years 
from the adoption of the law, the Government of Montenegro examined the 
relevant statistics. As a result of this, it adopted the document entitled Information 
on the Implementation of the Institution of Agreements on Admission of Guilt on 
26 June 201265.  By that time, there have been only 27 agreements signed 
throughout Montenegro. However, regardless of such a poor implementation it 
was again stressed in this document that: “This institution in our criminal 
procedure can realistically lead to the faster ending of many criminal proceedings 
and reduction of costs, while at the same time interests of legality and justice will 
not be jeopardized. This represents basic ratio legis of this institution in our 
Criminal Procedure Code.” The wish to “enliven” the institution was clearly 
demonstrated, and this was probably the moment when amendments to the 
existing plea bargaining provisions became part of the plans for the future.  
 
In June 2013, the Ministry of Justice prepared The Report on the Needs for 
Modifications and Additions to the Criminal Procedure Code66 based on the 
Government Information about the Implementation of the Criminal Procedure 
Code67 adopted in December 2012, and the Conclusions68 that were a follow-up to 
the Information from January 2013. While praising the obvious improvement 
when it comes to the efficiency of the criminal proceedings, a series of 
amendments to the CPC were proposed. All were deeply rooted in practice i.e. the 
inputs that had been received from practitioners who implement the law in their 
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daily work. One of the amending proposals concerned agreements on the 
admission of guilt and suggested: “The need for a change of Articles 300,301,302 
and 303 in relation to defining the issue of detention after judgment based on the 
agreement on the admission of guilt is adopted…, as well as the scope of crimes 
for which the agreement can be concluded.” These initial suggestions resulted in 
amendments that were adopted in July 2015. The plea bargaining mechanism was 
still be regulated in Articles 300 to 303 (the full text is in Appendix P), and it still 
forms Chapter XX of the new amended CPC, which kept a total of 517 Articles. 
 
Article 300 continues to define the conclusion of plea agreements. There are 
essentially three major changes that the amendments introduced. Firstly, contrary 
to earlier regulation, the agreement is now allowed for all crimes except terrorism 
related crimes and war crimes.69 Secondly, the agreement can be concluded not 
just by the accused and her/his attorney, but also by a suspect which was not the 
case before.70 Thirdly, contrary to the earlier solution, the indictment is now 
submitted together with the agreement as its constituent part (this is in cases when 
the agreement is concluded before indictment is formally brought up). In this case 
the indictment is not the subject of the so-called “control” or “check” that is 
regularly conducted in every criminal case by a non-trial court panel before the 
trial itself.71 
 
Overall, the efficiency and practicality of the institution “won” when it comes to 
the latest amendments. In the elaboration of the amendments legislator stressed 
that by such proposed solutions:”…even bigger privilege is given to this way of 
resolving criminal proceedings i.e. to this sort of alternative way of resolving 
cases, by which higher efficiency and effectiveness of the criminal procedure will 
be reached…”72  
 
When it comes to Articles 301, 302 and 303, they were kept essentially the same 
as in the 2009 CPC.73  
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Finally, there are two other CPC changes relevant to plea agreements. The first 
one concerns the mandatory defense of the accused. In general, mandatory 
defense implies a legally defined obligation to have a professional defense; it is 
for example present for the most serious crimes where the accused is obliged to 
have professional defense and if s/he cannot afford it, the Government will 
provide it for him. By the 2015 CPC amendments, the duty of the accused to have 
a defense attorney in cases of plea agreement negotiations was for the first time 
explicitly added to other cases of mandatory defense in Article 69. The second 
change concerns detention. In the 2015 CPC, in the amended to Article 376 
dealing with detention, it was for the first time defined that after the adoption of a 
judgment based on the plea agreement, the detained accused is directly sent to 
serve the prison sentence i.e. there is an automatic switch from the regime of 
detention to regime of serving the sentence (this is when the time spent in 
detention is shorter than the prison sentence ordered).74  
 
The 2015 CPC plea bargaining amendments were not numerous, and yet 
potentially capable of causing significant changes in practice. The expansion of 
this practice to almost all crimes, and putting this “tool into the hands” of 
Montenegrin prosecutors who deal with the most serious cases has the potential to 
result in a larger number of plea agreements in the future. 
 
Existing Practice  
 
In order to “check” the scope of the application of the elaborated provisions in the 
daily functioning of the criminal justice system of Montenegro, I will provide 
some statistical data from the beginning of the year 2010 (when plea bargaining 
became applicable in Montenegro) to the end of the year 2015 (when the latest 
amendments were adopted, which made plea bargaining possible for all the 
crimes except war crimes and terrorism related crimes).   
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Just by looking at the statistics it can easily be concluded that plea bargaining is 
not applied to a larger extent in Montenegro. In the period of six years, only 7975 
agreements were concluded. The yearly breakdown can be seen below. 
 
In the year 2010 – 0.01%76: 1 agreement (the number of total criminal cases 
completed was 7,48377)  
In the year 2011 - 0.14%: 9 agreements (the number of total criminal cases 
completed was 6,56778)  
In the year 2012 - 0.41%: 25 agreements (the number of total criminal cases 
completed was 6,04779)  
In the year 2013 - 0.27%: 14 agreements (the number of total criminal cases 
completed was 5,09580)  
In the year 2014 - 0.20%: 10 agreements (the number of total criminal cases 
completed was 5,07381)  
In the year 2015 – 0.45%: 20 agreements (the number of total criminal cases 
completed was 4,48282)  
 
The criminal cases completed include cases in the courts where plea bargaining is 
applied i.e. the Basic and High Courts of Montenegro. If the total number of cases 
completed per year is looked at, it is obvious how small a percentage of them 
were resolved by plea bargaining.  
 
For closer look at the practice, it is useful to give a brief overview of the regional 
breakdown, types of crimes committed, and types of sanctions negotiated.  
 
When it comes to the regional breakdown, almost equal number of agreements 
was concluded in the Central part of the country (39) and the rest of the country 
together (South 15 and North 25, in total 40). In terms of towns the largest 
number of agreements was concluded in the capital Podgorica (25). The least 
agreements were logically concluded in one of the smallest Montenegrin towns, 
Plav. A slightly larger number of agreements would be expected in the central 
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part of the country. The Central part includes the capital, Podgorica and three 
other towns, Cetinje, Niksic and Danilovgrad. Approximately one third of the 
Montenegrin population lives in Podgorica (185,937 out of 620,02983 inhabitants). 
The capital has the busiest prosecution offices and courts in Montenegro.84 
However, even though the number of cases is larger in the Central part of the 
country, in comparison to the North and South, the number of plea agreements 
concluded is almost identical. Moreover, 23 agreements were signed in the 
biggest northern town of Bijelo Polje only, almost as is the case in Podgorica 
which is significantly larger town (the population of Bijelo Polje is 46,051, and of 
Podgorica is 185,93785). The criminal justice actors from the North and South 
seem slightly more interested in and involved with this practice. 
 
By analyzing content of all the plea bargaining agreements, it can be seen that the 
crimes for which the agreements were concluded are various86 (an overview is 
provided in the Appendix Q). 
 
The types of criminal sanctions negotiated were: a prison sentence (in 34 cases), a 
conditional release-probation (in 38 cases), a fine (in 6 cases) and community 
service (in 1 case). In some cases, the sentences were followed by the security 
measure of the confiscation of assets related to the commission of crime. 
Additionally, the sentences were issued against individuals, and only in two cases 
against legal entities. Bearing in mind that the system of enforcing community 
service and the system of electronic surveillance of convicted people are still in 
the process of being setting up in Montenegro, it is expected that once these 
systems are fully operational there will be more plea agreements that will include 
those sentences. This was stressed by one of the defense attorneys I interviewed, 
A4 (for participants’ coding please see Chapter IV). As s/he explained, the 
inability to order the electronic surveillance of her/his client who was willing to 
serve a home detention sentence prevented the conclusion of the plea agreement.    
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The agreements were concluded before different courts depending on their 
jurisdiction i.e. the type of crime and sanction envisaged for that crime. Most of 
the agreements were concluded before the Basic Courts (60); they have 
jurisdiction over crimes where a prison sentence of up to 10 years is envisaged by 
law. Nineteen (19) agreements were concluded before the High Courts which 
have jurisdiction over crimes where prison sentence of more than 10 years is 
envisaged by law. Additionally, the High Courts have exclusive jurisdiction over 
some types of crimes including Unauthorized Production, Keeping and 
Distribution of Narcotic Drugs and Active Bribery.  
 
Even though the vast majority of the proposed agreements were accepted by the 
courts, there are a few cases when this was not the case (they were rejected or 
dismissed). Not all the prosecution offices were able to provide an exact number 
of such cases; their statistical system counts these cases as those where a regular 
trial took place, and it is not able to present them separately. However, based on 
the informal input I received from the prosecution offices, there was 
approximately up to 10 such cases in total, in the whole country. The reasons for 
rejection and dismissal were the following: the accused did not show up at the 
plea agreement hearing (CPC Article 302 par.7 of the CPC), and the fallacy of the 
accused (CPC Article 302 par. 8) determined by a mismatch between the 
accused’s confession/statement which was basis of the agreement, and her/his 
statement given to the court at the later stage of the judicial “check” of the 
agreement. In one case, after the complaint of the injured party against the court 
ruling on the acceptance of the agreement, the court canceled this ruling and 
rejected the agreement. 
 
Finally, the Montenegrin CPC includes other institutions that have some 
resemblance to plea bargaining, including deferred prosecution. Even though 
these legal possibilities are essentially or somewhat different from plea 
bargaining, they may potentially limit the usage of plea agreements, and in some 
situations seem more “attractive” to the accused. Due to their possible influence 
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on the application of plea bargaining, they are presented in Appendix R in more 
detail. 
 
As it can be concluded from above presented, plea bargaining is definitely far 
from having significant practical application in Montenegro. However, even 
minimally, it is still present in the practice of criminal justice institutions.87/ 88 In 
Chapter IV and V, which deal with the interviews conducted and their results, 
some factors that cause the non-usage of this legal institution will be discussed. 
Before going into that, I will briefly present the relevant experiences of two 
neighboring countries, Serbia and Croatia.   
 
3.2. Plea Bargaining in Serbia and Croatia 
 
When initially thinking about plea bargaining comparative experiences, apart 
from those related to the U.S. and to a smaller extent to other countries of the 
world, I wanted to include countries which are similar and comparable to 
Montenegro. Due to their joint legal tradition and similar legal systems, the same 
problems related to the inefficiency of criminal proceedings, as well as the 
existence of similar forms of plea bargaining, I chose Serbia and Croatia. These 
countries have similar, but still different approaches to plea bargaining. In my 
elaboration I will primarily focus on differences in comparison to Montenegro 
since the answers to some problematic aspects of the Montenegrin practice can 
potentially be identified this way.  
 
Serbia 
 
In order to illustrate the level of presence of agreements on the admission of crime 
(as they are named in the Serbian CPC) in the Serbian legal system, I will provide 
some relevant statistics. The Serbian system of court and prosecutorial statistics is 
somewhat different to the Montenegrin, so in line with that, theway of presenting 
essentially the same data is a little different. I took 2014 as an illustrative year.  
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Year 201489     
Total No. of 
agreements 
Court 
accepted 
Court 
dismissed/rejected 
Unsolved-
transferred to 
2015 
In the jurisdiction of the 
Special Prosecution for 
Organized Crime (out of 
total No.) 
2469 1670 518 281 38  
Table 1 - Serbia – Plea bargaining agreements 2014 
In the year 2014 – 3.12%: 1,670 agreements (the total number of criminal cases 
completed was 53.47790) 
 
The total number of criminal cases completed are cases completed by the courts 
of basic and higher jurisdiction where plea agreements can be applied. If we take 
this number into account, it is easy to conclude that plea agreements are not used 
to a significant extent in this country either. In the reference year, only 3.12% of 
criminal cases ended in plea agreements. This is just slightly more than in 
Montenegro.  
 
The statistical report of Serbian prosecution for 2014, however, stresses that due 
to the simpler plea bargaining procedure that was recently introduced into Serbian 
legislation, there is a noticeable growth of 48.62%91 in the number of agreements 
concluded in 2014 in comparison to 2013. 
  
This institution was first introduced into the Serbian legal system in 2009. It has 
developed since then, and in the present CPC92 which dates from 2011 these 
provisions got their current shape. By this new CPC provisions the application of 
plea bargaining was extended to all crimes and the procedure was simplified. The 
Serbian CPC defines three types of agreements which can be considered plea 
agreements in a wider sense: agreement on the admission of crime, agreement on 
the testimony of the accused, and agreement on the testimony of the convicted. 
Out of these three, agreement on the admission of crime represents real plea 
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bargaining, and it is similar to the one in Montenegro. The other two agreements 
essentially represent regulations of cooperating witness situations; they will also 
be briefly discussed later in this chapter.  
 
By agreement on the admission of crime the accused admits the commission of a 
certain crime, and as a result negotiates a more lenient sentence with the 
prosecutor. However, there are a few differences that are immediately obvious in 
comparison to Montenegro.  
 
a) The conclusion of an agreement is possible for all crimes in Serbia, while 
the Montenegrin provisions exclude war crimes and terrorism related 
crimes.  
b) The proposing and concluding of an agreement is allowed until the end of 
trial in Serbia, while in Montenegro this is possible only until the first 
session of the main hearing i.e. the beginning of the trial. 
c) There is the possibility to negotiate about the type and measure, as well as 
the range of the criminal sanction in Serbia. This is not the case in the 
Montenegrin system where the prosecutor and the accused can only agree 
about a specific sanction. 
d) The Serbian legislator defines that the element of an agreement on the 
admission of crime may be a prosecutor’s statement by which s/he gives 
up the criminal prosecution of the accused for any crime(s) which are not 
part of the agreement itself. This possibility does not exist in Montenegrin 
law where the prosecutor and the accused negotiate only about crimes 
which are subject of the specific agreement. 
e) In Serbian law, in order to accept the agreement, the judge must be sure 
that there is no evidence contrary to the confession of the accused. Unlike 
the Serbian definition, Montenegrin law imposes a duty on the judge to 
make sure that the confession is in line with the evidence provided, and 
requires him to make sure that is it not a fallacious confession. 
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f) Another possible arrangement between the prosecutor and the accused that 
is explicitly defined in Serbian law, unlike Montenegrin, is the agreement 
on the confiscation of property that ensued from the crime (this is related 
to property that indirectly came out of crime i.e. extended confiscation). 
This option exists in addition to the possibility of agreeing about the 
confiscation of property gain that is a specific, direct result of the 
commission of the crime in question. 
g) In Serbian law no rights are given to the injured party in terms of being 
informed about the plea agreement hearing, or complaining against the 
court’s decision on the acceptance of the agreement; both options do exist 
in Montenegrin law. 
h) Finally, Serbian law regulates the acceptance of the agreement by one 
single form of decision, and that is a judgment. In Montenegro the court 
first accepts the agreement by its ruling, and then based on this ruling the 
judgment on the acceptance of the plea agreement is adopted.  
 
Out of all the Serbian solutions, the following seem to be the ones which have the 
potential to improve Montenegrin plea bargaining practice to some extent:  
 
In relation to point b), the proposing and concluding of an agreement being 
possible until the end of the trial, this seems acceptable to Montenegro as well. 
Some of the interviewed prosecutors suggested exactly such a solution, since they 
do not see any barriers to it. They claim that, this way, both the prosecutor and the 
accused “…have a better possibility to see what … [they] have and don’t have.”, 
as prosecutor P4 says (for participants’ coding please see Chapter IV).93  
 
In relation to point d), enabling the prosecutor to give up criminal prosecution for 
crimes which are not part of the agreement, this could be considered an additional 
tool in the hands of the prosecutor. It may be an additional motive for the accused 
to accept the sentence offered by the prosecutor. 94 The introduction of such an 
option with plea agreements, even though it would essentially mean the 
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introduction of charge bargaining, would be acceptable and justified. The 
interviewed prosecutor P4 supported this by saying: “I think they [the prosecutor 
and the accused] should have possibility to negotiate the crime itself. Let’s 
negotiate about the crime!” 
 
In relation to point f), Serbian law explicitly defines that all assets can be the 
subject of a plea agreement ( property gain that is result of a specific crime, as 
well as all property that is an indirect product of crime, like for example, a 
purchased houses, yachts, and so on). Montenegrin law recognizes the possibility 
of negotiation about property gain that is result of only of a specific crime. In both 
Montenegro and Serbia though, the temporary freezing and permanent 
confiscation of property is regulated by separate laws that exclusively regulate 
this area including the conducting of financial investigations. However, explicitly 
defining this possibility in the framework of plea agreements may be useful from 
the perspective of, for example, organized crime cases and the efficiency of the 
procedure. It proved to be useful in the work of the Serbian Prosecution for 
Organized Crime which uses this extended asset confiscation option within their 
plea agreements.95  
 
The protection of the injured party’s rights deserves special consideration since it 
touches upon issues of justice and fairness. In Serbian law, no rights are given to 
the injured party in terms of being informed about the plea agreement hearing, or 
complaining against the court’s decision on the acceptance of the agreement; both 
options do exist in Montenegrin law. In both systems, regardless of the plea 
agreement, there is always the option for the injured party to protect their own 
rights in the civil procedure. The Montenegrin legislator, however, wanted to 
provide the injured party with the additional right to appeal against the acceptance 
of a plea agreement. As a result of that, the court’s two level decision process in 
relation to plea bargaining was introduced in Montenegro. The approach of the 
Serbian legislator to the injured party may be seen as a more practical option 
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which eliminates any “obstructions” from the injured party’s side and simplifies 
the procedure.  
 
As has been already said, two additional agreements are available in the Serbian 
system, the agreement on the testimony of the accused and the agreement on the 
testimony of the convicted. Essentially, these agreements are forms of plea 
bargaining and include sentence negotiation.96 They both involve a cooperating 
witness in cases of organized crime and war crimes. In Montenegro, the 
institution of the cooperating witness is limited to organized crime only, and to a 
total release from the criminal prosecution in case this witness/accused provides 
crucial testimony to the prosecutor. The opportunity for prosecutors to more 
widely use the testimonies of both the accused and the convicted in Serbian law is 
a very practical solution that is in line with potential real life scenarios. They open 
up space for larger number of negotiated pleas, seem very attractive and could be 
a good tool for Montenegrin prosecutors.97  
 
One fact that should be pointed out when discussing Serbian plea bargaining 
practice is that by the latest reform of the Serbian criminal procedure, a number of 
typical Anglo-Saxon elements were introduced. This includes not just prosecutor-
led investigations98, but also cross–examination at trial. Cross–examination does 
not exist in Montenegro. It looks as if the Montenegrin legislator opted for the 
slow, careful and partial introduction of certain adversarial elements into its 
system, while the pace of Serbian reforms in this sense seems to be faster. In both 
countries, their criminal procedures represent a mixture of inquisitorial and 
adversarial procedures which by itself creates problems of different types (these 
issues may be the subject of separate research) and also influences the application 
of plea bargaining. These criminal proceedings with their characteristics are 
probably not the best fitting for this practice for now, as is the case with fully 
adversarial criminal proceedings of the American type. In the observations of 
some of the participants in my research this was reflected. They stress that the 
mixture of the two systems causes problems in practice, and that it is better to opt 
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for exclusively one system, whichever that is. One of the participants, Judge J4 
said (for participants’ coding please see Chapter IV): “Agreements and the 
principle of material truth, this is a combination which is problematic…I don’t 
know why we don’t immediately transfer to something new, instead of doing it 
gradually and slowly.”      
 
The general impression is that the Serbian legislator was more open to the 
application of plea bargaining in practice. In line with that, less formality and 
more “maneuvering space” in the whole process was provided. On the other hand, 
the Montenegrin legislator tended to keep a somewhat rigid approach, and a 
certain level of caution when using this institution is concerned. This is 
particularly from the perspective of goods jeopardized by the commission of 
crimes, and injured party interests.  
 
Croatia 
 
Following the same matrix as with Serbia, I will first briefly present some 
statistical data related to the agreement of parties on guilt and sentences, as it is 
named in the Croatian CPC. I will then comparatively refer to the relevant 
legislative solutions of this country.  
 
For the statistics, 2014 is the reference year again. The Croatian system of court 
and prosecutorial statistics is somewhat different to both the Montenegrin and 
Serbian, so in line with that, the way of presenting essentially the same data is a 
little different, as can be seen in Table 2. 
 
Year 201499   
Total No. of 
judgments based on 
agreements 
In the jurisdiction of the 
Municipal and District 
Prosecution Offices 
In the jurisdiction of the Special 
Prosecution Office for Organized 
Crime and Corruption 
716 292 424 
Table 2 – Croatia – Plea bargaining agreements 2014 
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In the year 2014 – 1.21%: 716 agreements (the number of total criminal cases 
completed was 59,048100) 
The total number of criminal cases completed are those cases completed before 
the Croatian Municipal and District Courts101 where plea bargaining is applied. It 
can be concluded that only 1.21% of all criminal cases ended with plea 
agreements.  
 
The statistical data of the Croatian Special Prosecution Office for Organized 
Crime and Corruption show that 68.17% of the total number of convicting 
judgments that this office won were reached through plea agreements. Plea 
bargaining is obviously predominantly used for organized crime and corruption 
cases in Croatia, which is not the case in Montenegro or Serbia.  
 
Year 2014102 Statistics of the Special Prosecution Office for Organized Crime and 
Corruption 
Total No. of 
convicting 
judgments  
622 
No. of convicting 
judgments that 
ended with the plea 
agreements 
424 
Table 3 - Croatia –Convicting judgments 2014 
However, bearing in mind Montenegro’s recent extension of plea bargaining to 
almost all crimes where a prison sentence of more than 10 years is defined by law, 
it is rational to expect that there will be an increased use of this practice by the 
Montenegrin prosecutorial office specialized for the most serious crimes of 
corruption and organized crime. 
 
When it comes to the legislative regulation of this issue in Croatia, plea 
bargaining was first introduced in this country in 2008. From the very beginning 
the Croatian CPC103 allowed plea agreements for all crimes without exception.104 
Croatian solutions in relation to plea bargaining are generally more similar to the 
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Montenegrin ones than is the case with Serbia. For example, both systems do not 
allow the concluding and proposing of an agreement during a trial; in both 
systems the accused confesses a crime, and the subject of the negotiations 
between him and the prosecutor is on the type and measure of the sentence 
without the option to negotiate the range of the sentence, as is the case in Serbia. 
However, there are still some significant differences: 
 
a) In the Croatian system, the statement on the adoption of the judgment 
based on the plea agreement, that is proposed by the prosecutor and the 
accused to the court, is always followed by the indictment (the indictment 
is also part of the agreement in Montenegro in cases when the plea 
agreement is concluded before the formal bringing up of the indictment). 
In the Croatian system, however, unlike the Montenegrin, the indictment 
is always the subject of initial judicial control. 
b) When it comes to the interests of the injured party, Croatian law defines 
the obligation of the prosecutor to inform the injured party about signing 
the statement on the agreement with the accused. It further introduces the 
influential role of the injured party for crimes against life and body, and 
crimes against sexual freedoms for which a sentence of more than five 
years is envisaged by law. This solution does not exist in Montenegro. 
c) Unlike in Montenegrin law, Croatian law defines that by concluding the 
agreement the accused does not waive her/his right to appeal against the 
judgment based on the agreement. The waiving of this right exists in such 
situations in Montenegro.  
d) The Croatian CPC defines that the court decides about the acceptance of 
the statement on the agreement in the form of a judgment, so there is no 
two-level decision as is the case in Montenegro (where the court first 
adopts the ruling and then the judgment on the acceptance of the 
agreement). 
e) When it comes to the possibility of the prosecutor and the accused to 
negotiate and agree on the confiscation of assets, in Croatia it is the same 
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as in Serbia. Croatian law clearly allows parties to agree not just about 
property gain that directly came out of a specific crime, but also about 
property that indirectly ensued from the commission of the crime. This 
issue was elaborated in the part related to Serbia.  
 
Apart from the previously discussed possibility related to agreements on the 
confiscation of all assets being part of the plea agreement, no other solutions in 
Croatian law seems to have the potential to improve Montenegrin practice if 
transferred to Montenegro.105  
 
In addition to presenting the relevant statistics and legal provisions, it is worth 
noting that the Croatian Chief State Prosecutor has demonstrated a significant 
interest and active role when it comes to plea agreements. Not long after the 
introduction of this institution into the Croatian legal system, he issued the 
Guidelines for Negotiation and Agreement with the Accused about the Confession 
of Guilt and the Sanction.106 In this document, clear directions were given to 
prosecutors in relation to each segment of the plea bargaining process. This is a 
very useful tool which contributes to the harmonization of practice all over the 
country, and the legal equality of all the accused. The adoption of such guidelines 
would be very beneficial to Montenegro. This is bearing in mind the existence of 
different practices in this area across the country, which will be discussed further 
in the next chapter. The issuing of similar guidelines is known in the practice of 
Montenegrin institutions. In 2010, for example, the Montenegrin Ministry of 
Justice adopted the Rules on Deferred Prosecution107. 
 
The tendency to introduce Anglo-Saxon elements into the criminal procedure is 
also present in Croatian law, like for example, the transition from investigations 
which were led by an investigative judge to prosecutor-led investigation. 
However, the legislators and practitioners of this country have been “wandering” 
a bit when it comes to these types of novelties. Cross-examination was introduced 
in Croatia for a period of time, but this solution was left by the latest CPC 
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changes in Croatia. It proved unacceptable in this system. As Djurdjevic explains 
(2013, p. 334) : “…such a drastic cut in the court’s authorities during the main 
hearing and the introduction of cross-examination proved to be a plant from 
foreign climes which was not well accepted, nor did it ever begin to live in our 
continental criminal-procedural tradition. Research into court practice and the 
opinions of practitioners showed that they resist these new solutions, that cross-
examination is not applied in practice…” The Croatian legal system, similarly to 
the Montenegrin one, seems not to be ready to let the adversarial elements quickly 
become part of its criminal procedure.  
 
3.3. Conclusion 
 
After the analysis of the legislation and statistics related to plea bargaining in 
Montenegro and two neighboring countries it is clear that plea agreements are not 
used much in all three countries. They are least used in Montenegro (less than 
0.50% of all criminal cases are completed this way), then in Croatia (1.21%), and 
in Serbia they are used to a somewhat larger extent (3.12%). Serbia does seem 
most open to the acceptance of adversarial novelties. Consequently, it is reflected 
primarily in the legal regulation of plea bargaining in this country, and to a small 
extent in the practical application of this institution. Generally, however, in all 
three countries “plea bargaining percentages” are very small. The essence of the 
“problem” is probably the tradition of the criminal procedures of these countries 
which is based on Roman law. The key principle of the criminal procedure in 
these systems is the determination of truth by the court which manages the trial. It 
looks like it is still the leading one for the judicial systems of the three countries 
(with Serbia being most distant from this principle by its latest reforms of its 
criminal procedure, and particularly the inclusion of cross-examination in the 
trial). This can be said regardless of the fact of whether the principle is explicitly 
still kept as a leading one in the criminal procedural codes of these countries, or it 
arises from the totality of the provisions contained in the laws. Only the 
Montenegrin CPC has actually kept the principle of truth within its provisions. 
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With changing societies in these countries characterized by new forms of complex 
and growing crime, their legal systems are faced with the need to work on 
improving the efficiency of criminal procedure. This inevitably implies the 
application of alternative ways of completing criminal cases, which proved to be 
successful in other systems. 
 
In the next chapter I will present the attitudes, opinions, dilemmas and 
experiences of Montenegrin prosecutors, judges and defense attorneys in relation 
to plea bargaining. Their answers, comments and suggestions demonstrate their 
unanimous support for this institution. However, by contrast, their answers and 
comments also demonstrate the different practical challenges they face in their 
daily work, as well as their concerns related to the convergence of the two major 
legal systems, the inquisitorial and the adversarial one. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
106 
 
CHAPTER IV 
-ANALYSES OF THE RESULTS- 
THE INTERVIEWS WITH JUDGES, PROSECUTORS  
AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN MONTENEGRO 
 
This chapter will include the analytical presentation of the results of interviews 
conducted with Montenegrin judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys in relation 
to plea bargaining practice. The interviews with five judges, five prosecutors and 
five defense attorneys were conducted for the purpose of revealing the general 
perceptions and positions of the interviewees in relation to plea bargaining, 
discovering the motives that hide behind their positive or negative opinions about 
it, finding out about their practical experiences in this regard, being either 
successful or challenging, and finding suggestions related to the future of plea 
bargaining in Montenegro. Those directly involved in the process are those who 
can provide valuable and unique practical input that can contribute to a better 
understanding of the reality of plea bargaining in Montenegro, and defining useful 
conclusions and recommendations in this regard. In this chapter, the interview 
results will be presented, while in Chapter V they will be discussed. The relevant 
conclusions and recommendations will be subject of Chapter VI. 
The results reached proved to be valuable. Some of them are not new or unknown 
to me as a Montenegrin lawyer. However, many of them are a complete novelty to 
me, and I believe to the general legal community of the country. They could 
definitely only be reached through interviews as research method. Some refer to 
practices not generally known to exist; some refer to differences in practices that 
exist throughout the country; some demonstrate the importance of a personal 
approach to the matter; and so on. I believe that results reached justify the 
research approach and methods chosen.  
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4.1. The Roles of Judges, Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys in the Plea 
Bargaining Process 
 
Before examining the results presentation and analysis, is it necessary to generally 
refer to the role of each category of interviewees, i.e. judges, prosecutors and 
defense attorneys, in the plea bargaining process in Montenegro, and to their 
feedback. 
 
Judges 
 
The role of a judge in the whole process of plea bargaining in Montenegro is the 
least active, but still a very important one. This is primarily from the perspective 
of the main task of the judge, to “verify” the whole process and makes sure that it 
was done in accordance with the law, that the accused is aware of the essence and 
consequences of her/his act, and that everything is done in accordance with the 
available evidence. As was mentioned earlier, such a role of the judge does not 
always exists in other countries; this role can be more or less influential. This 
positon of the judge in the Montenegrin system enables primarily a good 
perception of the type and quality of the agreements submitted, as well as the 
relevant behavior and attitude of prosecutors, defense attorneys and the accused, 
as well as the injured party. The stage of the process before the judge is the final 
one where the totality of the “picture”, composed of small separate hidden parts or 
phases, finally becomes visible. Given this quite important role in the process, 
several issues were predominant in the answers of the interviewed judges. From 
the totality of judicial opinions it is clear that they a) do have affection for this 
institution as such and in their own “surroundings”, and that they appreciate its 
potential advantages; b) do recognize that there are different problems in the 
practical application of this legal institution and they elaborate well their own 
thinking related to the causes of this practice; and c) have some specific 
suggestions for future action, but in principle, they do not provide complete  
answers about what the right ways to resolve this situation are.  
108 
 
 
Prosecutors 
The prosecutor’s role in the process of plea bargaining in Montenegro, as is the 
case with all the other countries which have this practice, is extremely important. 
The prosecutor is the key actor or one side of the process together with the 
accused and her/his defense attorney. The prosecutor is able to significantly 
contribute to the usage of agreements or, on the contrary, to discourage the 
implementation of this practice. The interviews conducted with prosecutors lead 
to three major conclusions: a) prosecutors do like this legal institution in general, 
as well as when it comes to its availability in the Montenegrin legal system, and 
they appreciate all of its potential advantages; b) they all stress the lack of 
practical implementation of plea bargaining and believe that it is not good, that 
this institution should be used more, and in their answers they do identify the 
causes of such a low level of implementation; and c) they do have specific 
proposals about which steps should be taken in order for this institution to be used 
to its full capacity. In principle, the prosecutors were a little bit more specific in 
their observations in comparison to judges. This is understandable, bearing in 
mind their fully active role in this process, and them being one side of the 
agreement. 
 
Defense Attorneys 
 
A side which is equally important in the whole process and which can largely 
influence the practice in this area is that of defense attorneys. Similarly to 
prosecutors, interviews with them showed three major issues: a) that defense 
attorneys do like the institution of plea bargaining, appreciate the fact that it is 
part of the Montenegrin legal system and think that it is very useful; b) they do 
recognize problems related to the non-implementation of agreements on the 
acceptance of guilt in practice, think that this is not good, and do elaborate on the 
reasons for such a situation in practice; and c) do have certain recommendations 
on how to improve the situation. Just like prosecutors, remembering their active 
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role in the process, defense attorneys are also more precise when it comes to their 
opinions, conclusions and proposals than the judges are.  
 
4.2. The Interviews Results Analyses 
 
As already stressed in Chapter III, for the sake of better understanding the 
experiences and opinions of the interviewed judges, prosecutors and defense 
attorneys, and better quoting, the five interviewed judges are coded J1 to J5, the 
five prosecutors P1 to P5, and the five defense attorneys A1 to A5. Even though 
such coding is not relevant to the results as such, it may be helpful in recognizing 
some specific positions or opinions typical (but not exclusive) to the members of 
each group. The participants’ age and length of professional experiences is not 
elaborated at all since it is clear from the interviews conducted that it does not 
affect their attitude and approach to plea bargaining practice.  
 
There are six reporting themes: the nature of the plea bargaining institution as 
such, their own attitude to and relationship with plea agreements, the legal 
regulation of the practice, the practical implementation of plea bargaining, the 
position and importance of plea agreements in the context of the whole criminal 
procedure, and suggestions for the future. The reporting themes were defined 
once all the interviews were thoroughly analyzed. The themes were largely 
affected by the pattern of the interview questions. In answering the questions, the 
participants would follow a certain pattern as well. Led by my questions, they 
would usually start with their general opinion about the institution, its nature and 
purpose, which caused the creation of the first and second reporting themes on the 
nature of the plea bargaining institution and their own attitude to and relationship 
with plea agreements. In answering my further questions, they would then transfer 
to their own specific practical experiences with plea bargaining. This would 
usually be the longest and most useful elaboration that provided lots of valuable 
information. Through the presentation of their own experiences, which was 
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enriched and clarified through additional questions from me, they practically 
answered most of the interview questions.  
 
All the information reached this way was categorized into the main reporting 
themes: the legal regulation of the practice, their positive and negative 
experiences with the practice, and suggestions for the future. When discussing 
their own experiences they would refer to specific examples to support their 
positive opinions or to express criticism in relation to some specific issues. While 
talking about their personal experiences, they would answer most of the interview 
questions including those related to the injured party’s rights, the attitude of their 
colleagues in relation to this practice, and so on. Through presenting their own 
plea bargaining cases they would quite often also refer to other participants in the 
process and to legal provisions. The relationship between plea bargaining and 
other similar available CPC mechanisms for resolving criminal cases was mostly 
discussed separately by participants. They would comment on deferred 
prosecution108 only when additionally asked about this, but some participants 
would at the same time, on their own, make comments about regular confession 
issues as well. The question about deferred prosecution seemed to be motivating 
for them to share their relevant opinions and experiences in this regard. That is the 
reason why it was produced as an individual reporting theme.  
 
Bearing in mind the large amount of interrelated and interconnected information 
that was reached through the interviews, these six themes crystalized as the most 
practical and clear way of presenting it. They fully reflect the answers of all the 
research participants. 
 
a) The nature of the plea bargaining institution as such 
All the participants generally consider agreements on the acceptance of guilt a 
very good legal institution, which contributes to the efficiency and low-costs of 
the procedure, satisfies all the parties involved, and from a wider perspective, 
reduces case back-log. “It’s a good institution because the costs are lower, 
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everything is done faster, it lasts a shorter time…it’s a good institution 
because of the economics of the procedure”, prosecutor P3 claims. Judge J1 
additionally stresses and interestingly describes another good element of the 
agreement and that is its settlement character, or as s/he said the very important 
effect of reaching a kind of “settlement between parties”. As s/he claims, 
“…the parties get closer. There is always space for conflicts if parties don’t 
conciliate.” As defense attorney A4 claims, by plea bargaining “…the 
prosecutor is enabled to complete the case in an elegant way...taking care of 
the economics of the procedure, rationality, time and so on.” Furthermore, 
prosecutor P4 says: “I think that with this institution a large number of cases 
can be completed fast, and that by this the number of backlog cases can be 
reduced.”     
 
b) Their own attitude to and relationship with the agreements on the 
acceptance of guilt in Montenegro 
All participants stress their positive personal attitude towards this legal institution 
and consider it a good practice that they are completely open to. All claim that the 
fact that it is a novelty in the Montenegrin legal system does not affect their own 
opinion about it at all. One prosecutor, P5, even said: “As for novelties, I’m 
always for that. …this institution has a privilege with me.” Keeping this in 
mind, s/he added that s/he is maybe not the “best” prosecutor to ask about this. “I 
have a fully positive opinion about this institution…The efficiency of the 
proceeding is the main reason for the positive attitude. There is no 
reluctance, and especially not for the reason of this being a new institution”, 
Judge J5 claims. Judge J1 stresses that “when parties agree the court will never 
disrupt it in principle.”  Defense attorney A5 expresses her/his opinion about 
plea agreements in the following way: “This institution can ‘do a good job’, it 
is useful by its nature…it is given so that the cases can be resolved in an 
efficient and speedy way, that all parties are happy; finally, it’s not us who 
made it up, not a small number of countries have it…In normal conditions 
this is something which is necessary in the system…This is my general 
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opinion and that is completely clear.” Her/his colleague, Attorney A4 
concludes: “Wherever there is an opportunity, defense attorney should 
initiate the agreement.” 
 
By the nature of their roles in the process, the prosecutors and defense attorneys 
were specific about what generally personally motivates them to enter a plea 
agreement. Apart from that being the enlargement of overall procedural 
efficiency, those are also specific types of cases that are motivating. Cases where 
the outcome of trial is not certain and when the evidence is weak are some of 
those. In this context, Attorney A2 explains: “…when it is obvious that the 
evidence against him [the accused] exists, then we can directly negotiate with 
the prosecutor, so to say; therefore, it is not certain what will happen in front 
of the court, and with the plea agreements we are tactical and we get 
certainty when it comes to the sentence.” Prosecutor P4 claims something 
similar: “Prosecutors are generally motivated by the efficiency of the 
procedure, or when we are as prosecutors ‘at the edge’ when it comes to 
evidence. If the procedure in front of the court is uncertain both for me and 
the accused, then we can try and ‘lower the limits’ as it were.”  
 
Cases in which there is the potential for money to be returned to the state budget 
also trigger some of the participants to enter plea agreements. Prosecutor P1 talks 
about her/his own case in which a €10,000 fine and €141,000 of tax money was 
agreed to be paid; s/he says that money return: “...was a condition for us to 
accept the agreement. This is a good agreement from the aspect of the state 
budget.” This same prosecutor also finds cases when a crime is committed by 
accomplices as motivating to initiate the concluding of a plea agreement. In these 
situations, as s/he claims, the agreement is signed with one perpetrator, which 
makes prosecution of the other easier. S/he explains this in the following way: 
“One of the key reasons which would motivate them [prosecutors], for 
example with the crimes where we have accomplices committing the crime, 
where you can sign an agreement with one accused, and then he testifies 
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against the other in some other role. That is, for example, a motive to sign an 
agreement with a person from a criminal organization.”  
 
Prosecutor P4 claims that with the new provisions which allow the application of 
plea bargaining for all crimes (except terrorism related ones and war crimes), one 
motivation would be precisely to use it in the more serious and complex cases. As 
an illustration s/he says that currently, for example, s/he is working on a very 
serious case where 46 witnesses are involved: “I can barely agree with all of 
them when to come with their defense attorneys! The best and easiest thing 
for everyone, including the Judge, would be for the defense attorney to tell 
him: ‘You will get five years in court, and if you agree with the prosecutor it 
will be four’, done deal!” 
 
Prosecutor P3, explains that in all the cases of plea agreements s/he has 
concluded, the defense attorneys initiated the conclusion of the agreement, in all 
these cases the evidence was complete and strong, and a confession existed and 
was clear, so in these cases s/he was motivated precisely by all these elements to 
avoid a trial by the negotiation and conclusion of the agreement: “I’m actually 
motivated by this economics, it’s all done fast, we don’t lose time at trial, this 
one session is completed fast, all in one day and everything is written in two 
hours. But we have never concluded an agreement on our own initiative…it 
was upon the proposal of the defense attorney…and with all the cases it’s not 
just that the accused accepted the agreement, but we had both evidence and a 
confession, and then we opted for a plea agreement.”  
 
Naturally, the interest of the client and getting a lower sentence for him is a 
general motive of attorneys in proposing the conclusion of agreements. Attorney 
A5 clearly explains this: “Our motive is the interest of the client, but the 
proper moment for concluding the agreement should be recognized.” “I look 
at what I can do to bring some betterment to the accused, I look for reaching 
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a lower sentence for him. The motive is, therefore, a lower sentence and, 
certainly, speeding up the procedure”, an attorney A1 says. 
 
Regardless of their general positive opinion about the institution, some judges, 
however, stress a necessary level of caution when it comes to plea agreements. 
Judge J3 emphasizes the important role of the judge in checking the agreements: 
“There is something with the agreements that must be taken care of, and that 
is for it to be done exactly as the legislator defined. It is not a rule that, if the 
prosecutor submitted proposal and the accused accepted it,  the court will 
accept this agreement in every case. The court must do all these checks...If 
the court checks the agreement in a proper way, then in my opinion this 
institution is most beneficial.” Finally, even though Judge J4 believes that “The 
institution is a step forward in the Criminal Procedure Code; a good solution 
that simplifies the procedure”, and regardless of the potential formal approval 
of an agreement which fulfills all the legal conditions, s/he still worries about the 
truth: “Who guarantees that what the accused said is true?”  
 
c) The legal regulation of plea bargaining in Montenegro 
All the participants described the Montenegrin legal provisions related to plea 
bargaining as generally good, representing a solid framework for the application 
of plea bargaining; a general positive view is prevailing. “I think the provisions 
are good, especially now with the latest amendments”, Judge J5 says. Attorney 
A3 says that “The legal provisions are good. …The problem is in people’s 
heads, not the provisions.” Prosecutor P2 agrees: “The provisions are 
generally framed in an excellent way”. “The new changes to the Criminal 
Procedure Code will contribute to larger implementation”, Judge J2 claims. 
As can be seen, some specifically praise the recent extension of the practice to 
almost all crimes (except war crimes and terrorism related crimes). However, 
some also praised the introduction of the prosecutor’s obligation to submit the 
indictment together with the agreement (in cases when the agreement is 
concluded before the formal bringing up of the indictment). In fact, according to 
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some of them, the lack of this obligation in the past led to the conclusion that 
from a formalist standpoint, the criminal procedure starts without the indicting 
act. In relation to this issue Judge J4 says: “I think it’s better to have a formal 
indicting act prior to adjudication; now that has been introduced, I think it is 
a proper thing, there’s no adjudication without indictment.”  
All the participants agree that human rights are well protected when it comes to 
plea bargaining provisions. As Judge J1 explains: “In the end….the Court takes 
care of that [human rights].” Attorney A2 briefly says: “Human rights...it is 
all fine. Just like with the court settlement, the agreement is reached and 
that’s it.” “Everything is fine in relation to that [human rights], the accused 
is told everything on three occasions, everything is told to him before the 
negotiations, what his rights are, what the disadvantages are. He is aware of 
what he is entering into”, Prosecutor P5 explains.  
However, regardless of the general positive opinion about the legal framework in 
this area, a number of participants expressed some criticism. Most of the 
prosecutors have objections and thus offer proposals for specific legislative 
changes that should take place, which, in their opinion, would contribute to the 
better implementation of this practice in Montenegro (please see details in Section 
f below). As already said, the majority of participants believe that human rights 
and the injured party’s interests are well protected, but one prosecutor, P3, 
believes that they should be better protected and provided a specific 
recommendation in this regard (please see in Section f again).  
 
In the context of the lack of motivation for plea agreements, Prosecutor P4 
generally criticizes the ranges of sentences defined by law for certain crimes as 
being too large: “Please tell me what kind of range it is……between 2 and 10 
years, what a sentence range!”  
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Furthermore, Judge J1 objects to the overly formal character of the procedure: 
“Generally the institution is good, useful, but here it is too formalized and 
complicated…It is really too much formality.”  
 
Attorney A1 referred to the whole CPC and the concept of the Montenegrin 
criminal procedure which is according to him not good, and which consequently 
negatively reflects on the human rights of the accused (this will be discussed 
further in Section e). Finally, Attorney A4 stresses that there were initial 
discussions between some legal professionals about whether giving up the right to 
trial is unconstitutional; however, these discussions are in her/his opinion 
unfounded: “There was some thinking that the accused’s basic constitutional 
right to procedure in front of the court is jeopardized, but I believe there’s 
no ‘space’ for this, he is simply giving up the right to appeal himself.”109   
 
d) The practical implementation of plea bargaining in Montenegro 
Most of the participants’ answers are directly or indirectly related to problems in 
the practical implementation of plea bargaining and the reasons that stand behind 
these problems. All of them evidently recognize the non-usage of plea bargaining 
in Montenegro and are naturally thinking about the causes of this reality. None of 
the participants think that these agreements are significantly applied in practice, 
and none of them think that this is good. “Well, we had a very small number of 
agreements in practice…”, Judge J1 says. Attorney A3 describes the situation in 
the following way: “In practice these are just initial steps. However, we are 
going in the right direction, maybe slowly but we are going.” Her/his 
colleague, Attorney A4 explains: “It must be said that during the last five 
years this institution hasn’t become part of practice. We have a few 
agreements here and there, and this surely deserves criticism.” When asked 
about the applicability of plea agreements in practice Prosecutor P2 answers: 
“Until now it wasn’t like that [applicable], but maybe something will change 
in the future.” The primary focus of the participants’ answers was the 
problematic aspects of this practice, but to a lesser extent positive issues and 
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developments as well. In their answers they focus on the key reasons for the 
limited usage of agreements in practice, and the causes of the practical challenges 
they face. It is very noticeable that quite often blame in relation to existing 
practical problems is put on the “other side” of the process.  
 
First of all, the general passive position of prosecutors and defense attorneys 
where proposing agreements is concerned is stressed by many participants, from 
each interviewed group. “The prosecution should be active!...The attitude 
should be changed, it should be an active attitude of prosecutors, as well as 
defense attorneys”, Judge J5 stresses. Prosecutor P5 says: “Everything is 
somehow there, but still they are not applied enough, passiveness exists on all 
sides…there should be more initiative from us, prosecutors”. Another 
prosecutor, P3, claims that attorneys are quite passive: “I think attorneys should 
be a little bit more active because a defense attorney is something different in 
comparison to us. When a defense attorney says something to a suspect or the 
accused, he believes the attorney more, we are the ones who practically 
decide on his sentence. It’s a different relationship between the attorney and 
the suspect, the attorney can talk to him about whatever he wants.” On the 
other hand, Defense Attorney A5 claims that: “For the plea agreements 
prosecutors do not have the courage…inventiveness, wish, intention, they are 
completely passive for a thousand reasons”. Most of the interviewed defense 
attorneys claim that prosecutors do not wish to conclude agreements and thus do 
not offer lower sentences; some defense attorneys believe that prosecutors should 
be active in a way to convince the other side that the proposed agreement is good 
and in that sense should refer to specific case-law in order to justify the proposed 
sentence. Attorney A1 says: “I believe that the prosecutor should be the first 
one to initiate an agreement, he is the one who should offer and put pressure 
on the other side…The institution is not being applied due to the rigidness 
and the total lack of understanding of the institution by the prosecution.” 
Attorney A5 thinks similarly: “If the application of the agreements is wanted, I 
think that prosecutor should be inspired, to offer and to convince the other 
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side, to find similar cases from case–law and to show that example…” As a 
result, the same A5 attorney claims that many of her/his colleagues did try to offer 
agreements once or twice and when they were rejected by prosecutors, they gave 
up: “Some attorneys offered once, twice to conclude an agreement, but there 
is no adequate answer from the prosecutors.” Judge J1 agrees with the 
attorneys: “In my opinion, the prosecutor is most important, he needs to force 
the use of the institution.” On the other hand, some prosecutors like P5 claim the 
opposite: “The attorney always thinks and expects that he is a great help to 
the prosecutor by wanting the agreement, and that he has to have some 
‘discount’ because of that. They [attorneys] always ask for very low 
sentences…attorneys obstruct with the low sentences they ask for.” When it 
comes to this rigidness in offering lower sentence on the part of the prosecutor, 
Judge J4 explains this by saying:  “As for prosecutors I see them as being 
sentimentally attached to the charges, and they do not want to grow through 
the procedure”. Similarly, Judge J3 claims that for some agreements that s/he 
knows from her/his own practice, the sentences were just like those that the 
accused would get at a trial: “I think that the sentence which the accused got 
through the agreements would be exactly like that at the trial itself...I would 
order these same sentences.”  
 
Apart from the above mentioned reasons for prosecutorial passiveness, there are 
many other various reasons recognized by all the participants. The sentencing 
policy of the courts was mentioned by some participants as a discouraging factor 
when it comes to concluding agreements, since the accused can quite often expect 
a more lenient sentence in the court than through an agreement. Judge J2 says: 
“The sentencing policy of courts is lenient and it does not leave good 
negotiating opportunities for the prosecution.” Prosecutors fully agree with 
this. In order to illustrate this, Prosecutor P4 elaborated a particular case that s/he 
worked on where it can be easily concluded how lenient the court sentencing 
policy is. In this case, the accused recidivist (who committed a crime for third 
time) was given a prison sentence 2 months longer than the minimal sentence 
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envisaged by law for that specific crime; s/he was sentenced to 2 years and 2 
months in prison and minimal sentence for the crime in question is 2 years110. 
S/he concluded her/his elaboration by saying: “This is the key problem. As a 
prosecutor I can never ever accept an agreement in such situations.” When 
talking about the lenient court sentencing policy another prosecutor, P1, says: 
“The court does not participate in negotiations directly, but it certainly 
influences the application of the institution through its sentencing 
policy…That is why sentencing policy is a problem with these agreements.” 
On the contrary, defense attorneys, even though they do admit that it has some 
influence, do not believe that it is a major reason of prosecutorial passiveness. 
Attorney A1 claims that: “Maybe it [court sentencing policy] has some small 
influence, but it is the smallest one “. Attorney A4 notices that “lately there is a 
slightly more severe sentencing policy present” and prosecutor P5 agrees with 
that: “Sentencing policy was really lenient, now it’s a little bit more severe.”  
 
In connection with sentencing, some judges do believe that the range of sentences 
defined by law is very lenient for some serious crimes, which limits the judges in 
ordering more severe sentences. Judge J4 explains: “When we have serious 
crimes, in my opinion, the legislator is very soft there. I am for this solution 
the Americans have when it comes to these serious crimes, five times one 
hundred years regardless of the length of life, I support this.”  
 
Furthermore, when it comes to the effect of the courts’ sentencing practice, 
Prosecutor P1 stresses the lack of unified court sentencing practice as a factor 
which also makes plea bargaining harder to apply. S/he notices: “Every time 
when negotiations happen a prosecutor has a dilemma in relation to the 
choice of sanction...It’s not strange that this institution is present in Anglo-
Saxon law since in the practice of their courts you have some rules, the 
accused knows what he can expect in court. You don’t have to think which 
judge you will end up with, whether a judge will like you…There should be 
unified practice with the courts as well.”  In relation to the non-uniformity of 
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practice there are some interviewees who stress this problem, but from the 
perspective of prosecutorial practice. The same prosecutor, P1, further explains: 
“I think that at the level of prosecution standards should be set up…we 
should have standards….let’s say for the range of sentences when we 
negotiate. So that, when we negotiate, the accused gets the same he would get 
from another prosecution office….what we do now, practically nobody 
controls.” Judge J1 shares the same opinion: “They [prosecutors] don’t have 
any kind of legal opinions that are being adopted and that they can stick 
to…the courts issue legal positions and there is nothing like that for the 
Prosecution Office. The Supreme Court judges have experience, we respect 
their opinion, and we find the legal opinion [we need]…” 
 
Another factor which was recognized by many participants as particularly 
problematic for plea bargaining practice is the formalism of the procedure. The 
whole procedure in this area is seen as too formal by many participants. Judge J1 
says: “It is a huge task that doesn’t reflect adequately…It is easier for me to 
write the judgment, than both the ruling and the judgment”. In one 
illustrative case, as the Judge says, “We did reduce costs, but it was painful, 
just like we had trial”.  Some participants characterized the procedure as 
burdened with lots of document writing, Prosecutor P1 explains: “There are 
some disadvantages to this in our system, and that is the strictly formal 
procedure which precedes the conclusion of the agreement and which is for 
the prosecutors who work on the case, depending on the procedural phase, 
very demotivating…As for the form, this is even more complicated than the 
indictment itself. A lot of writing is involved.” Some attorneys, like A4, share 
their opinion: “Prosecutors are afraid of this institution, but it does really put 
additional work on them. This is especially the case if it happens after the 
indictment, because they have already gathered and prepared everything and 
they go to trial where in such cases all this is finalized very fast. In this phase 
of the procedure we can see rejection by prosecutors...with the conclusion of 
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the agreements there is truly lots of work for prosecutor.” “There’s a lot of 
formalism present”, attorney A1 agrees. 
 
One factor which is found influential when it comes to plea bargaining by a 
number of participants is public and media influence. As some believe, the media 
and the public sometimes discourage prosecutors from concluding agreements. 
Judge J1 describes this in the following way: “The public is very 
important…the public definitely influences a prosecutor, whenever you have 
a public person, nothing happens. The prosecutor immediately says ‘We’ll 
throw the ball to the court!’ And then it’s easy, you got the sentence you 
deserved. The prosecutor tells me the following himself ‘Everything is 
different when you have a judgment; when a lay person hears about the 
agreement, you can’t explain to him what it is really about; the public 
immediately considers it problematic; they will say - this person, because he 
is a public person, should make a payment for humanitarian purposes for 
this, and I would get worst sentence for the same thing’.” Some prosecutors 
agree with this. Prosecutor P1 believes that the public indirectly affects the 
prosecutor’s will to negotiate in some cases. S/he used an example from her/his 
own practice to explain this, and referred to the crime of brokering in prostitution 
(pandering) where a prison sentence of 1 year is envisaged by law111; s/he further 
stresses: “This is interesting to the public, but they simply can’t understand 
this sentence. There is no direct pressure from the public, but for every case 
we do take care of the fact of how it will be interpreted by the public.” On the 
other hand, some prosecutors claim completely the opposite. Prosecutor P2 says: 
“The public doesn’t affect it at all, we have laws that we apply, the public is a 
lay public, it is only important to implement the law.” P3 answers in a similar 
way: “The public, for me, I’m not interested in that at all. I do my work in 
the framework of laws and by following my beliefs…” Attorney A1 believes 
that there is a certain influence in this sense, but which can be minimalized or 
removed by professionalism and authority: “The pubic is a factor which has a 
certain influence, it goes primarily towards the prosecution or court to some 
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extent… they [prosecutors and courts] are afraid of public trust in the 
institutions, they justify their work to the public as institutions. But when it 
comes to this pressure from the public, it is resolved by the thing we lack, 
and that is the authority. Therefore, by professional responsibility and 
knowledge, this is what makes authority.”  Her/his colleague, Attorney A5, 
strongly believes that public pressure exists: “I know, I spend days and days in 
the courtroom…Prosecutors are still under pressure from the public, but 
also their supervisors, attorneys and the accused themselves. It is this - ‘Just 
that somebody doesn’t think I did some shady business with the defense 
attorney’.” Attorney A3 thinks the same: “Prosecutors are worried that 
‘somebody’, and most often it is their supervisor, does not think that through 
the agreement they made a concession larger then needed. This is important 
to them.” Interestingly, Judge J1 also mentions this supervisor aspect: “It seems 
to me that there is a certain fear for their job with prosecutors, it is a 
completely different system in comparison to the courts; it is a hierarchy, like 
in the army.”  
  
As a follow up to the knowledge issue mentioned by Attorney A1 in the previous 
paragraph, it is interesting to note that some participants, mostly attorneys, say 
that there is lack of knowledge in this area including within their own professional 
group. Attorney A5 criticizes her/his colleagues, attorneys, in this sense:  “I 
believe that also for them [attorneys], there should be organized some sort of 
promotional campaign and education. To make the agreement closer to 
them…there are attorneys who are not introduced to this practice and area, 
and they even submit wrong proposals in relation to the conditions of the 
[agreement] conclusion.” Attorney A1 agrees with this: “I think that the 
majority of attorneys don’t fully understand this institution, except what the 
law strictly says…they don’t understand the essence, but regardless of that, 
the prosecutor is still the most important one.” Her/his colleague, Attorney A3, 
believes that prosecutors are those who need education in this area: “I think that 
prosecutors should be educated [in plea bargaining].” When talking about the 
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prosecutors’ role in the process, one judge, Judge J1, also stresses the importance 
of education: “Training is important.” 
 
When discussing knowledge it is always indirectly linked to the issue of 
professionalism. A great number of participants, including attorneys themselves, 
stress the unprofessionalism of attorneys in the context of plea bargaining. Many 
see this attorneys’ relationship with plea agreements as quite unprofessional. 
Specifically, many participants find the main reason for attorneys’ passiveness in 
this area in a lack of financial motivation on their part. In other words, plea 
agreements do not pay off for attorneys. Prosecutors P1 and P4 describe this in 
the following way: “The accused himself is in the mood for negotiation and he 
has the initiative; attorneys when they see that it won’t bring money to them, 
they act contrary to that” and “It pays much better for attorneys when they 
go to trial.” Defense attorneys themselves do not claim differently. 
“Additionally, attorneys have this inert dimension, attorneys get more money 
from trials, and with the agreement and completion of the case this way, 
their fee is lower”, Attorney A5 openly says. Another attorney, A2, explains it in 
the following way: “The problem here is this financial interest which is most 
important for defense attorneys; it is therefore the disloyalty and 
unprofessionalism of attorneys towards their clients.” Judges think the same. 
Judge J5 claims: “Attorneys always opt for trials, there are more court 
sessions, and they are paid more that way.” Another judge, J2, has the 
impression that both prosecutors and defense attorneys “avoid agreements 
whenever they can”.  
 
In this context, some participants find the way attorneys present the plea 
bargaining option to their clients problematic. Prosecutor P5 thinks the following: 
“The accused knows as much about the agreement as his defense attorney 
tells him. If a person has been convicted already, then he knows a lot about 
the agreement, but he won’t initiate it unless his attorney suggests that to 
him. And usually the attorney tells him ‘You’ll be better in court’…even if 
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the accused wants to try something different, he [the attorney] hampers 
him.” Prosecutor P2 thinks the same: “They [the accused] read [about plea 
bargaining], but when they have an attorney, attorneys obviously like to earn 
money, and they don’t propose agreements.” Judge J5 shares the same opinion: 
“For attorneys it pays off better to go to trial for money…the openness of the 
accused is important, but it should all be presented to them in the right way, 
then there would be more interested in the agreement. Quite often they don’t 
even know about this option, from my private life I know people, friends and 
others who went to court but didn’t know about this option, and maybe they 
would have used it [if they had known]. But it is also a matter of the way of 
thinking of our people. Here everybody wants to go to court…” 
 
The last sentence in the above quotation brings us to the interesting issue of 
mentality which was also mentioned by a number of participants as an influential 
factor when it comes to plea bargaining in Montenegro. Judge J5 continues 
her/his above mentioned comment in the following way: “…it is easier for 
everybody that way [to go to court], let the court decide about everything and 
do everything.” Prosecutors agree that mentality is important. As they claim, the 
accused sometimes prefers conflict rather than settlement, and defending 
themselves by neglecting rather than pleading guilt; Prosecutor P2 says: 
“Somehow for the accused it is most important to ‘attack’ somebody; that 
attorney’s language is close to the accused, so attorneys do act like that. 
There is very small number of people who admit that they committed a crime 
even when it is completely obvious and all the evidence exist…” This 
prosecutor then referred to one such case from her/his own practice. The 
mentality of injured parties was also discussed in the participants’ comments as 
important in the whole process. They see injured parties as mostly preferring 
revenge in comparison to settlement. One prosecutor, P5, metaphorically 
explained this using the following words: “For the injured party the court 
proceeding is satisfaction, especially when the public is interested. 
Newspapers write- the victim said this and that…for the injured party it is 
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important that everybody knows what he went through, he believes that he 
lost when there is an agreement, he doesn’t see an accused that is put under 
torture. He doesn’t see him, as it is said, ‘on the grill in the courtroom’.”  
 
When it comes to injured party issues, some participants believe that the injured 
party always in some way affects the prosecutor, so it is the case with agreements 
on the acceptance of guilt where the injured party can actually demotivate the 
prosecutor to offer or conclude an agreement. In order to illustrate this, Judge J1 
explains that, informally, prosecutors tell him that even in regular trials, in the end 
they are quite often satisfied with the sentence but they still do file an appeal 
because of the injured party: “The prosecutor says to himself, sometime he is 
satisfied with the sentence, but the injured party is unhappy, and then the 
prosecutor, under pressure from the injured party, reacts and files an 
appeal.” Judge J4 used metaphoric questions to illustrate this always present 
dissatisfaction of the injured party with the sentences ordered; s/he says that they 
always ask: “Why is this accused not hanged?” or “Why this accused was not 
fined €300,000?” These sentences may at the same time be seen as a good 
illustration of the mentality and expectations of the parties. The feeling of the 
importance of injured party interests for the prosecutor can be sensed in the 
answers of Prosecutor P3 who insists that the injured party should be more 
protected by law when it comes to plea agreements, as already briefly mentioned 
earlier: “With crimes where we have injured parties, I think they should 
participate in negotiations, so that they can express their opinion.” 
 
Furthermore, this mentality may be, but is not necessarily, linked to the criticism 
which is directed at prosecutors by many participants in relation to their general 
resistance to new and modern developments, and the conservatism of society. 
Attorneys are “loudest” when it comes to this. “When prosecutors say that they 
have the will [for plea bargaining], they are surely not honest, and that is 
because of their mental attitude”, Attorney A5 claims. S/he further stresses: 
“When it comes to rejection, yes, there is rejection, but on the part of 
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prosecutors… for the plea agreements, prosecutors do not have the 
courage…inventiveness, wish, intention, they are completely passive for a 
thousand reasons…they don’t have the intention to change.” In order to 
illustrate the conservatism of prosecutors, Attorney A2 refers to situations from 
her/his own practice when the prosecutor informally asked him to propose the 
agreement instead of s/he her/himself doing it: “Prosecutors should propose 
agreements, but instead they call the attorney and say ’You propose the 
agreement!’, I had this situation...prosecutors are passive…this is a new 
institution and Montenegrin society is conservative, it’s the same with the 
institutions of protected witness and cooperating witness.” Judge J1 agrees 
and explains: “The fear of prosecutors of the new institution is the main 
reason for not having more agreements…fear is the key reason here, fear is 
present on all sides, but it is mostly reflected in prosecutors.” When talking 
about plea bargaining, Judge J4 also believes that conservatism has a negative 
effect on this practice: “Conservatism is present”, s/he says. 
 
It is evident from participants’ comments that in some cases there are certain 
(dis)trust problems in the relations between prosecutors and attorneys as key 
actors in the plea bargaining process. Some attorneys claim that prosecutors do 
not consider them a side in the process with whom they should cooperate in order 
to reach the joint goal of resolving the case in an efficient way. Attorney A5 is 
particularly focused on this issue: “It’s a barrier that none of the prosecutors 
considers the attorney a friend of the truth, but actually a bluffer. Really, it’s 
literally like that…a prosecutor should be above all this, I know, not every 
attorney is the same, but the prosecutor should be above all that.” S/she 
believes that: “In the psychological sense, any kind of agreement with the 
attorney or the accused is considered corrupting from their [prosecutors’] 
perspective”. This attorney further explains: “The mentality of the prosecutors 
cannot stand that we bargain about something. It has certain ‘weight’ for 
them, this novelty is still a taboo topic for them.” Her/his colleague, Attorney 
A1, claims the same: “They [prosecutors] look at the attorney as though he is 
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the enemy.” In relation to this, Judge J1 notices that prosecutors do not like to be 
seen as equal to attorneys before the court: “Prosecutors are one side, and 
before the court they are equal to the other side, the judge looks at things this 
way, and prosecutors don’t like it.” Some prosecutors, like P5, talk about this as 
well: “Attorneys always expect much lower sentences than what the court 
would say. It’s demotivating… this kind of haggling…and not real 
bargaining. Interestingly, it’s always the attorney who asks for the lowest 
sentence, not that much the accused himself. Due to all this there is a little 
aversion to this.”  
 
Finally, some participants did discuss the issue of the relationship between the 
current Montenegrin criminal procedure structure and plea bargaining as a barrier 
to practical application. They find the structure of the existing procedure 
problematic, and being split between the two main types of criminal procedure, 
adversarial and inquisitorial (this issue will be discussed separately in Section 
e).112  
 
Apart from talking about the challenges and problems they face in practice, the 
participants also have positive comments and observations in relation to plea 
bargaining practical implementation.  
 
Attorney A3 says: “It [plea bargaining] was mostly a positive experience. In 
practice it all functioned well. It’s surprising how well both judges and 
prosecutors did this, as they have many years of experience with this.”  
 
The majority of participants see the judges’ attitude and role in the whole process 
as a very positive one. Attorney A3 says: “Judges would always accept the 
agreement without any problems. I even think that it’s undisputable that this 
makes their work much easier. Nobody who wasn’t in the courtroom, can 
know how exhausting it is to reach an judgment.” Prosecutor P5 confirms this 
by one simple sentence: “Judges like agreements very much.” Prosecutor P2 
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also talks positively about the judicial role in the process: “Judges were always 
very good, everything was fine, every agreement was accepted without any 
objections. They are generally very much in the mood for this institute, it is 
easier for them this way.” Attorney A5 agrees: “The court in principle has a 
fair relationship with this institution, the court has less work when an 
agreement is used …the court generally has a positive attitude…judges are 
always ready to accept an agreement if everything that is needed is all right.” 
 
Some participants, mostly defense attorneys, praised the way prosecutors take 
care of the interests of the injured party. Attorney A5 explains: “A prosecutor is 
somebody who takes care of the injured party’s interests, I think that they 
take very good care of this…simply, the prosecutor and the injured party are 
continuously in touch, they have communication before the conclusion of 
every agreement, the injured parties are introduced to the agreement…” 
Her/his colleague, Attorney A4 stresses similar: “All the rights and interests of 
the injured party are fully protected…prosecutors want the injured parties 
to agree with everything. In principle, with the agreements they fully relax 
when the injured party agrees with something…” Judge J5 agrees: “The 
interests of the injured party are fully protected. The prosecutor represents 
these interests, the injured parties are informed about the court hearing, and 
quite often they are present at the hearing…” Prosecutor P1 confirms such 
practice: “We as prosecutors tend to have the injured party present, to give 
consent, so far we haven’t had problems with this.” 
  
Participants also discuss different sets of circumstances which from their own 
experience proved to be stimulating for plea bargaining practice.   
 
Prosecutor P5 describes members of the recidivist category as the most willing to 
conclude agreements in order to avoid an unpleasant trial. S/he explains this in the 
following way: “Recidivists are thankful for the agreement, this way they 
want to avoid ‘pillory’ at the trial…when there is a trial, there they are in the 
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hallway, photos, video recording, and this way they are ‘hidden’ in my office, 
the conversation is relaxed; it all comes down to the conversation, attorneys 
sometimes get involved, and the injured party is there as well. There are no 
persons who ‘shower’ him [the accused] with questions, for the first time he 
is in the position that he doesn’t need to defend himself, for the first time he 
doesn’t need to stand, it’s very good for them. So for recidivists it is pretty 
certain that they won’t refuse the agreement.” S/he concludes by illustrating 
this through her/his own case:  “When he signed the agreement he was 
thanking me endlessly. For the first time, he was in position not be ‘attacked’ 
by everybody.” Prosecutor P2 agrees with this statement: “I think that the 
people who would be best suited to this institution can be found amongst 
recidivists.”  
 
Prosecutor P5 further talks about other circumstances which proved motivating 
for the conclusion of the agreements in her/his cases: “In this case, there was 
huge media interest. It was in their [accused] interest to conclude an 
agreement… their motive was to avoid the media, they were followed by the 
media everywhere, it was their main motive…one year of work ended in just 
one day, it cannot be better.” Her/his colleague, Prosecutor P1 shared the same 
experience in relation to public exposure: “They [the accused] have their own 
reasons…we had cases that they accept the agreement because they don’t 
want the public, they don’t want to be exposed…”  
 
Prosecutor P5 further stresses that her/his practice showed her/him that people 
who travel or are in a hurry are quite motivated for the conclusion of the 
agreement: “I have an example of a seaman who was not able to receive the 
invitation from the court and come to trial because of his job, so he suggested 
that we conclude an agreement. He elaborated it all well, that he wants to 
respect the institution of the state and shorten the procedure.”  
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Furthermore, their colleague, Prosecutor P3 believes that even a small reduction 
in the prison sentence in negotiations, even by a few months, in comparison to the 
common court sentence for the crime in question can mean a lot to the accused: 
“The key is to go below common practice with the sentence, with negotiations 
we would go lower, a month or two, and even that meant a lot to them [the 
accused].”  
 
Finally, Prosecutor P1 thinks that plea bargaining is generally more suitable for 
more serious than less serious crimes, where the accused has an option of deferred 
prosecution as well. In this context, P1 says: “Less serious crimes are more 
suitable for deferred prosecution, and plea agreements are maybe more 
suitable for more serious crimes; plea bargaining exists when you have more 
serious crimes...as the crime is more serious, it is harder to foresee what will 
happen..” 
 
e) The position and importance of agreements on the acceptance of guilt in 
the context of the whole criminal procedure 
In their answers, the participants referred not just to the relationship between plea 
bargaining and deferred prosecution that they were specifically asked about by the 
interviewer. Inspired by their practical experiences, they also talked about the 
concept of the Montenegrin criminal procedure as such, and other possibilities 
that exist in the criminal procedure that are generally potentially “more attractive” 
and may represent a certain limiting factor for the agreements’ implementation.  
 
As mentioned earlier, Attorney A1 strongly emphasized that the existing concept 
of the Montenegrin criminal procedure as such represents a key barrier to plea 
bargaining. S/he explains that the Montenegrin criminal procedure represents a 
mixture of an inquisitorial and adversarial procedure which causes problems in 
practice, primarily by creating a generally unequal position of the prosecutor, and 
the accused and her/his defense attorney. According to her/him, the Montenegrin 
criminal procedure which, on the one hand, has a prosecutor led investigation 
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characterized by greater rights and authorities for the prosecutor than was the case 
earlier, and on the other hand, kept a classical inquisitorial trial characterized by 
the exclusion of cross-examination and by the leadership of a judge, deprives the 
accused and her/his attorney of enough good opportunities to present their own 
evidence and defend their position. S/he believes that this inequality can be 
applied to plea bargaining as well, for example, through the inability of the 
attorney to have timely access to case files in some cases or prosecutors simply 
not wanting to enter negotiations because their acts related to evidence are not 
always proper. S/he claims: “The prosecutorial investigation and that part is 
one thing, that was changed, but everything else remains the same. The 
position of the accused under this law, including the human rights aspect as 
well, is based on an inequality principle…our Criminal Procedure Code is a 
bad basis for the application of this institution. In practice, the key problem 
is how the law is set up.” S/he concludes: “…the law should be changed, to 
bring into the law all that is needed or to give up such a procedure...every 
system in any case is based on rules which refer to the equality of arms. If 
something like that doesn’t exists and it’s missing, than it’s not what it needs 
to be.”  
 
This opinion is indisputably linked to the general principle of truth in the 
Montenegrin criminal procedure and fact that the presence of this principle may 
be a barrier to plea bargaining (this issue was elaborated in Chapter III). In this 
context, Judge J4 claims the following: “The condition for this institution [plea 
bargaining] to live is to deviate from the principle of truth in the criminal 
procedure. We should introduce…cross-examination. Plea agreements and 
the principle of material truth, it is a combination which is problematic…I 
don’t know why we don’t immediately transfer to something completely new, 
but we do it slowly and gradually.” It can be said that in some way Prosecutor 
P3 follows up on this with the following conclusion: “What is important is that 
in our criminal procedure we do take care of fairness, so this defines 
everything somewhere down the line.” This complex issue can obviously be 
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subject of separate research; in this research it contributes to “getting the whole 
picture” and a better understanding of the issues linked to plea bargaining 
application in Montenegro.  
 
Furthermore, a number of participants discussed the relationship between a 
regular confession and a confession in the framework of plea bargaining. A 
regular confession is seen by some as a simpler and more attractive solution than 
an agreement on the acceptance of guilt. Judge J1 explains that there is an 
informal practice for the prosecutor and the accused to agree about regular 
confessions, and generally agree and present the agreed sentence to the judge. 
S/he says that in these situations, after the confession is checked by the court and 
it is determined that all the elements and evidence are in line with the confession 
and the law, the judge orders the agreed sentence in a shortened procedure 
without a full presentation of evidence at the trial. As Judge J1 says, this is much 
simpler then an agreement on the acceptance of guilt and lots of formalities and 
paperwork are avoided this way: “We have something that we apply in 
practice, because this informal approach was born out of practice…what is 
its main disadvantage? [of the plea bargaining procedure], it’s complicated 
due to documents, ‘million’ of statements are written, the proposal, the 
agreement, as with the indictment all evidence must be submitted…what 
happens informally, a prosecutor comes with the proposal and says ‘If you 
are willing to confess, confess, and I’m ready to propose this sentence’…the 
court, if this is all ok, literally doesn’t have to do anything after that, so it is a 
confession, and he immediately goes to issuing a judgment, the decision on 
sentence, checks the circumstances, and adopts the decision without 
presenting evidence. With the agreements, this is not possible.” Attorney A4 
also talks about cases from her/his practice when the accused had confessed the 
crime, but then informal steps were taken in order to avoid a plea agreement. In 
these cases, the prosecutor agreed with the accused about the confession and 
generally about the sentence, then it was all presented to a judge who after that 
conducted a shortened version of the trial based on the given clear confession of 
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the accused and the existing evidence, and then s/he adopted a judgment with the 
agreed sentence involved. As this attorney says: “So….this is how it was 
informally agreed, and in fact there was no plea agreement as the law defines 
it.” S/he concludes: “They [prosecutors] are becoming more relaxed in that 
sense.” According to this attorney this simple confession is a much better option 
for all the sides involved, since it is shorter and simpler in comparison to the very 
formal procedure of concluding plea agreements. Judge J2 shares the opinion of 
the above mentioned judge and attorney: “When it comes to the confession of a 
crime, it is very easy to finish the procedure without a plea bargaining 
agreement.” 
 
Judge J3 mentions, even though s/he does not fully agree with it, the interesting 
issue of the possible existence of a difference between those accused who make a 
regular confession and those who make a confession in the framework of plea 
bargaining, with the first group being discriminated against in comparison to the 
second group, who are much better treated because of the agreement: “My 
general opinion is that it is a good institution [plea bargaining], it’s a shorter 
way of completing the criminal procedure. There were many who thought 
that this is not all right, that this way certain categories of accused are being 
favored, actually those who confess in the framework of a plea agreement in 
comparison to those who confess in the regular procedure, not through an 
agreement. But confession is a mitigating circumstance in any case. It’s good 
and I’m happy that this institution has now been introduced for all crimes.”    
 
Finally, when it comes to the relationship and comparison between deferred 
prosecution and plea bargaining, most participants stress the usefulness of both 
institutions, but in their own way, since the former is used for less serious crimes 
only, and the latter is now used for almost all crimes. Judge J5 says: “Both of 
these institutions are excellent because they shorten the procedure…There 
are similarities but there are differences as well. Deferred prosecution is used 
for less serious crimes. With deferred prosecution the accent is on 
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personality, so the prosecutor takes into account what kind of person is in 
question, whether the person has been convicted before, somehow the person 
himself is important. Only some personalities are suitable for deferred 
prosecution, while the plea agreement can be used by everybody, every 
accused person.”  Judge J2 agrees that both institutions are useful: “Both are 
useful, but in different aspects.”  
 
In this context, some prosecutors stress that deferred prosecution is much better 
for those accused who commit a crime for the first time, while agreements are 
better for those who are “returning” criminals or recidivists. Prosecutor P2 says: 
“We did use deferred prosecution. It’s primarily and more useful for those 
accused who did not show up before as perpetrators of crimes. They were 
mostly stimulated by not being given a criminal records.” Her/his colleague, 
Prosecutor P5 agrees with this: “Well, deferred prosecution can be applied 
with people who have not been convicted before, recidivists are not a 
category of people who are suitable for deferred prosecution.”   
 
Many claim that the main advantage of deferred prosecution which motivates the 
accused is her/his absence from the official criminal records in cases when s/he 
fulfils the agreed obligation: Judge J1 says: “Both institutions have the same 
purpose, but deferred prosecution is better because the crime is not added to 
the criminal records, everybody ‘runs after this’, even when there are no 
elements of criminal offense, people want to have deferred prosecution.” 
Prosecutor P1 claims that deferred prosecution is used more and it is much better 
for the accused for the same reasons described above: “Deferred prosecution is 
used much more. They opt for this first of all because there’s no evidence of a 
criminal offense. It’s much more present in practice than agreements…for 
example for less serious traffic crimes, the injured party gets damage 
compensation much faster this way...quite often here we have the consent of 
the injured party which includes compensation for damage.“ Prosecutor P4 
agrees and explains it in in the following way: “Deferred prosecution is a much 
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more useful institution and suspects are more open to this institution. Why? 
Because in the process of deferred prosecution, after one of these obligations 
defined by law is fulfilled, the crime report against the suspect is rejected. He 
doesn’t have a single consequence, no conviction, like nothing happened.”  
 
Attorney A1 thinks similarly and just like Prosecutor P1 stresses the good position 
of the injured party when it comes to deferred prosecution: “It’s a much larger 
role for the injured party with deferred prosecution… and it is not logical for 
the injured party to have deciding role with the agreement since the law 
doesn’t give him such a role in the regular trial either…Deferred prosecution 
is different, I think that the key reasons why it is easier to implement and 
more attractive are easier cooperation between the parties and mentality.” 
Attorneys A2 agrees when it comes to the injured party position and says: 
“Deferred prosecution is of a really great usefulness, I had … deferred 
prosecution in my practice. The attitude of the injured party is very 
important here.”  
 
Furthermore, Attorney A3 stresses one more advantage of the deferred 
prosecution: “Both institutions are useful, I have experience with deferred 
prosecution as well. Maybe it should be applied much more than the 
agreement because its advantage is that it affects a person’s thinking, a 
person thinks that next time it will be worst for him. The task of the state is 
to act not just in a repressive way, but also to be preventive.”  
 
On the other hand, some participants stress the advantages that they think plea 
agreements have in comparison to deferred prosecution, primarily the existence of 
judicial control of the whole process. They also express worry about the possible 
misuse of the deferred prosecution institution. Judge J4 claims:  “Both 
institutions are good, with the agreement there is more control from the 
court. With deferred prosecution we don’t know whether the person 
committed a crime. He entered the procedure, fulfilled the obligation, and 
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paid. There may be misuse there. Much more than with the institution of the 
agreement where everything is protected by judicial control. But both are 
good in relation to the rights of parties”. Attorney A1 shares this opinion 
related to possible misuse, and explains it in the following way: “But this 
[deferred prosecution] can be misused as well, and here again we come to 
professionalism, professionals should work on the prosecution, and bad 
things should be resolved by being held accountable.”  Judge J3 is also 
cautious when the application of both institutions is concerned: “Both 
institutions are good, but both require special attention. With deferred 
prosecution, as it is the case with plea agreements, they should be 
approached carefully.”  
 
Finally, Prosecutor P1 notices that the accused quite often mix up the two 
institutions in practice until it is explained to them: “Suspects very often mix up 
these two institutions, in principle it must be explained to them every time. 
The defense attorney is, of course, involved in this.” 
 
As can be seen from the participants’ answers, for both of these institutions they 
consider them useful in their own ways, having similarities but also differences. It 
is obvious that deferred prosecution is limited to a certain number of less serious 
crimes while plea bargaining was extended to almost all crimes not long ago. As 
Attorney A5 says: “…these institutions ‘touch’ each other but there is a 
difference in the sentence, both institutions are affirmative and may be of use 
to all sides.” Some participants believe that the extension of plea bargaining to 
almost all crimes will influence practice primarily in terms of the increased 
number of plea agreements concluded. Judge J2 says: “It [the changed 
legislation] should stimulate the greater implementation [of plea 
agreements].” 
 
f) Suggestions for the future 
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When it comes to finding solutions to the identified problems, the participants 
suggest either very specific actions, primarily legislative changes that they would 
like to happen, or talk about more general proposals or desired tendencies in 
relation to what steps should be taken, where the effort should be put in, and 
where the “keys for resolving problems are hidden”.  
 
Regarding proposed legislative changes, the participants are very specific. Some 
participants suggest allowing agreement conclusion until the end of the trial, as 
well as the introduction of the possibility of bargaining about the facts and the 
legal qualification of crime. Prosecutor P4 says the following in relation to this 
proposal: “What my legal dilemma or thinking is, whether it would be more 
efficient if it is possible to apply this legal institution until the end of the main 
hearing, and not practically until the beginning of the main hearing. So that 
you have a better opportunity to see what you have and don’t have, both the 
prosecutor and the accused. This would reduce the workload of the court, 
and everybody else.” S/he continues: “Furthermore, … now we negotiate 
about the conditions of the admission of guilt, I think they [prosecutors] 
should have the option to negotiate the crime itself. Let’s negotiate the 
crime!” Attorney A1 fully agrees with this: “The prosecutor, when adopting 
the order to open an investigation, indicates the facts and the legal 
qualification of crime therein. No prosecutor agreed about it, nor do any of 
these 60 to 70 agreements include an agreement on the legal qualification of 
the crime, where you can have negotiations on giving up some charges, on 
mitigating the legal qualification; maybe to negotiate the factual description 
of the crime, because in this description there are facts which I don’t want to 
admit but the crime still stands and then some less serious form of crime can 
be agreed. It may happen, if the prosecutor doesn’t have evidence for one 
part, I don’t want to admit that part, but I will admit another. In practice, 
the negotiations are narrowed down to negotiations about the criminal 
sanction.”   
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However, there are those who are not sure about this option, like Judge J3 who 
says: “It’s questionable to negotiate about the legal qualification of the crime. 
You have a factual description from which a certain qualification derives and 
that’s it…there are a very small number of crimes in practice where it could 
be some other qualification [rather than the original one which the 
prosecutor defined].” 
 
Other participants’ proposals concern the injured party’s level of influence in the 
whole process. Specifically, Prosecutor P3 calls for the greater involvement of the 
injured party in negotiations and suggests the law be amended in this sense: “In 
my opinion, all the Criminal Procedure Code provisions are good except that 
the participation of the injured party in negotiations should be defined…I 
think the law should regulate for the injured party to be introduced to 
everything…at least for us to have that party’s opinion…” 
 
Unlike Judge J4, who thinks that the introduction of the prosecutor’s duty to 
provide the indictment together with the plea agreement to the court (in cases 
when the agreement is concluded before the formal bringing up of the indictment) 
is a good solution113, Prosecutor P5 criticizes it and suggests the opposite: “When 
it comes to legal provisions [changes]…this duty…that the indictment should 
be submitted with the agreement in cases when the indictment hasn’t been 
brought up yet, I don’t see the purpose of that, I think we can do well 
without that.”  
 
Clear proposals for the adoption of some kind of prosecutorial standards for 
negotiating sentences in the plea bargaining process can also be heard from some 
participants, particularly from the already quoted114 Prosecutor P1 and Judge J1. 
 
Additionally, Judge J1 suggests the introduction into the law of informal, more 
simple, negotiation practices that s/he describes115, and by that giving these 
practices a formal obligatory character: “...and this thing that exists informally 
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should be copied into the plea agreement provisions and the law should be 
changed in that sense.” 
 
In order to encourage attorneys to suggest plea bargaining to their clients when 
appropriate, Attorney A5 proposes the introduction of a special rate for attorneys’ 
plea bargaining services. S/he says: “As I said, the provisions are not a 
problem. I have suggestion to start a campaign, that all the actors are 
involved, and to amend certain provisions within the Bar Chamber Tariff 
where plea agreement services would be charged at 50% more than it is the 
case with other, regular things.”     
 
Other participants’ proposals are of a more general character. Some of them are 
directed towards making the whole plea bargaining process simpler and less 
formal, as can be seen from the already quoted statements of Judge J1, Prosecutor 
P1 or Attorney A4.  
 
Many participants propose more educational or promotional activities in this area, 
so that all the potential actors in this process are much more aware of it. In this 
context, Prosecutor P2 suggests the following: “It would be useful that in prison 
libraries, in addition to the Criminal Procedure Code and the Criminal 
Code, they [convicted recidivists] also get some kind of brochure that would 
explain what this institution means, to explain to them that if the agreement 
is not reached their confession cannot be further used as evidence against 
them, and that all the documents are then destroyed.”  Attorney A2 believes 
that media exposure of the agreements may be useful: “I think it is good to 
announce information about the agreements in the media, so that people are 
being educated about this issue.” Her/his colleague, Attorney A4 shares the 
same opinion: “In this sense it would be needed to have some media 
presentation of this institution, through the words of judges, experts, 
academics…” On the other hand, Attorney A3 thinks that the education of all 
actors is important and says: “Education is important. We should organize a 
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round table discussion with the participation of all the professionals and by 
using our own practices, but also those of other counties.” Judge J5 thinks 
similarly: “Maybe to do some kind of promotion of this institution, I don’t 
know how, but something needs to be done. Maybe some training sessions. 
For example, when I heard about this topic at the seminar, it was actually 
one of the best I attended…everything looked so positive to me, and that 
there was a great potential for this in practice.” The earlier quotations of 
Attorney A5 imply the same opinion. 
 
Additionally, proposals concerning the desired tendency of prosecutors to offer 
plea agreements to the category of recidivist as the ones most open to this 
institution are also given by Prosecutors P2 and P5, as already quoted. 
 
The firm general proposal of making the sentencing policy more severe comes 
from Prosecutor P4 who says: “The key condition for everything is a more 
severe sentencing policy in the courts. As long as we don’t have that, we 
won’t have many agreements…the cure for better implementation is making 
the courts’ sentencing policy more severe.” 
  
Furthermore, many earlier quotations clearly illustrate the participants’ general 
proposal directed towards increasing the motivation of prosecutors and attorneys 
to conclude agreements. However, the participants do not offer that many answers 
on how to do this. 
 
The earlier quotations, specifically of Judge J4 and Attorney A1 demonstrate their 
strong message to the legislator inviting him to opt for either a fully adversarial or 
fully inquisitorial criminal procedure, and not to have a mixture of both, which 
they find to be very problematic in practice. 
 
Finally, as can also be seen from some earlier quotations, the authority of 
prosecutors is directly or indirectly commented on by some participants. In line 
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with this, there are some general proposals related to strengthening prosecutorial 
authority for the sake of the more successful implementation of the plea 
bargaining institution. Attorney A3 says: “I think they [prosecutors] are not 
independent enough, they stick only and very strictly to the court 
practice...they are afraid how their supervisors will react, they are not 
free…it should be initiated that prosecutors are given the autonomy to adopt 
decisions…if somebody selected you to be a prosecutor, then you should be 
given autonomy including …to conclude agreements with the attorney.”  
Her/his colleague, Attorney A5 has a similar opinion: “The Heads of the 
Prosecutorial Offices must tell their prosecutors to conclude agreements, 
they should say ‘Conclude them, there’s no need to hide behind the courts’ 
decisions’. There’s nothing like this, if they started with this then everybody 
would be able to see that it works, there would be more cases where 
agreements would be concluded.”116   
 
4.3. Conclusion  
 
The results presented above demonstrate the complexity of plea bargaining 
practice in Montenegro, and particularly of reasons for the non-implementation of 
this practice in the country. The analysis of interviews was a manageable, but still 
challenging task, bearing in mind the quite large amount of information received 
from participants. The discussion of the presented results in the following chapter, 
and final recommendations that are part of Chapter VI, are based on the complete 
interview information, as well as the direct impressions and observations of the 
researcher. The sophisticated research elements that influence the researcher’s 
final conclusions are quite often not possible to express in written form, but can 
hopefully be anticipated and “felt” by the readers of this work.   
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION OF KEY FINDINGS 
 
5.1. A Few General Comments 
 
Some of the goals of my research have already been partly answered in Chapter 
III through the relevant document analysis; those are analyzing plea bargaining 
legal regulations in Montenegro, and comparing plea bargaining legislation and 
practice in Montenegro with that of neighboring countries. However, these, as 
well as the remaining research goals, would hardly be fully reached without using 
the interviews as a research method. The interviews “put some light” on the 
reality when it comes to this practice in Montenegro. The interview results 
presented in the previous chapter, the discussion of the research results that 
follows in this chapter, and the relevant conclusions which will be part of Chapter 
VI, will provide answers in relation to the remaining research goals: the 
investigation of the level of use, usefulness and productiveness of plea bargaining 
practice in the Criminal Justice system of Montenegro; identification of the 
problems and successes and their causes in the application of plea bargaining in 
this country; and based on that, the provision of adequate conclusions and 
recommendations which can be useful in the further development of the practice 
and study of this issue in Montenegro. In general, the research represents a solid 
contribution to the overall literature in the plea bargaining field, particularly as no 
other authors have so far dealt with this issue while being specifically focused on 
Montenegro.  
 
5.2. Limiting Factors 
 
Before going into the discussion of the interview results, there are two limiting 
factors related to the influence and scope of this research that must be stressed. 
One obvious aggravating factor is the complete absence of previous research of 
this type and on this topic in Montenegro, and the very limited literature related to 
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the same or similar issues in the regional countries which are most adequate when 
it comes to comparative analysis. Another barrier to a larger research scope and 
influence is the very small number of plea agreements concluded in Montenegro. 
However, the identification of the reasons for this situation forms a large part of 
this research. In this context, the research will provide relevant conclusions and 
recommendations to both practitioners and future researchers in this area.   
 
5.3. Key Issues Discovered 
 
The legislative, statistical and comparative analysis and discussions from Chapter 
III clearly lead to three major conclusions. They speak for themselves, serve as a 
starting point and provide a framework for the key findings that come out of the 
interviews: 
 
a) The practice of plea bargaining is obviously not widespread in 
Montenegro, nor is this the case in neighboring Serbia and Croatia. On 
the contrary, a very small number of criminal cases are being resolved this 
way in all three countries. Even though such a situation is quite obvious 
this finding represents a comparative contribution to universal plea 
bargaining research, as well as a starting point for all further findings and 
possible future actions in Montenegro when it comes to the relevant legal 
norms. It supports the mentioned research approach of the Law-in-Action 
and Davis’s (2017, p.3) discussion about the opposite direction of that 
research - from a recognized problem in reality towards specific findings, 
and consequently towards possible appropriate interventions in the “law-
in-books”.   
 
b) The main motives of the legislator for introducing this legal instrument 
into the legal system of Montenegro were improving the efficiency and 
reducing the costs of criminal proceedings. The legislator was clear about 
her/his motives in a number of relevant discussed documents which were 
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adopted by the government. When it comes to this finding, it indisputably 
goes in favor of supporters of plea bargaining who praise it for its 
efficiency and practicality, such as Easterbrook (1992, p.1975) whose 
discussions were mentioned in Chapter I. It is evident that both 
Montenegrin legislators, as well as actors in the plea bargaining process, 
believe in its practicality. Therefore, when it comes to this particular 
aspect of the practice they definitely take the side of plea bargaining 
supporters.  
 
c) The plea bargaining legal solutions of Montenegro and Croatia are quite 
similar, and these systems seem more “closed” to plea bargaining in 
comparison to Serbia. When it comes to these three countries, as 
discussed, the openness to plea bargaining seem to be larger where there is 
a more adversarial set up of the criminal procedure. The Serbian criminal 
procedure is somewhat closer to the adversarial system in comparison to 
other two, having not just prosecutor led investigations like Montenegro 
and Croatia, but also cross-examination at the trial.  In general, the results 
of examining the plea bargaining practices of Serbia and Croatia represent 
a contribution to  overall universal comparative knowledge about plea 
bargaining, whose specific segments were discussed in Chapter I, through 
the elaboration of the experiences of different countries in this area.    
 
These starting conclusions are followed up and significantly enriched by those 
findings that arise from the interviews conducted. The interviews and the data 
they provide in some cases demonstrate the presence of completely contrary 
opinions, even of members of the same professional groups, as well as the 
influence of personal experiences and surroundings on the participants’ attitudes 
about plea agreements. On the other hand, they clearly demonstrate the joint 
position of the participants in relation to a number of key issues. One factor 
important for the validity of the data gathered through interviews is the obvious 
honesty of the participants when they talk about their own negative characteristics 
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or practices which limit the use of plea bargaining in Montenegro. Keeping these 
general impressions in mind, the interview results undisputedly recognize the 
following: 
 
d) The existence of a generally positive opinion of all actors in relation to 
plea bargaining as such 
 
None of the interviewees is explicitly against plea bargaining and this practice 
being part of the Montenegrin legal system. It is completely clear from their 
answers, their thinking and reasoning as a whole. However, some concerns were 
expressed in relation to the fairness of the practice i.e. the question of truth and 
“natural justice” discussed in Chapter I. One of the judges (J4) who generally 
favors the institution and its practicality, clearly says: “What is the thing that is 
questionable to me? That is the existence of plea agreement and the principle of 
truth and justice… I would be for truth and justice.” Such concerns can be “felt” 
in the answers of some other interviewees as well. One of the prosecutors (P3), 
stressed that: “…what is important is that in our criminal procedure we do take 
care of fairness.” Those attitudes indirectly support the retributive justice theory 
requirements of being punished for a committed crime by a sentence adequate to 
the seriousness of the crime, elaborated in Chapter I through Kant (1999, p.138) 
and Hegel’s (1897, cited by Materni, 2013, p.276) discussions on the issue, but 
also through the observations of modern authors like Materni (2013, p 276) and 
Primoratz (1989, cited by Materni, 2013, p.278). Such positions obviously still 
retain their non-dominant place in the Montenegrin legal system and within its 
actors. This is the case with many other legal systems of the present time as well. 
When it comes to Montenegro this is to be expected, taking into account the 
current set-up of the criminal procedure which will be discussed further in Section 
d, and also the existence of the previously mentioned formal requirement for 
respecting the principle of truth and fairness defined in Article 16 of the 
Montenegrin Criminal Procedure Code.117   
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e) The existence of the negative influence of procedural formalism on plea 
bargaining practice  
  
It is clear from the very explicit answers of all the participants that the legally 
defined procedure of plea bargaining in Montenegro is too formal. This is the 
joint observation of all the participants, even though this formalism represents the 
smallest burden for defense attorneys. These opinions are supported by the 
discovered existence of informal negotiation practices which represent shortcuts 
to the final judgment, and essentially the avoidance of plea agreement and the 
established formal procedure (elaborated in Chapter IV). The more widespread 
usage of deferred prosecution and the existence of the prevailing favorable 
opinion of prosecutors and even some defense attorneys about this practice is to 
some extent also linked to its formalism. With deferred prosecution, the procedure 
is less formal, considering that the criminal procedure in this situation formally 
does not even start. In addition to this, with deferred prosecution, the prosecutors 
do have guidelines on how to act (the Rules on Deferred Prosecution mentioned 
in Chapter III), which makes the whole situation much easier to handle for all the 
sides involved.  
 
This finding definitely contributes to comparative analyses of the formalism of 
the plea bargaining process discussed in Chapter I through presenting the 
experiences of the U.S. and a number of other countries mentioned in Appendix 
A, as well as through presenting a historical overview of this practice. A formal 
statutory regulation of plea bargaining practice is generally speaking a final 
requirement in countries using civil law, while it is not a predominant concern for 
the adversarial legal systems. However, this finding proves that strict formal 
regulation may be a barrier to the application of any practice including plea 
bargaining, and that quite often any legal institution finds its way towards its 
further development through the establishment of informal practices. 
Additionally, this finding also takes us back to the discussions of the concepts of 
the “Law-in-Books” and the “Law-in-Action”, and how important it is to observe  
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social reality, as well as practices and needs, in order to shape, adapt, understand, 
and interpret legal norms better.       
 
f) The existence of the negative influence of the lenient sentencing policy of 
the courts on plea bargaining  practice 
It can be concluded that the sentencing policy of the courts plays some role in the 
whole process i.e. it demotivates prosecutors to conclude plea agreements. This 
was stressed by all the participants. However, it is evident from the interviews 
that there is an open call from judges to try with the lower sentences than the 
expected court ones are. Judges explicitly stress the passive role of prosecutors in 
this context. Some say that prosecutors “love” their charges and that they are 
“sentimentally attached” to them, as quoted earlier (J4); some even stress that the 
agreed sentences in some cases were the same as the ones the court and they 
themselves would probably order after the trial. In this context, as was already 
stressed, one judge (J3) claims: “I would, for example, order the same 
[sentence]”.  On the other hand, defense attorneys claim that the sentencing policy 
is, as one attorney says, just “an alibi” for prosecutors (A5). In general, it seems 
that it does have an effect, but also that prosecutors in many cases stick to their 
positions in terms of sentence and are not willing to try to go just a little bit 
“under” the typical sentence in a specific case. However, some maneuvering 
space seems to exist; as one prosecutor says based on her/his own experience: 
“The key is to go below some practice when it comes to sentence, with 
negotiation we would go lower, by a month or two, and even that meant 
something to them [accused].” (P3) Furthermore, the expectation that sentencing 
policy will become more severe is not something to fully rely on in the future. 
When talking about sentencing policy becoming more severe, however, there are 
some signs of this happening as well, according to the results of the interviews. 
Specifically, as one defense attorney recognizes: “lately there has been a slightly 
more severe sentencing policy present” (A4). In order to illustrate this s/he used a 
specific case from her/his practice.118 One prosecutor (P5) also recognized 
sentencing policy becoming more severe lately: “…sentencing policy, it was 
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really lenient, now it’s a little bit more severe”. This relatively lenient sentencing 
policy does have an influence, but it obviously cannot be a complete excuse for 
not trying to find some “maneuvering space” when it comes to sentencing in the 
plea bargaining process. 
 
This finding can be linked and it contributes to the general discussions on the role 
of sentencing policy in the application of plea bargaining. In particular, the 
coerciveness of the U.S. legal system in this context was discussed in Chapter I 
with reference to the positions of Alschuler (1981, p.705), Lynch (2003, p.24), 
Scott and Stuntz (1992, p.1919-1921), and others on this issue. This finding 
illustrates the possibility that in Montenegro there is exactly the opposite situation 
in comparison to the U.S. where, as some authors believe, the severe threatened 
sentences cause a greater use of plea agreements which are seen as a “safer way” 
for the accused in that country. As can be concluded from the experiences of the 
Montenegrin participants, there is a possibility that a certain level of non-
coerciveness of the system in this sense might exist, or even better to say – that 
discouragement exists where the use of plea agreements is concerned through the 
system’s lenient sentencing policy. In any case, it is evident that discussions about 
the influence of sentencing on application of plea bargaining are universal and 
have their own strong reasoning.   
 
g) The existence of the general negative influence of the set-up of the 
criminal procedure in Montenegro on  plea bargaining practice 
An issue which has been mentioned many times in this work, particularly in 
Chapter III, is the current set-up of the Montenegrin criminal procedure, and the 
role of the principle of determining the truth in this system. This issue emerged 
from the answers of the interviewed participants, including judges and 
prosecutors. The main observation of some of them in relation to the current 
criminal procedure in Montenegro is that it is actually Canivet’s (2003, p.941) 
“hybridized” form of criminal procedure discussed in Chapter I. One judge (J4) 
explicitly said that combining plea bargaining and the principle of determining the 
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truth, still the leading one in the Montenegrin criminal procedure, is not 
functional, and that the solution would be to cancel this principle, introduce 
cross–examination and. through that, simply to transfer to a different type of 
criminal procedure, the adversarial one. S/he concludes: “I don’t know why we 
don’t immediately transfer to something new, instead of doing it gradually and 
slowly.” In such a procedure, in her/his opinion, plea bargaining would function 
much better. One attorney noted this mixture of inquisitorial and adversarial 
elements in the Montenegrin criminal procedure as a huge problem and main 
“culprit” for the non-application of plea bargaining and the existence of many 
other practical problems. S/he says: “Our Criminal Procedure Code is a real 
deception. Prosecutorial investigation and that part is one thing, and everything 
else remained the same. The position of the accused under this law ... is based on 
the principle of inequality.” (A1) S/he obviously believes that the criminal 
procedure set-up gives a more powerful role to prosecutors and produces an 
inequality between the sides in this process, just as a number of U.S. authors 
argue, including Burke (2007, p.183-211) whose views were discussed in Chapter 
I. As already mentioned, one prosecutor, it seems somewhat unconsciously, at one 
moment said: “What is important is that in our criminal procedure we take care of 
fairness, so it actually determines everything somewhere down the line.“ (P3) 
That is actually the truth and the overall impression. Prosecutors in Montenegro 
seem to be reluctant to bargain because it never fully satisfies the requirements of 
justice and fairness linked to the principle of determining the truth in the 
Montenegrin criminal procedure.  
 
Another question is: Whether there is enough “maneuvering space” for plea 
bargaining in the existing situation, without leaving the principle of determining 
the truth as the leading one in the criminal procedure? Probably yes, particularly 
with the recent extension of the practice to almost all crimes, but only time will 
show that. This could be the topic of a separate future research.  
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One more question is: Whether these same “worries” would still exist in a 
criminal procedure “released” from the principle of determining the truth? The 
U.S. experiences and academic discussions prove that issues of justice and 
fairness are eternal and that they would probably still remain present even in this 
“changed” system. It must be taken into account, though, that the sentencing 
policy of the U.S. is quite severe, so it is huge incentive for the accused to 
bargain.  
 
Furthermore, in this context, it would be interesting to observe and research the 
implementation of plea bargaining in the coming years in Serbia, which has 
recently significantly backed away from the typical civil law inquisitorial system. 
Probably, the general approach when it comes to Montenegro should be to try to 
“find” and further develop its own type of plea bargaining, one that is adequate to 
the existing, still predominantly civil law system.  
 
Nevertheless, this finding clearly contributes to the previously mentioned general 
academic and theoretical discussions about the issues of innocence and truth and 
justice, and discussions specifically focused on innocence and truth in the context 
of plea bargaining. It is yet another demonstration that those issues are popular 
nowadays and in different legal systems, as they have always been in the past. 
This finding is also fully in line with Givati’s (2011, p.21) conclusion in relation 
to the perception of innocence discussed in Chapter I.  Specifically, from the 
answers of the Montenegrin judges and prosecutors it is obvious that they are very 
much concerned about seeking the truth i.e. primarily that guilty people are not 
left unpunished, and such concerns definitely arise from the set-up of the criminal 
process. Such a concern for the truth and for justice seems to be eternal, and are 
seen by many as incompatible with plea bargaining. 
 
h) The existence of problematic relationships between prosecutors and 
defense attorneys when it comes to plea bargaining 
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Another aspect which emerged in the analysis of plea bargaining practice in 
Montenegro is the relationship between prosecutors and defense attorneys in 
relation to this practice. During the interviews, quite often the very first thing 
which the majority of members of both groups would do is blame other side for 
the failure of plea bargaining. Both sides were not “shy” when it came to 
criticizing the other side. In this sense, the most creative relevant illustrative 
terminological constructions came from some “theatrical” attorneys ; for example 
they claim that prosecutors perceive attorneys as “a crowd of semi-criminals” and 
“bluffers”, and that prosecutors are “conservative… non-creative”, and so on 
(A5). This attorney’s observation was also that prosecutors “cannot accept 
bargaining with us [defense attorneys].” On the other hand, prosecutors were 
more sophisticated in this sense so, for example, they say “…attorneys want to 
put responsibility on the courts” (P2) or “Attorneys obviously like to earn money, 
and they don’t propose agreements” (P3). It is not common for these two sides to 
work in the spirit of cooperation, it is expected that they are confronted sides 
which argumentatively and in line with the rules “fight” in the arena called “the 
court”. However, plea bargaining represents an alternative to classical criminal 
proceedings and implies a certain level of cooperation between prosecutors and 
attorneys.  
Regardless of the obvious lack of this cooperation, the totality of the participants’ 
answers gives hope that there is space for that kind of cooperation in the practice 
of Montenegro. Amongst other things, both sides agree that the focus of future 
activities should be on bringing this concept closer to everybody, and explaining 
that plea bargaining does mean “jumping out” of regular roles and cooperation 
with other side in the interest of this efficient way of reaching justice. As one 
defense attorney suggests: “It’s necessary to seriously get plea agreements closer 
to defense attorneys…that they understand…that the institution gives the chance 
for a faster ending to the case.” (A5)  
It can be said that this finding is somewhat specific to Montenegro. In all the 
literature discussed in Chapter I, no other consulted author refers to the issue of a 
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lack of trust between the prosecutors and defense attorneys in this context. Many 
authors do discuss the role of prosecutors in this process, and some of them see it 
as a dominant one shaping the whole process. (Burke, 2007, p.183-211). 
Alschuler (1968, p.68) is also one of those authors who believes that prosecutors 
have a key role in plea bargaining. As he says: “Defense attorneys…are not equal 
competitors in the game of deception.” He justifies his position by explaining that, 
unlike attorneys, prosecutors have a whole state-supported system for 
investigation standing behind them, and that, as he believes, attorneys need to 
have good personal relationships with prosecutors in order to be successful with 
plea bargaining.  
 
However, in order to further research this aspect, a deeper examination of the 
relevant experiences of primarily civil law countries  is needed, which this 
research does not allow due to its limited scope. Regardless of that, this finding 
definitely represent an interesting contribution to the literature discussions on 
factors which influence the application of plea bargaining. It will be briefly 
touched upon again below in Section J in the context of the obvious need for 
further education in this area in Montenegro. 
 
i) The potential existence of the limited negative influence of the public and 
mentality on plea bargaining practice  
When it comes to the existence of the influence of the public and mentality on 
plea bargaining in Montenegro, it cannot be called a firm finding of this research 
since it’s based more on participants’ impressions and observations, and less on 
their own personal experiences. However, these impressions are quite strong, 
sometimes they do rely on personal experiences, and are present for the majority 
of participants, so they do deserve some elaboration. They are also the result of 
the demonstrated openness of the participants during the interviews.  
 
Very creative terminological illustrations can be seen from all the participants 
when it to comes to “people”, the media and the public in general. Some of them 
153 
 
are on verge of being humorous like, for example, those already stressed, that the 
injured party likes to see the accused “on the grill” at the trial (P5), to those that 
“here everybody wants to go to court”(J5) or “journalists are not professional, 
they need sensational titles only to create benefit for themselves”(J1). However, 
there are some conclusions arising from the answers that are quite significant. 
Apart from both judges and defense attorneys’ estimation that, when deciding 
about plea bargaining, prosecutors are influenced by the public, in terms of 
demotivation, it was also confirmed by some prosecutors themselves. One 
prosecutor said: “There is no direct pressure from the public, but for every case 
we do take care of the fact of how it will be interpreted by the public.”(P1) What 
goes in favor of such conclusion is also the mentioned observation of attorneys 
that prosecutors are afraid of the public reaction to some agreements i.e. that they 
might be suspected of some improper activities that involve the accused and 
her/his attorney.  
 
Another interesting estimation of both judges and attorneys is related to the 
existence of the fear of prosecutors of their own supervisors and in line with that 
for their own position/job in situations when they take certain steps, including 
those related to plea bargaining in some cases. It is a pretty strong “accusation” 
and is still just the impression of judges and attorneys; there are no other issues or 
sources provided through this research that would support these impressions. In 
some way, such impressions may be a result of the hierarchical functioning of the 
prosecutorial system in Montenegro, where each prosecutor is directly responsible 
to her/his immediate supervisor, with this line of responsibility going all the way 
up to the Supreme State Prosecutor in the end. In this sense, one of the very good 
suggestions of defense attorneys was for supervisors to encourage prosecutors 
underneath them to use this practice more, which according to them never 
happens. As one defense attorney suggests: “… Heads of Prosecution Offices… 
should say……’Conclude the agreement, there’s no need to hide behind the 
courts’ decisions.’” (A5). 
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Additionally, the issue of Montenegrin mentality in a wider sense is also an 
interesting one, which indirectly “peeped out” from the totality of the answers and 
impressions of the participants. Many participants claim that people love to go to 
trial in Montenegro; that they prefer to “attack”, as one prosecutor says, and favor 
conflict over settlement (P2); and that it is a really obvious thing in Montenegro 
that a great number of people go to court. “Everybody wants to go to court” as 
one judge says (J5). Some attorneys explicitly say that the prosecutors’ mindset is 
definitely based on some mental elements, like fear of their supervisor, and in line 
with that there is this always present question on the prosecutor’s side: Will 
somebody think that this sentence I negotiated is too large a concession?  
 
Apart from that, some other issues mentioned during the interviews may be linked 
to mentality. For example, one prosecutor stresses that there is a commonly 
present unpreparedness of the accused to confess crimes and s/he would always 
rather deflect guilt even in cases where the evidence is strong; as this prosecutor 
says: “He [accused] doesn’t want to confess even in cases when he is obviously 
guilty”(P2).  
 
The very interesting observation of some prosecutors that comes out of their own 
plea bargaining cases is that the accused accepts agreement in order not to be 
publicly exposed, and the injured party also favors it, but in order to be publically 
exposed as a victim. (P5) As this prosecutor says: “Avoiding the media was the 
main motive to them [the accused].”, or “The court proceeding is satisfaction for 
the injured party, especially when the public is interested. Newspapers write….the 
victim said this and that….it is important to the injured party that other people 
know what he went through, he thinks that through the agreement he lost…”. This 
might be linked to the fact that Montenegro is a very small country and to some 
extent a traditional society in which “shame” is still an important and influential 
factor in people’s behavior, while “the role of the brave victim” causes social 
attention in that it is a sort of measure of endurance, pride and dignity. The 
“opinion” of people is very important in small societies which function in a very 
155 
 
specific way defined by the existence of a small number of people in a relatively 
small space. As could be seen from the interviews even some prosecutors think 
about “what people will say”.  
 
Conservatism is the word heard during the interviews, used primarily by judges 
and defense attorneys. Participants “attached” this characteristic to all the actors 
in the process, but unfortunately in the majority of cases mostly to prosecutors 
only. This impression of prosecutors being conservative and not ready to accept 
new things was naturally strongly refuted by prosecutors themselves. However, 
this characteristic may be linked to the fact that, in general, by nature, structures 
like the judiciary and prosecution offices are least able to change remembering 
that they are large and complex state structures with powerful roles. 
 
The existence of the above described influence of the media, public and mentality 
on plea bargaining practice in Montenegro is obviously not a firm conclusion 
based on clear and strong research evidence. The interviews and comments of the 
participants refer to a large potential for the existence of such influence in reality, 
which is worth mentioning when discussing this practice in Montenegro. It can be 
said that this finding does contribute to the literature discussions on the concepts 
of the “Law-in-Books” and the “Law-in-Action”,  including those of Halperin 
(2004, p.76), Silbey (2003, p.860), and other previously mentioned authors. It 
generally refers to the importance of social factors in creating and applying the 
law. It can be seen that some social factors, in this case in Montenegro, may 
discourage the application of the existing legal provisions. Furthermore, this 
finding potentially opens up another questions suitable for further research, and 
that is how and whether the social context was actually analyzed well enough 
before creating the “law-in-books” in this case i.e. the introduction of plea 
bargaining provisions in the legal system of the country.  
 
j) The existence of a passive approach from prosecutors and defense 
attorneys when it comes to plea bargaining practice  
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One of the quite generally defined reasons for the non-application of plea 
bargaining practice in Montenegro which the majority of participants clearly 
identified is the passiveness of both prosecutors and defense attorneys in this 
regard. This conclusion inevitably emerges from the above elaborated findings. 
The causes of this passiveness have been directly or indirectly recognized and 
expressed by the actors in the process themselves, and they include: the subjective 
concern for reaching justice and truth as the purpose of the criminal proceeding; 
the formalism of the procedure; conflicting relations between the plea bargaining 
legal institution and the set-up of the Montenegrin criminal procedure; the 
relatively lenient sentencing policy of the courts, and the uncooperative 
relationship between prosecutors and defense attorneys when it comes to plea 
agreements.  
 
The focus of the passiveness critique is logically on prosecutors and defense 
attorneys (and their defendants) as those who initiate and conclude agreements, 
while the judges’ position in the whole process is by nature the most comfortable 
one. Even though there are judges who did express concerns about justice and 
fairness issues in relation to plea bargaining, as noted on a few occasions earlier, 
in principle what can be concluded from the interviews is that judges do have a 
positive attitude towards the agreements. As they stress, this is primarily due to 
the fact that it brings significantly less work to them. Some of their statements 
illustrate this: “The biggest advantage for the court is the shorter procedure and 
writing of judgments, which are much smaller in scope.” (J2), or “In the case of 
the agreement, for the court, the procedure is definitely easier…the number of 
court sessions is lower, the presence of the parties is less…” (J4). It is expected 
that judges will always act based on the law and reject agreements only when they 
are contrary to the legally defined requirements. This was confirmed by all 
participants in their answers, but also by the fact that there is a negligible number 
of proposed agreements which were rejected or dismissed in practice (elaborated 
in Chapter III). This recognized position of judges supports Canivet’s (2003, 
p.940-941) discussions about the reasons for the worldwide spread of the plea 
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bargaining practice mentioned in Chapter I - that is, that judges are being 
universally burdened with the huge number of cases which makes them primarily 
focus on how to deal with their situation quickly, rather than having time to deal 
with the essential issues of justice in each case. The biggest problem in 
Montenegro obviously lies within the individual, subjective relationship of 
prosecutors and defense attorneys towards plea agreements, as well as within the 
somewhat complicated relationship between members of these two groups. 
 
When it comes to the subjective relations of prosecutors and defense attorneys 
towards plea agreements, in addition to all the earlier information presented in 
this chapter, both groups did express an introspective, general criticism of the 
professional groups they belong to in relation to some segments of the plea 
bargaining process. Even though those are general statements not directly linked 
to the interviewees, it is worth mentioning them since they might reflect reality 
and contribute to a better understanding of the practice.  
In this regard, as could be read earlier, some attorneys openly claim that financial 
motives are predominantly leading a number of attorneys when it comes to plea 
bargaining, and that going to trials simply pays off better for attorneys. This may 
refer to the potential existence of truly unethical and unprofessional practices. 
One attorney summarizes the problems related to defense attorneys and plea 
bargaining in one sentence: “They [defense attorneys] are simply led by inertia, 
subjectivism and opportunism.”(A5) There are also some attorneys’ claims about 
the lack of knowledge of their colleagues in this area.  
On the other hand, when it comes to prosecutors, they never explicitly talk about 
their own professional group’s negative characteristic in relation to plea 
bargaining. Apart from noticing the general passiveness of both sides of the 
process, they mostly look for reasons for the practice’s unsuccessfulness in factors 
“outside themselves” and outside of their professional group. In some of 
prosecutors’ answers, a certain level of reluctance to accept some aspects of the 
process can be sensed. One prosecutor, for example, said that s/he does not like 
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bargaining with attorneys “like at the market, but negotiations” (P5). It also looks 
like some prosecutors opt for plea bargaining only when everything is “clear” in 
terms of the evidence and confession, and when they practically do not need to 
negotiate at all and consequently reduce the sentence to larger degree. One 
prosecutor actually stresses that it was like that with all her/his cases when 
concluding agreements: “   …with all the agreements, it’s not just that the accused 
accepted the agreement but we had all the evidence and the confession, and then 
we opted for an agreement” (P3). Another prosecutor says: “It is not the purpose 
of this institution to get a much lower sentence” (P5). All this ties in with the 
observation of some attorneys who claim that prosecutors cannot accept 
bargaining with them, as well as the observation of one judge who says: 
“Prosecutors are one party, and in front of the court they are equal with the other 
side; judges see it that way and prosecutors don’t like it.” (J1)  
The general passiveness of prosecutors when it comes to plea bargaining may be 
explained by the set-up of the criminal procedure in the past, where prosecutors 
did not have an active role, but on the contrary quite a passive one. They were not 
responsible for the investigation, the investigative judges were; their role was to 
go to trial with the evidence gathered by investigative judges, and as prosecutors 
represent the state during the trial which was led by a judge. Based on my 
personal experience of the courts, in practice, in most cases, it would mainly be 
reduced to making opening and closing remarks with a “few” questions asked in 
between, and all this keeping in mind that the crimes of those times were much 
simpler than today. 
The passiveness of prosecutors and defense attorneys when it comes to plea 
bargaining and the key causes of this passiveness have obviously been expressed 
by the interviewees and identified, but there is always the risk of some being 
unexpressed by the actors themselves, and therefore they may remain unrevealed. 
 
This discovered problem of the passiveness of both sides involved in the plea 
bargaining process in Montenegro, and to some extent the above-mentioned 
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problematic relationship between prosecutors and defense attorneys, potentially 
points to Canivet’s (2003, p.941) “hybridized” criminal procedure discussed in 
Chapter I, and the consequent resistance to unfamiliar or non-inherited legal 
practices. The unfamiliarity is further linked to education and training. To be 
specific, all the interviewed candidates did not show any wider knowledge about 
the practice apart from what the legal norms tell them about it. For example, none 
of them referred to the practice of the ECoHR discussed in Chapter I in her/his 
answers as an argument for their opinion. This again indirectly leads to the issues 
of the “Law-in-Books” and the “Law-in-Action”, and the lack of relevant 
systematic contextual examination and analysis prior to the introduction of a 
completely new legal institution in the system. Many of the interviewees 
themselves directly or indirectly referred to this problem in their answers when, 
for example, they talked about the need for future training in this field. This 
finally leads to a conclusion which is relevant to future practice – that there is a 
recognized need for further public and professional education in this field in order 
to bring the legally available practice closer to those who are supposed to 
implement it.  
 
5.4. Conclusion 
 
The research results are obviously interesting and are “filled out” by the 
“energetic” and “confronting” opinions and experiences of participants. Indeed, 
the goals of the research have been mostly reached, and some useful specific 
answers have been provided. There were no illusions on my part that this research 
would reveal the totality of the issues in question or fully identify solutions to the 
recognized problems, but in principle, it has enabled me to formulate some 
specific conclusions, presented in the next chapter. They will hopefully be found 
beneficial when it comes to the future application of plea bargaining in 
Montenegro, as well as for potential future research in this field.  
 
160 
 
Finally, the research contributes to the overall knowledge about plea bargaining 
primarily bearing in mind that it reveals for the first time how this practice is 
applied in Montenegro, but to some extent it also adds to the existing knowledge 
about this practice in the neighboring countries of Serbia and Croatia. It also 
clearly expands the universal discussions and debates about some of the specific  
issues mentioned above related to plea bargaining, which obviously exist in 
Montenegro as well.   
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CHAPTER VI  
CONCLUSION  
 
In this concluding chapter, elaborated recommendations in relation to future steps 
that may be taken in the area of plea bargaining in Montenegro will be presented. 
Based on the determined research goals and the research findings reached, a set of 
actions in the plea bargaining field that might be taken by practitioners and 
legislators, as well as the academic community of Montenegro will be presented 
in this chapter. The leading goal in formulating the final recommendations is to 
improve the application of this practice in the country. As can be concluded from 
the previous chapters, improving this practice is the indisputable wish of all the 
interviewed participants and Montenegrin legislators, but also hopefully of those 
Montenegrin academics whose voices are yet to be heard.  
6.1. Research Goals - How have they been reached? 
Before providing the final recommendations, it is useful to recall the initially 
determined research goals and the ways they have been reached in my research. 
The first two research goals, analyzing the quality of the legal regulation of plea 
bargaining in Montenegro, and comparing plea bargaining practice in 
Montenegro with the practice in neighboring countries, Serbia and Croatia were 
crucial initial steps which together with the plea bargaining literature review in 
Chapter I and the methodology review in Chapter II provided context for the 
interviews that followed. Through the method of document analysis and relevant 
discussion in Chapter III, the reader was introduced to the reasons for the 
introduction of plea bargaining in Montenegro, the ways in which this practice is 
regulated in the country, and what the differences are in comparison to Serbia and 
Croatia, which have similar legal systems. The reader was able to learn that plea 
agreements are not a widespread practice in Montenegro, that a very small 
number of criminal cases is completed this way, and that the legal regulation of 
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the practice in the country is strongly affected by the general concept of the 
existing criminal procedure, being based on civil law with some adversarial 
elements in the investigation phase. The relevant experiences of Serbia and 
Croatia were also presented to the reader who was able to conclude that plea 
bargaining is not used to a larger extent in both of these countries either. 
Additionally, in Chapter III it could be seen that the legal solutions of Montenegro 
and Croatia in this area are quite similar, while the Serbian procedure is somewhat 
different, since it is closer to the adversarial system having not just prosecutor led 
investigations, like Montenegro and Croatia, but also cross-examination at the 
trial.  
The third research goal of investigating the level of use, usefulness and 
productiveness of the plea bargaining institution in the criminal justice system of 
Montenegro was partly reached through the mentioned document analysis and 
discussion in Chapter III, which clearly showed that the level of usage of this 
legal instrument is quite low in Montenegro. However, the usefulness and 
productiveness of the plea bargaining institution could only be examined through 
the experiences of actors in this process i.e. the interviews conducted with them. 
The interviews, being the key part of this research, led to fulfillment of the third, 
but also the remaining research goals: identifying problems in the application of 
plea bargaining in Montenegro, as well as successful schemes in the 
implementation of this practice; discovering the causes of challenges in the 
application of plea bargaining in Montenegro, as well as factors of success in the 
implementation of this practice; and in line with these two goals, providing 
adequate conclusions and recommendations which can be useful in the further 
development of the practice and study of this issue in Montenegro. The interviews 
with judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys who have practical experience 
with plea agreements managed to reveal the real practices, positions, thinking and 
attitudes hidden behind the legal norms and documents.  
Through relevant presentations, analysis, elaborations and discussions in all the 
chapters, the key research findings were shaped and elaborated in Chapter V:  
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a) The plea bargaining practice is not widespread in Montenegro, nor is 
this the case in  neighboring Serbia and Croatia;  
b) The main motives of the legislator for the introduction of this legal 
instrument into the legal system of Montenegro were improving efficiency 
and reducing the costs of the criminal proceedings; 
c) The plea bargaining legal solutions of Montenegro and Croatia are quite 
similar, and these systems seem more “closed” to plea bargaining in 
comparison to Serbia;  
d) The existence of a generally positive opinion of all actors in relation to 
plea bargaining as such; 
e) The existence of the negative influence of procedural formalism on plea 
bargaining practice;   
f) The existence of the negative influence of the lenient sentencing policy of 
courts on plea bargaining  practice; 
g) The existence of the general negative influence of the set-up of the 
criminal procedure in Montenegro on plea bargaining practice; 
h) The existence of problematic relationships between prosecutors and 
defense attorneys when it comes to plea bargaining; 
i) The potential existence of the limited negative influence of the public and 
mentality on plea bargaining practice; and   
j) The existence of a passive approach from prosecutors and defense 
attorneys when it comes to plea bargaining practice.  
 
Based on the above summarized research goals and findings, the relevant 
recommendations which will be presented further in this chapter have been 
formulated. 
6.2. Implications for Practice 
In considering the key implications for practice when it comes to this research, it 
was first necessary to take into account the recommendations which were given 
by the interviewed participants themselves. Their voice is the major one in this 
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process since it is expected that they best know what challenges they face in 
practice, and what needs to be done in order to overcome them. The prevailing 
suggestions of the most important actors in the process i.e. prosecutors and 
defense attorneys have primarily been taken into account when discussing 
implications for the future, but judicial suggestions have not been excluded. A 
few of the participants’ proposals are neglected in this part for various justified 
reasons (they are presented in more detail in Appendix S). All of these 
recommendations reflect the totality of the participants’ answers and comments, 
the existing Montenegrin legislative framework, as well as the comparison of 
relevant Montenegrin legal solutions with those in neighboring countries.  
It is important to emphasize that the following recommendations are based on the 
existing set-up of the Montenegrin criminal procedure discussed earlier. The 
question of whether the Montenegrin Criminal Justice system should or will 
transfer to a fully adversarial criminal procedure is one which is hard to answer. 
Due to the complexity and potentially far reaching effects of such a transfer, it is 
not easy to suggest this big systematic change even though it looks attractive in 
some of its aspects. Additionally, the fact that the existing CPC was adopted and 
amended relatively recently leads to the conclusion that the Montenegrin criminal 
procedure will keep its current shape for many years. Therefore, identifying 
practical suggestions which are realistic and potentially useful in the existing set-
up of the criminal procedure in Montenegro was the guiding idea. 
Furthermore, all the identified practical suggestions are directed towards the 
promotion and further development of plea bargaining practice in Montenegro. 
The intention and wish to keep this legal instrument as part of the Montenegrin 
criminal procedure are reflected in the participants’ interviews, as well as in the 
general direction chosen by the Montenegrin legislator (this was discussed in 
Chapter III). This is a legal instrument which is obviously part of not just reality 
but also the future of the Montenegrin Criminal Justice system.  
Apart from the above presented issues, the obvious lack of previous research in 
this area in Montenegro adds an additional burden when it comes to shaping 
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conclusions and suggestions in this research. Some of the recommendations and 
research segments presented in this work may be able to generate ideas for future 
research in this field.  
Finally, many factors and elements on which the following proposals are based 
have already been largely elaborated and discussed in the earlier chapters. Bearing 
this in mind, all the recommendations that will be presented further are the logical 
outcome of these earlier discussions, and therefore their justification will not be 
extensive.  
Based on their goal, the research recommendations can be grouped in the 
following categories: 
a) Legislative and other similar recommendations;  
b) Educational;  
c) Promotional; 
d) Academic. 
Legislative and Other Similar Recommendations 
 To allow plea bargaining to be applied until the end of the main 
hearing i.e. the trial 
 To allow negotiation on the circumstances of the case and 
consequently on the legal qualification of the crime 
These two recommendations related to amendments to the current plea bargaining 
provisions have the purpose of enlarging the potential scope of the application of 
plea bargaining.  
It is currently allowed to conclude agreement only until the first session of the 
main hearing i.e. the beginning of the trial, and it is limited to negotiation about 
criminal sanctions, meaning that the accused can only confess the crime which is 
initially legally qualified by the prosecutor. The proposed widening of this 
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application should not bring any harm to the practice, but can only potentially 
contribute to its development. In relation to the possibility of plea bargaining 
being applied until the end of the trial, this has already been discussed in the 
previous chapters, and was proposed by the prosecutors and defense attorneys 
themselves. We should recall that the proposed change might be a more practical 
solution since quite often the trial i.e. the presentation and elaboration of 
evidence, convincingly demonstrates reasons for simplifying the process and 
concluding the agreement. The trials, particularly those that involve large number 
of accused, witnesses and experts, may last a long time and become complicated.  
As for another proposed change to allow negotiation on the circumstances of the 
case and the legal qualification of the crime, it was also earlier discussed and 
suggested by prosecutors and defense attorneys, but also by some judges. Some 
might criticize this proposal. However, this solution may primarily be useful in 
terms of opting for a less severe rather than more severe form of the single crime 
in question. It can often happen that the accused is, for example, willing to 
confess one act but not another, in which case s/he can still be accused of the 
same crime i.e. a less severe form of the obvious crime in question. In some 
situations where the evidence is weak, negotiating case circumstances and the 
legal qualification of the crime might be a more practical solution for prosecutor 
that sticking to more severe charges and potentially losing the case.  
 To reduce the formalism of the procedure 
The formalism of the procedure was clearly marked as a problem by many 
research participants. It was also demonstrated through the spontaneous creation 
of earlier mentioned informal practices in the courts which essentially represent 
plea bargaining; they basically represent the avoidance of procedural formalism. 
In line with this and the analysis of the relevant provisions in the earlier chapters, 
it can be concluded that there is space for a reduction in formalism. For example, 
it may be through canceling the acceptance of the plea agreement at two levels 
(first through the court ruling, and then the court judgment), or through a 
reduction in the number of documents and forms that are written and adopted 
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during the process itself. A reduction of formalism in the plea bargaining process 
is one of the proposals that has the potential to be implemented in practice 
relatively easily.  
 To adopt official guidelines by the Office of Supreme State Prosecutor 
related to plea bargaining application  
Through the interviews with participants in this research, it was easy to notice that 
Montenegrin prosecutors feel a certain type of worry and uncertainty when it 
comes to using plea bargaining in practice. Amongst other things, as some of 
them suggested, this can significantly be reduced by providing them with some 
major guidelines on how to act and how to handle this process. This could be 
done through the issuance of some kind of guiding document by the Supreme 
State Prosecutor of Montenegro. For example, as was earlier noted, precisely this 
was done in Croatia by their Chief State Prosecutor. Such guidelines would not 
just contribute to uniformity in the prosecutorial application of this legal 
institution throughout the country, but what is maybe more important, it would be 
a sort of encouragement for prosecutors to start using the agreements more. The 
lack of such encouragement was clearly recognized by almost all the participants, 
including prosecutors themselves. The existing Montenegrin guidelines about 
deferred prosecution practice are seen as a potentially encouraging factor, 
particularly bearing in mind that deferred prosecution is much more widely 
applied in practice in comparison to plea bargaining. Even though the existence of 
guidelines would obviously not be a deciding factor when it comes to larger plea 
bargaining application, it would surely be an influential one, since prosecutors 
clearly expressed complains about the lack of any kind of guidance in this area.  
 To (perhaps) amend the Defense Attorneys’ Tariff  
The amendments that are proposed here are those suggested by some attorneys, 
and that is the introduction of higher attorneys’ rates for plea bargaining related 
legal services in order to encourage the conclusion of plea agreements. When it 
comes to this recommendation, it can be interpreted as indirect verification of the 
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potentially unethical behavior of some Montenegrin attorneys who, according to 
the impressions of research participants, led by financial interest, opt rather for a 
trial than an agreement. Consequently, it can also mean favoring one side or 
profession in this process i.e. the attorneys’ one. However, this practice can be 
justified, keeping in mind that more or less the same amount of money would 
ultimately be paid to the attorney for her/his services. In other words, defense 
attorney would earn a similar amount of money from an average length trial as 
from the plea agreement (in the case of the existence of higher attorneys’ rates for 
plea bargaining legal services). This is maybe a questionable recommendation in 
some of its aspects, but it can contribute to the significantly larger application of 
plea bargaining in practice, and consequently to releasing the Criminal Justice 
system from very long and expensive criminal trials.  
Educational recommendations 
 
 To continuously organize plea bargaining related training for 
prosecutors and defense attorneys, as well as judges when deemed 
appropriate 
   
Almost all the interviewees stress training as an important element that can affect 
the future application of plea bargaining. In their comments, most of the 
participants call for educational activities in this area. Many of them stress that in 
the initial period when plea bargaining was introduced into the Montenegrin legal 
system, there were many relevant training events for prosecutors, defense 
attorneys and judges. However, as they claim, such activities do not exist to the 
needed extent at present. In line with this, the general recommendation for the 
Judicial Training Center of Montenegro as the key national judicial training 
institution is to continue to include this topic in its yearly Criminal Law 
Curriculum, but with more attention being paid to it in practical curriculum 
implementation. Furthermore, in line with the research findings, the special focus 
of the training programs in this area should be on: a) understanding and 
developing cooperative relationships between prosecutors and defense attorneys 
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in the process of plea bargaining; b) learning about the practices of other relevant 
countries; c) recognizing situations in which plea bargaining is the most practical 
solution like, for example, the earlier discussed recidivists category of accused, 
and d) the influence of the sentencing policy of courts on plea bargaining. 
Educational activities cannot be expected to cause a revolution when it comes to 
plea bargaining application, but they have a specific type of importance. They 
have the potential to “deliver” specific results like, for example, legislative 
proposals, but also to cause certain thinking and develop certain subjective 
reactions of participants in relation to the topic discussed. In this context, one of 
the interviewed judges says: “When, for example, I heard about this topic at the 
seminars…it all looked so positive and that there was a potential for that in 
practice.” (J5). 
 
Promotional Recommendations 
 
 To organize promotional activities related to plea bargaining  
 
Even though this proposal is nominated by many interviewed participants, at first 
glance it may provoke the question of whether it is appropriate to promote 
something that exists in the law, especially in the criminal law. However, if plea 
bargaining is understood as an alternative to the classical criminal trail (which is 
usually exhausting for all of its actors), then the promotion of this legal institution 
is acceptable. One of the interviewed attorneys says: “Anybody who hasn’t been 
in a courtroom cannot know how exhausting it is to actually reach the judgment.” 
(A3) Similarly, mediation is strongly promoted as an alternative way of resolving 
civil, but also criminal cases in many countries including Montenegro. In this 
context, it would be useful for the Ministry of Justice of Montenegro, as the 
“neutral party” in the whole process and the key criminal law legislator which 
supports this institution, to start a kind of promotional campaign. This could 
potentially include the delivery and distribution of more informative brochures to 
the courts and prosecution offices (a limited number have already been 
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distributed), organizing public debates and discussions on this topic including TV 
and radio debates, promotion through the newspapers, and so on. These activities, 
just like the educational ones, cannot be expected to bring tremendous changes, 
but may still motivate a number of prosecutors and the accused and their defense 
attorneys to try plea bargaining. It would be a positive result which could lead to 
fewer long and expensive trials. 
 
Academic Recommendations 
 
 Encouraging future research on this topic  
 
The final recommendation is related to the need for future research of plea 
bargaining in Montenegro. This is primarily bearing in mind the already 
mentioned key limiting factors of this research: the complete absence of previous 
research of this type and on this topic in Montenegro; the very limited literature 
related to the same or similar issues in the countries of the region which are the 
most useful when it comes to comparative analysis; and the very small number of 
plea agreements concluded in Montenegro so far. This research obviously 
represents just a starting point. It does provide key information about one phase of 
plea bargaining application in Montenegro, since its introduction for a limited 
number of crimes in 2009 to its significant extension to almost all crimes in 2015. 
However, as can be seen from the research results, this period of six years is 
characterized by a very small number of concluded plea agreements and 
practically just modest attempts at using this legal instrument. It can be logically 
expected that by the recent amendments of the CPC, by which plea bargaining has 
been extended to almost all crimes, the number of plea agreements will increase 
in the future. In line with this, the suggestion is to repeat the same kind of 
research, but covering the period of five years from the present time. This future 
research would be a follow up to the present study. It should again be focused on 
examining essentially the same issues i.e. generally the regulation and practical 
usage of plea agreements in Montenegro, and it should use the same research 
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methods, primarily interviews. Examining the Serbian experience with this 
institution in the years to come would be interesting as well, bearing in mind their 
recent transfer to a largely adversarial criminal procedure. Obviously, the 
timeframe, relevant legal provisions and total number of plea agreements that 
would be in the focus of this future research would be different. Consequently, 
this follow up research would potentially include not just a larger number of plea 
agreements to be analyzed, but also a larger number of interviews to be 
conducted. It would logically produce different results, but ones which would be 
fully comparable with the results of this research. Altogether, it would cover a 
very long period of the development and practical implementation of this legal 
institution in the country. It would be very useful for learning about the 
development of the legal institution, as well as for the final identification and 
determination of the most adequate plea bargaining legal and practical framework 
in Montenegro.    
 
Additionally, this research has tackled and opened up one separate interesting 
topic that should be a focus of separate future research; this is particularly keeping 
in mind the wish for the further development of plea bargaining institution and 
practice clearly expressed by the Montenegrin legislators, but also practitioners. 
That is the public perception of plea bargaining in Montenegro. It is a segment 
which is important for the successful implementation of this practice. Through 
targeted focus groups and questionnaires, public perceptions about plea 
agreements should be examined in the future. The findings of this research would 
be useful primarily in the context of the successful promotion of this legal 
institution and general encouragement for its use. These findings would definitely 
be an additional helpful tool that could contribute to the process of the further 
examining and development of this practice in the country.   
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6.3. Conclusion 
 
At the very end, I hereby express the hope that the conclusions reached through 
this research will be beneficial to the legal community of Montenegro, as well as 
interesting to the reader. I will conclude this work with the wish that plea 
bargaining, in whatever form it is present in the Montenegrin legal system in the 
future, fulfills its main purpose, and that is to assist all the actors in the criminal 
procedure to go through this challenging process in an easier and more efficient 
way, while at the same time, satisfying the inexorable requirements of justice. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Brief Overview   
The plea bargaining practice in the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Russia 
and India 
 
The United Kingdom – England and Wales 
 
In England and Wales, there is no strictly formal and institutionalized plea 
bargaining. As Raphael says (2008, p.2): “Opportunities for the prosecution to 
engage formally in discussions with the defense over possible pleas are more 
limited in England and Wales than in many other 
jurisdictions.” He further explains that historically the criminal justice system in 
England and Wales has been reluctant to formalize any sort of plea bargaining, 
primarily because of the need to retain judicial independence and ensure that no 
undue pressure was put on the defendant to plead guilty. However, plea 
bargaining is and has been very much part of the English Criminal Justice System 
in an informal way. Based on statistical analysis, Horne writes that (2013, p.2): 
“The vast majority of defendants in criminal cases in England and Wales plead 
guilty… The overwhelming majority of these guilty pleas will have been 
influenced by plea bargaining in one of its forms.” He explains that some of the 
guilty pleas are a result of “express bargaining between the parties” which ends 
either with an agreement of a lesser charge or a “less serious version of the facts” 
i.e. charge bargaining and fact bargaining. However, as he writes, most commonly 
there is no express negotiation taking place, and plea agreements are reached 
“through the operation of the sentencing discount.” “This entitles a defendant who 
pleads guilty to a reduced sentence (which, depending on the stage at which he 
pleads guilty, will be up to one third less than would have followed conviction at 
trial)... Thus, the sentencing discount amounts to a third form of plea bargaining.” 
In relation to the formalization of the practice, Horne further enumerates (2013, 
n.p.) laws and other documents which do regulate certain aspects of guilty plea 
issues in England and Wales i.e. the sentencing discount and the role of 
prosecutors and judges. Those documents are: the 2003 Criminal Justice Act119, 
the 2007 Sentencing Guidelines Council - Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty 
Plea120, the 2013 Code for Crown Prosecutors121, the 2011 Ministry of Justice’s 
Consolidated Criminal Practice Direction122 and the 2012 Criminal Procedure 
Rules123.  She further writes: “In the Crown Court, the judge must consider 
whether the plea is ‘a proper plea on the basis of the facts set out by the papers’ 
and sentencing can only take place if the judge is ‘satisfied that the plea is 
properly grounded’. In the magistrates’ court, the court must be satisfied that the 
plea ‘represents a clear acknowledgement of guilt’”. Something that is typical of 
the legal system of England and Wales when it comes to plea bargaining is how a 
plea of guilty as such is understood by the courts. Baldwin and McConville, 
known for criticizing the coercive nature of guilty pleas in England and Wales, 
claim that (1979, p.288): “…the courts themselves have been reluctant to 
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acknowledge that a plea of guilty can be anything other than a full, free, and 
voluntary decision by the defendant.” In this context, Horne explains (2013, n.p) 
that courts have traditionally presented a guilty plea as a ‘confession’ and as “a 
gesture of remorse”, and commonly relied on that as a mitigating factor in 
sentencing. In relation to this, she refers to the well-known Regina v. Turner 
case124. When talking about the stronger formalization of plea bargaining and 
leaving behind such an understanding of the guilty plea, it is obvious that in 
recent years there are number of steps that the Government and even the Courts of 
England and Wales have taken in this direction. Horne particularly emphasizes 
the effects of the 1993 Royal Commission on Criminal Justice Report125 which 
recommended better regulation of the sentencing discount for guilty plea. She 
notes that after this report was issued several important things happened in this 
regard, such as, for example, the introduction of plea discussions in serious fraud 
cases126. It is obvious that there is a factual plea bargaining in England and Wales 
including sentence, charge and, to a lesser extent, fact bargaining, with a 
significant role for the court, but the road towards its complete formalization still 
seems to be long.  
 
Germany  
 
In the past Germany, as a typical civil law country, did not have formal plea 
bargaining agreements. However, there were so-called “informal agreements” of 
this type that were quite widely used. They largely involved judges in the process 
of negotiations, and led to much confusion in practice. Finally, in 2009, the Law 
on Agreements in Criminal Proceedings127 was adopted by the German 
Parliament. This was result of a wish to formalize the above-mentioned exiting 
practices and was also motivated by clear instructions given in the German 
Supreme Court Decision from 2005128. As Frommann writes (2009, p. 201-202): 
“…the German Supreme Court…called on the legislature to assume its 
responsibility to draft a law regulating agreements in order to put an end to legal 
uncertainty.” Frommann further describes how the German Law on Agreements 
in Criminal Proceedings regulates this area (2009, p.202-203): “The Law on 
Agreements inserts section 257c StPO into the German Code of Criminal 
Procedure, as the main provision dealing with agreements. Section 257c I StPO 
stipulates that the court can, in suitable cases, agree with the participants about the 
further course and outcome of the proceedings. The same paragraph states that the 
obligation of the court to elucidate the merits of the case pursuant to section 244 
II StPO remains unrestricted.” He further explains that the subject-matter of the 
agreement may be related to the sentences. The added section clearly says that the 
subject-matter of the agreement is the defendant’s confession, and that “neither a 
conviction nor the defendant’s announcement to waive remedies may be part of 
the agreement”. It is clear that the role of the judge in the German plea 
negotiations and agreements is large, and that it is in general limited to sentence 
bargaining.  
 
Italy 
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In 1988, Italy adopted a new Code of Criminal Procedure129. This marked the 
beginning of the application of special form of plea bargaining practice in Italy. 
At that time, it was quite a revolutionary law in terms of the introduction of 
adversarial elements into a typical civil law system, primarily elements close to 
plea bargaining and cross-examination. In relation to these novelties, the Italian 
author Iovene writes that (2013, p.3): “…in 1988, the Italian legislature 
…introduced so-called special proceedings which, generally speaking, can be 
numbered among negotiated justice: the sentencing by parties’ request … and the 
abbreviated trial.” An abbreviated trial represents more an alternative to a 
complete trial in the form of shortened trial rather than plea negotiations, 
therefore, I will not elaborate on that. When it comes to the first mentioned 
procedure, the so-called patteggiamento which can be considered a form of Italian 
plea bargaining i.e. sentence bargaining, Iovene further writes (2103, p.4): “In the 
Italian plea bargaining there is actually no guilty plea, but just a request that a 
particular sentence be applied; furthermore, due to the mandatory prosecution, no 
charge bargaining is possible.” This procedure enables the prosecutor and the 
defendant to agree on a sentence with a judge’s scrutiny. The judge is not bound 
by their agreement, but can approve it or reject it. It can be concluded that in Italy, 
as in Germany, the role of the court in plea bargaining process is quite important, 
and it is also focused on sentence bargaining. 
   
Russia 
 
In 2001, Russia adopted a new Criminal Procedure Code130; this was the first new 
law of this type, which replaced the old Soviet Union Criminal Procedure Code 
dating from 1961. The new Code introduced a form of resolving criminal cases 
that can be linked to plea bargaining. As Semukhina and Reynolds write (2009, 
p.401): “In Russian jurisprudence, this plea bargaining is termed as ‘special court 
order proceeding.’” These authors refer to Orland (2002) and say that within this 
procedure: “…a defendant has the right to file a petition to request the ‘special 
order of court proceeding’ if the accused agrees the charges specified in the 
indictment are true. In such a case, the judge can order the trial stage omitted and 
sentence the defendant to no more than two-thirds of the maximum sentence 
allowed for the crime by the Criminal Code.” They further write that (2009, 
p.405):”…the defendant can either completely agree with the charges of the 
indictment or go to trial…” and conclude that “the special court procedure in 
Russia can only be viewed as a sentencing plea but cannot include any type of 
charge or count negotiations.”  The authors discuss the scope of judicial discretion 
in this process in Russia as well (2009, p.406) by referring to Geintze (2007), and 
explain that a Russian trial judge can reject or accept the plea, decide to change 
the criminal charges, “remand the case to the prosecutor, or drop the criminal 
charges.” The similarities of the Russian legal solutions in this area with the 
German and Italian ones are obvious when it comes to the described forms of plea 
bargaining i.e. sentence negotiations. 
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India 
 
After many years of harsh judicial resistance towards classic forms of plea 
bargaining, primarily when it comes to Indian Supreme Court, in 2005 a small but 
significant change in the judiciary’s attitude happened. As Santhy writes (2013, 
p.91):“...it was Gujarat High Court that recognized the utility of this method in the 
case State of Gujarat v. Natwar Harchandji Thakor, as an alternative measure of 
redressal to deal with huge arrears in criminal cases.” In exactly the same year 
2005 and regardless of the serious debate and confrontations to the practice, the 
Indian Criminal Procedure Code131 was amended and provisions related to plea 
bargaining were introduced into the Indian criminal justice system. Kathuria 
describes how this process functions in India (2007, p.57). To be clear, the 
initiative to start negotiations is from the accused. Kathuria says: “A person 
accused of an offence for which the maximum punishment does not exceed seven 
years may file an application for plea bargaining in the court in which such 
offence is pending for trial.” After the application is received by the court, the 
court examines the accused in order to check whether the application was filed 
voluntarily. After it is determined as voluntarily the accused together with the 
prosecutor, the victim and the investigator, is given some time to mutually agree 
about the form of case disposition. Kathuria stresses that (2007, p.58): “The judge 
is not envisaged to be a silent spectator, but has a significant role to play in the 
process. The court is responsible for ensuring that the whole process is carried out 
with the full and voluntary consent of the accused.” After the disposition of the 
case is agreed, in line with what was agreed the court decides on compensation to 
the victim, as well as on the sentence. When it comes to this type of bargaining, 
since it is vaguely left to the accused, the prosecutor, the investigator and the 
victim to decide on case disposition, in practice this includes not just sentence but 
also charge bargaining. The Indian advocate Pradeep discusses this in his article 
(2010, n.p.), and he stresses that even though the Criminal Procedure Code: 
“…does not state about the nature of bargaining, it is a consolidation of Charge, 
Sentence and Fact plea-bargaining.” As can be concluded, the Indian Criminal 
Justice System implies quite a big influence of the court in the plea bargaining 
process, and it allows sentence, charge, as well as fact bargaining. Additionally, a 
particularity of this system especially comparing to the U.S., as well as to most 
other countries, is that it gives significant attention to the rights of victims, who 
can literally veto the reaching of the plea agreement. 
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DRAFT - INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR JUDGES 
Semi-structured interview 
Interviewer: Ana Grgurevic 
Interviewees: Judges  
Date and time: xxx 
Introduction, general overview of the topics that will be discussed, stressing the 
importance of informality and relaxed atmosphere, general encouragement to 
speak as much as they want. 
Main questions Additional questions Eventual clarifying 
questions 
Q 1. As you have been 
informed, the overall 
purpose of this interview 
is to find out your 
opinion about plea 
bargaining agreements, 
potential for their 
application in the 
Montenegrin legal 
system, challenges and 
successes with 
implementing this 
practice. In line with 
this, firstly what is your 
general opinion about 
such agreements? 
Why do you think they 
are good/not good? What 
are advantages and 
disadvantaged of this 
legal instrument? 
 
Does your opinion come 
from your practical 
experience with plea 
bargaining agreements? 
 
Can you please describe 
your personal practical 
experience with these 
agreements? 
 
Can you please tell me 
how many agreements 
have you approved and 
how many agreements 
have you rejected during 
last year? 
Q 2. From your In your opinion what are  
INSTITUTE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STUDIES 
Researcher: Ana Grgurevic 
E-mail: ana.grgurevic@myport.ac.uk 
Supervisor: Dr Diana Bretherick 
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perspective how 
Montenegrin judges 
generally perceive such 
agreements? 
 
the reasons for these 
perceptions?  
What might explain a 
judge’s reluctance to plea 
bargaining? To what 
extent might this 
reluctance be linked to all 
the novelties of the 
criminal justice system. 
Do you think it could be 
typical for the plea 
bargaining institution 
only? 
 
Q 3. In relation to my 
next question, it’s 
obvious from the courts’ 
statistics that there are 
not that many cases in 
which plea bargaining 
was applied. In your 
opinion, are these 
agreements realistically 
applicable in the 
Montenegrin legal 
system to a larger 
extent? 
 
To what extent do you 
think that the barriers for 
the application of plea 
bargaining are within the 
provisions of the 
Criminal Procedure Code 
itself? Do you think that 
they could relate more to 
the approach and motives 
of prosecutors and 
advocates? Are there any 
other reasons that could 
be put forward for this? 
Can you please explain 
what do you think: 
whether this type of 
reluctance of the criminal 
justice system can be 
linked to all the novelties 
of the criminal justice 
system which are in a 
way alien to traditional 
continental legal system 
of Montenegro, or it is 
typical for plea 
What do you think, does 
sentencing policy of the 
courts plays role in 
application of plea 
bargaining, and if it does 
how? 
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bargaining institution 
only? 
Q 4. In your experience, 
how prosecutors and 
advocates generally act 
when it comes to plea 
bargaining agreements? 
 
Are there any particular 
problems in practice that 
you can identify? 
 
What in your opinion 
could be done to improve 
the situation? 
Can you please share 
with me some examples 
from your practice which 
were problematic when 
it comes to plea 
bargaining practice, 
primarily in relation to 
cases in which you 
rejected the agreements 
proposed? And opposite, 
good examples? 
Q 5. Do you have any 
comments regarding 
application of plea 
bargaining agreements 
in the context of the 
protection of human 
rights?  
What specific European 
Convention of Human 
Rights standards you 
have in mind? 
 
Q 6. Can you please 
comment on the position 
of the damaged party 
when it comes to plea 
bargaining agreements 
and Montenegrin 
legislation in this 
context? How do you see 
this? 
In your opinion, how well 
are the interests of the 
injured party protected? 
Is this satisfactory? 
 
 
From your experience 
does this issue of the 
injured party interests 
ever comes as 
problematic in practice? 
Can you please share 
with me some 
experiences of this kind? 
Q 7. The law, practice 
and literature suggest 
that both plea 
bargaining and deferred 
prosecution have a 
purpose of enlarging 
work efficiency and 
reducing case backlog. 
In the light of this how 
do you see the 
relationship between 
these two legal 
institutions? 
In your opinion, which of 
these two legal 
institutions is more useful 
in practice, and why? 
 
Q 8. Defendant’s 
understanding of the 
In your opinion, how 
important openness of the 
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purpose and 
consequences of the plea 
agreement that he/she is 
signing, is a 
precondition for its 
approval. What are you 
experiences with this 
element of the plea 
bargaining?  
defendants’ for plea 
bargaining is in the whole 
process of plea 
bargaining application? 
Do you or would you 
worry about public 
perception when 
approving the plea 
bargaining agreement? 
Q 9. What you think 
could be done by 
legislators and all the 
actors of plea 
bargaining (prosecutors, 
lawyers, judges) in 
order to make it an 
efficient alternative tool 
in resolving criminal 
cases? 
 
Who has the most 
important role in 
promoting this institution 
(having in mind that it 
has been part of the 
Montenegrin criminal 
legislation for quite some 
time, and that by its 
nature it is expected to 
contribute to the 
efficiency of the criminal 
justice system)? 
Do you have any concrete 
legislative changes in 
mind that could be useful 
when it comes to plea 
bargaining? 
 
Q 10. Finally, is there 
anything you would like 
to add on this topic, 
anything we missed and 
you see it as important? 
Any comments, 
suggestions and similar? 
 
 
 
 
Ending the interview. Thanking. Reminding on the researcher’s availability for 
further communication.  
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DRAFT - INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR PROSECUTORS 
Semi-structured interview 
Interviewer: Ana Grgurevic 
Interviewees: Prosecutors 
Date and time: xxx 
Introduction, general overview of the topics that will be discussed, stressing the 
importance of informality and relaxed atmosphere, general encouragement to 
speak as much as they want. 
Main questions Additional questions Eventual clarifying 
questions 
Q 1. As you have been 
informed, the overall 
purpose of this 
interview is to find out 
your opinion about plea 
bargaining agreements, 
potential for their 
application in the 
Montenegrin legal 
system, challenges and 
successes with 
implementing this 
practice. In line with 
this, firstly what is your 
general opinion about 
such agreements? 
Why do you think they 
are good/not good? What 
are advantages and 
disadvantaged of this 
legal instrument? 
 
Does your opinion come 
from your practical 
experience with plea 
bargaining agreements? 
 
Can you please describe 
your personal practical 
experience with these 
agreements? 
 
Can you please tell me 
how many agreements 
have you concluded 
during last year i.e. how 
many cases have you 
finished that way? 
Q 2. From your In your opinion what are  
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perspective how 
Montenegrin 
prosecutors generally 
perceive such 
agreements? 
the reasons for these 
perceptions?  
What do you think 
motivates prosecutors 
when considering 
whether or not to engage 
with plea bargaining? 
  
What might explain a 
prosecutor’s reluctance to 
engage with plea 
bargaining? To what 
extent might this 
reluctance be linked to all 
the novelties of the 
criminal justice system. 
Do you think it could be 
typical for the plea 
bargaining institution 
only? 
Q 3. In relation to my 
next question, it’s 
obvious from the courts’ 
statistics that there are 
not that many cases in 
which plea bargaining 
was applied. In your 
opinion, are these 
agreements realistically 
applicable in the 
Montenegrin legal 
system to a larger 
extent? 
 
To what extent do you 
think that the barriers for 
the application of plea 
bargaining are within the 
provisions of the 
Criminal Procedure Code 
itself? Do you think that 
they could relate more to 
the approach and motives 
of prosecutors and 
advocates? Are there any 
other reasons that could 
be put forward for this? 
 
Can you please explain 
what do you think: 
whether this type of 
reluctance of the criminal 
justice system can be 
linked to all the novelties 
of the criminal justice 
system which are in a 
way alien to traditional 
continental legal system 
of Montenegro, or it is 
typical for plea 
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bargaining institution 
only? 
Q 4. In your experience, 
how advocates generally 
act when it comes to 
plea bargaining 
agreements? 
 
Are there any particular 
problems in practice that 
you can identify? 
 
What in your opinion 
could be done to improve 
the situation? 
Can you please share 
with me some examples 
from your practice of the 
advocates who did not 
want to enter into plea 
bargaining, and you 
believed that there were 
good grounds for plea 
bargaining, and/or 
opposite? 
Q 5. How do judges 
react when plea 
bargaining agreement is 
offered to them? 
Are there any particular 
problems in practice that 
you can identify, and can 
you please describe 
them? 
 
What in your opinion 
could be done to improve 
the situation? 
Can you please share 
with me some examples 
from your practice, when 
a judge rejected the 
agreement, and you 
thought that it was 
completely justified and 
well grounded? 
Q 6. Do you have any 
comments regarding 
application of plea 
bargaining agreements 
in the context of the 
protection of human 
rights?  
What specific European 
Convention of Human 
Rights standards you 
have in mind? 
 
Q 7. Can you please 
comment on the position 
of the damaged party 
when it comes to plea 
bargaining agreements 
and Montenegrin 
legislation in this 
context? How do you see 
this? 
In your opinion, how well 
are the interests of the 
injured party protected? 
Is this satisfactory? 
  
 
 
From your experience 
does this issue of the 
injured party interests 
ever comes as 
problematic in practice? 
Can you please share 
with me some 
experiences of this kind? 
 
Q 8. The law, practice 
and literature suggest 
that both plea 
bargaining and deferred 
prosecution have a 
purpose of enlarging 
work efficiency and 
reducing case backlog. 
In the light of this how 
In your opinion, which of 
these two legal 
institutions is more useful 
in practice, and why? 
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do you see the 
relationship between 
these two legal 
institutions? 
Q 9. In your experience, 
how much the 
defendants know about 
plea bargaining? 
 
How would you describe 
the defendants’ opinion 
about such agreements? 
Are they generally open 
for plea bargaining or 
not? 
 
How important this factor 
is in the whole process of 
plea bargaining 
application? 
 
Do you or would you 
worry about public 
perception when entering 
into plea bargaining? 
 
Q 10. What you think 
could be done by 
legislators and all the 
actors of plea 
bargaining (prosecutors, 
lawyers, judges) in 
order to make it an 
efficient alternative tool 
in resolving criminal 
cases? 
 
Who has the most 
important role in 
promoting this institution 
(having in mind that it 
has been part of the 
Montenegrin criminal 
legislation for quite some 
time, and that by its 
nature it is expected to 
contribute to the 
efficiency of the criminal 
justice system)? 
 
Do you have any concrete 
legislative changes in 
mind that could be useful 
when it comes to plea 
bargaining? 
 
Q 11. Finally, is there 
anything you would like 
to add on this topic, 
anything we missed and 
you see it as important? 
Any comments, 
suggestions and similar? 
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Ending the interview. Thanking. Reminding on the researcher’s availability for 
further communication.  
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DRAFT - INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR ADVOCATES 
Semi-structured interview 
Interviewer: Ana Grgurevic 
Interviewees: Advocates 
Date and time: xxx 
Introduction, general overview of the topics that will be discussed, stressing the 
importance of informality and relaxed atmosphere, general encouragement to 
speak as much as they want. 
Main questions Additional questions Possible clarifying 
questions 
Q 1. As you have been 
informed, the overall 
purpose of this 
interview is to find out 
your opinion about plea 
bargaining agreements, 
potential for their 
application in the 
Montenegrin legal 
system, challenges and 
successes with 
implementing this 
practice. In line with 
this, firstly what is your 
general opinion about 
such agreements? 
Why do you think they 
are good/not good? What 
are advantages and 
disadvantaged of this 
legal instrument? 
 
Does your opinion come 
from your practical 
experience with plea 
bargaining agreements? 
 
Can you please describe 
your personal practical 
experience with these 
agreements? 
 
Can you please tell me 
how many agreements 
have you concluded 
during last year i.e. how 
many cases you finished 
that way? 
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Q 2. From your 
perspective how 
Montenegrin advocates 
generally perceive such 
agreements?  
 
In your opinion what are 
the reasons for these 
perceptions?  
What do you think 
motivates advocates 
when considering 
whether or not to engage 
with plea bargaining? 
  
What might explain an 
advocate’s reluctance to 
engage with plea 
bargaining? To what 
extent might this 
reluctance be linked to all 
the novelties of the 
criminal justice system. 
Do you think it could be 
typical for the plea 
bargaining institution 
only? 
 
Q 3. In relation to my 
next question, it’s 
obvious from the courts’ 
statistics that there are 
not that many cases in 
which plea bargaining 
was applied. In your 
opinion, are these 
agreements realistically 
applicable in the 
Montenegrin legal 
system to a larger 
extent?  
 
To what extent do you 
think that the barriers for 
the application of plea 
bargaining are within the 
provisions of the 
Criminal Procedure Code 
itself? Do you think that 
they could relate more to 
the approach and motives 
of advocates and 
prosecutors? Are there 
any other reasons that 
could be put forward for 
this? 
 
Can you please explain 
what do you think: 
whether this type of 
reluctance of the criminal 
justice system can be 
linked to all the novelties 
of the criminal justice 
system which are in a 
way alien to traditional 
continental legal system 
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of Montenegro, or it is 
typical for plea 
bargaining institution 
only? 
Q 4. In your experience, 
how prosecutors 
generally act when it 
comes to plea 
bargaining agreements?  
 
Are there any particular 
problems in practice that 
you can identify? 
 
What in your opinion 
could be done to improve 
the situation? 
 
 
Can you please share 
with me some examples 
from your practice of the 
prosecutors who did not 
want to enter into plea 
bargaining, and you 
believed that there were 
good grounds for plea 
bargaining, and/or 
opposite? 
Q 5. How do judges 
react when plea 
bargaining agreement is 
offered to them? 
Are there any particular 
problems in practice that 
you can identify, and can 
you please describe 
them? 
 
What in your opinion 
could be done to improve 
the situation? 
Can you please share 
with me some examples 
from your practice, when 
a judge rejected the 
agreement, and you 
thought that it was 
completely justified and 
well grounded? 
Q 6. Do you have any 
comments regarding 
application of plea 
bargaining agreements 
in the context of the 
protection of human 
rights?  
What specific European 
Convention of Human 
Rights standards you 
have in mind? 
 
Q 7. Can you please 
comment on the position 
of the damaged party 
when it comes to plea 
bargaining agreements 
and Montenegrin 
legislation in this 
context? How do you see 
this? 
In your opinion, how well 
are the interests of the 
injured party protected? 
Is this satisfactory? 
 
 
From your experience 
does this issue of the 
injured party interests 
ever comes as 
problematic in practice? 
Can you please share 
with me some 
experiences of this kind? 
 
Q 8. The law, practice 
and literature suggest 
that both plea 
bargaining and deferred 
prosecution have a 
purpose of enlarging 
work efficiency and 
In your opinion, which of 
these two legal 
institutions is more useful 
in practice, and why? 
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reducing case backlog. 
In the light of this how 
do you see the 
relationship between 
these two legal 
institutions?  
Q 9. In your experience, 
how much your 
defendants know about 
plea bargaining?  
How would you describe 
your defendants’ opinion 
about such agreements? 
Are they generally open 
for plea bargaining or 
not? 
 
How important this factor 
is in the whole process of 
plea bargaining 
application? 
 
Do you or would you 
worry about public 
perception when entering 
into plea bargaining? 
 
Q 10. What you think 
could be done by 
legislators and all the 
actors of plea 
bargaining (prosecutors, 
lawyers, judges) in 
order to make it an 
efficient alternative tool 
in resolving criminal 
cases? 
 
Who has the most 
important role in 
promoting this institution 
(having in mind that it 
has been part of the 
Montenegrin criminal 
legislation for quite some 
time, and that by its 
nature it is expected to 
contribute to the 
efficiency of the criminal 
justice system)? 
 
Do you have any concrete 
legislative changes in 
mind that could be useful 
when it comes to plea 
bargaining? 
 
Q 11. Finally, is there 
anything you would like 
to add on this topic, 
anything we missed and 
you see it as important? 
Any comments, 
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suggestions and similar? 
 
Ending the interview. Thanking. Reminding on the researcher’s availability for 
further communication.  
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APPENDIX E 
Brief overview of the Montenegrin legal system and a diagram of the 
Montenegrin courts with jurisdictions in criminal procedure  
 
The Montenegrin legal system is a civil law system based on Roman law. The 
Government forms the executive branch of power, the Parliament is the legislative 
branch of power, and the courts form the judicial power. The Ministry of Justice 
is part of the Government and is responsible for legislation and policy 
development in the criminal justice area. When it comes to criminal law issues the 
Ministry is also responsible for international legal assistance in criminal matters, 
and it has oversight over the system of enforcement of criminal sanctions. The 
State Prosecution does not belong to any branch of power in Montenegro, but 
rather represents a institution of its own, a so-called sui generis institution that is 
responsible for the investigation and prosecution of crimes.  
There are 15 Basic or Municipal Courts responsible for crimes where a prison 
sentence of up to ten years is envisaged by the law. There are two High Courts, 
one for the central and southern part of the country, and one for the northern part 
of the country. They act as appellate courts for criminal cases in the Basic Courts, 
and as first instance courts for crimes where a prison sentence of more than ten 
years is envisaged by the law. The High Court in the capital city of Podgorica has 
the Specialized Department for Organized Crime, Corruption, War Crimes and 
Terrorism Cases. There is also the Appellate Court of Montenegro, which acts as 
the court of appeal for first instance criminal cases from the High Courts for the 
whole country, while the Administrative Court is responsible for administrative 
disputes in the whole country, and the Commercial Court is specialized in 
commercial cases across the whole country. Misdemeanor cases are under the 
jurisdiction of the three first instance Misdemeanor Courts and one second level, 
High Misdemeanor Court, a court of appeal that covers the whole country. 
Finally, there is the Supreme Court of Montenegro which acts as a third instance 
court in all the cases.  Separately, there is also an individual Constitutional Court 
of Montenegro which is responsible for deciding on the constitutionality of legal 
acts and violations of human rights. Both the Supreme Court and the 
Constitutional Court cover the whole country. 
The State Prosecution Offices are organized in accordance with the court network 
and organization. In line with that, there are: 13 Basic or Municipal State 
Prosecution Offices (they act before the Municipal Courts; some of them act 
before the two Municipal Courts), two Offices of the High State Prosecutor 
(acting before the High Courts), and an Office of the Special State Prosecutor 
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responsible for organized crime, serious corruption cases, war crimes, terrorism 
and money laundering cases (which acts before the Special Department of the 
Podgorica High Court). Finally, there is the Office of the Supreme State 
Prosecutor that is generally responsible for all prosecutions (and which acts 
before the Appellate Court, the Administrative Court and the Supreme Court, as 
well as other courts when appropriate).  
Defense attorneys are organized by the Bar Chamber of Montenegro responsible 
for the whole country. It deals with all matters related to this profession.  
There is a Judicial Council and a Prosecutorial Council whose main tasks are the 
election and dismissal of judges and prosecutors, statistical and other reporting, 
and budgetary tasks. 
The Center for Training the Judiciary and the Prosecution is an individual 
institution that provides initial and continuous training to all the judges and 
prosecutors in the country, but also when necessary and appropriate to members 
of other legal professions like defense attorneys, court experts and members of 
other state institutions. 
The Center for Mediation is an individual institution responsible for matters 
related to this form of alternative dispute resolution that is applied in both civil 
and criminal cases in the country. 
Montenegro has a Representative before the European Court of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg who represents the country in all cases before this court. 
There are separate systems of bailiffs and notaries with their own managing 
bodies and associations that deal with matters related to these professions. 
Court experts are organized by their own professional organization responsible for 
matters related to this profession. 
When it comes to plea bargaining, in accordance with the Amendments to the 
CPC from 2015, this practice can be applied in the Basic Courts, High Courts and 
Misdemeanor Courts. A diagram which shows the organization and jurisdiction of 
the Montenegrin courts is given below. 
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SUPREME COURT 
 (Third instance for all; no plea bargaining) 
 
APPELLATE COURT  
(Second instance for High Courts; no plea bargaining) 
 
2 HIGH COURTS 
 (First instance for crimes with a  prison sentence of more than 10 years and some 
types of serious crimes; second instance for Basic Courts; plea bargaining is 
possible) 
 
15 BASIC COURTS 
 (First instance for crimes with a prison sentence of up to 10 years; plea 
bargaining is possible) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 (Third instance for all; no plea bargaining) 
 
HIGH MISDEMEANOR COURT 
 (Second instance for all misdemeanor cases; no plea bargaining) 
 
3 BASIC MISDEMEANOR COURTS  
(First instance misdemeanor courts; plea bargaining is possible) 
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APPENDIX F 
Favorable ethical opinion of the Research Ethics Committee of the 
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences 
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APPENDIX G 
UPR16 form 
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APPENDIX H 
 
 
 
 
Study Title:  Plea Bargaining in Montenegro 
REC Ref No: 09/10:10 
Name of Researcher: Ana Grgurevic     Please 
initial box  
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated     
20 May 2015 (Version No 1) for the above study. I have had the 
opportunity 
 to consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered 
 satisfactorily.  
 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time without giving any reason up to the point when the  
data are analyzed. 
 
3. I understand that data collected during the study, may be looked at by  
individuals from the University of Portsmouth, or from regulatory 
authorities.  
I give permission for these individuals to have access to my data. 
 
 
4. I agree to my interview being recorded and to being quoted verbatim  
(without being named and quoted by name).      
  
 
     
INSTITUTE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STUDIES 
Researcher: Ana Grgurevic 
E-mail: ana.grgurevic@myport.ac.uk 
Supervisor: Dr Diana Bretherick 
E-mail: diana.bretherick@port.ac.uk  
Consent Form 
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x.  I agree to take part in the above study.  
 
 
Name of Participant:     Date:   
 Signature: 
Name of Person taking consent:  Ana Grgurevic Date:   
 Signature: 
 
When completed:  1 for participant; 1 for researcher‘s file. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
 
 
 
 
Study Title: Plea Bargaining in Montenegro 
REC Ref No: 09/10:10 
Dear xxx, 
I hereby invite you to participate in the research on application of plea bargaining 
in Montenegro. I conduct this research as a doctoral student at the University of 
Portsmouth, Institute of Criminal Justice Studies in the UK.  The research deals 
with various aspects of application of plea bargaining in Montenegro with special 
focus on recognizing challenges, as well as identifying success formulas in 
practical implementation of this legal institution. Among other, in the framework 
of this research the relevant views of direct participants of this process, judges, 
prosecutors and lawyers, will be taken into account and analyzed. Having this in 
mind, I would be thankful if you could consider being interviewed for this 
purpose.   
This letter is sent to you because I have identified that you might be a suitable 
participant of my research primarily taking into account your profession and 
active role in the plea bargaining process. 
Please have in mind that participation in this research is completely voluntary and 
you can withdraw any time up to the moment of data analyses. Attached is more 
detailed information sheet about the research, as well as consent form which you 
are expected to sign in case you accept to participate in this project. In order to 
either confirm or deny participation in the research, or eventually if you need any 
additional information, please feel free to contact me at the e-mail address 
provided in the header of this letter.  
Thank you very much for taking time to read this letter regardless of your final 
decision on participation. 
INSTITUTE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STUDIES 
Researcher: Ana Grgurevic 
E-mail: ana.grgurevic@myport.ac.uk  
Supervisor: Dr Diana Bretherick 
E-mail: diana.bretherick@port.ac.uk 
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Sincerely, 
Ana Grgurevic 
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APPENDIX J 
 
 
 
 
 
Study Title: Plea Bargaining in Montenegro 
REC Ref No: 09/10:10 
 
We would like to invite you to take part in our research study. Before you decide 
we would like you to understand why the research is being done and what it 
would involve for you.  Please ask us if there is anything that is not clear.  
What is the purpose of the study?  
A main purpose of this study is to research how legal institution of plea 
bargaining is regulated and how it functions in Montenegro; the extent to which it 
is applied in practice; in what way it is applied; what are the reasons for 
challenges in application and what are successful formulas for the application of 
plea bargaining in this country. All the available statistical data and other 
information related to plea bargaining in Montenegro will be gathered and 
analyzed through this study.  Additionally, a comparative elaboration in relation 
to plea bargaining will also be conducted when it comes to Montenegro and 
countries of the region which have all relatively recently introduced this legal 
instrument into their legal systems, and which have the same legal tradition as 
Montenegro.  
This study is part of researcher’s post-graduate doctoral studies, and is required 
element in the process of gaining the doctoral award at the University of 
Portsmouth. 
Why have I been invited?  
INSTITUTE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STUDIES 
Researcher: Ana Grgurevic 
E-mail: ana.grgurevic@myport.ac.uk  
Supervisor: Dr Diana Bretherick 
E-mail: diana.bretherick@port.ac.uk 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
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You were recognized as adequate participant in this study by researcher herself. It 
is primarily due to your professional engagement as one of active participants of 
the plea bargaining process, as well as due to your obvious interest in this area. 
Apart from you, fourteen other persons will be interviewed in the framework of 
this research, making it all together fifteen interviews with five judges, five 
prosecutors and five advocates.  
Do I have to take part?  
Taking part in the research is entirely voluntary. It is up to you to decide to join 
the study. We will describe the study in this information sheet. If you agree to 
take part, we will then ask you to sign a consent form.  
What will happen to me if I take part?  
If you decide to take part in this study, you will firstly be asked to give formal 
consent for participation in the study i.e. to sign the consent form. In a period of 
15 days after signing the consent form, the researcher will schedule and conduct 
an interview with you. The interview will be composed of a series of main and 
possibly some additional, explanatory questions; and only if you agree it will be 
audio recorded (otherwise the notes will be taken by researcher). You will not 
need to discover your identity. All that you say during the interview will be 
confidential and will be used exclusively for research purposes. By giving the 
interview, your participation in this research is considered completed. The 
research itself will last longer (according to internal University of Portsmouth 
rules it must end by May 2016) since it includes not just conducting of interviews, 
but also reviewing of relevant literature, above mentioned comparative analyses, 
analyses of documents , and other. 
 
Expenses and payments  
There are no expenses or payment related to participation in this study. 
What will I have to do?  
If you decide to take part in this study and after giving a formal consent for 
participation, you will be expected to give interview to the researcher.  You will 
first agree about date, time and place of the interview with the researcher, 
whenever and wherever it suits you the best. The interview itself will be semi-
structured and will be composed of a series of main questions. These main 
questions will most probably be followed by additional questions whose purpose 
is for you to better explain your positions and statements to the researcher 
concerning the research topic, in the cases when a researcher or you believe it is 
needed. The interview will not be strict and formal, it will be set up in a way to 
encourage you to fully express yourself and answer the main questions in a free 
and relaxed way. The interview will be audio recorded only if you agree 
(otherwise the notes will be taken by researcher).  
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By signing the consent form you will allow the researcher to quote you verbatim. 
Purpose of the recording is for researcher to have all the materials needed for 
analyses fully and accurately noted. Purpose of quoting you verbatim is to 
illustrate well your expressed positions and opinions.  Your identity and 
participation in a study is confidential.   
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?  
There are no possible risks or disadvantages of taking part in the study. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part?  
There are no direct benefits for taking part in the study. However, the study 
results can serve as a main source of information related to existing practice in 
this area in Montenegro. Additionally, it can potentially serve as an assistance tool 
in further development and regulation of this practice in Montenegro since it will 
contain concrete conclusions and recommendations in relation to overcoming 
eventual organizational, normative and other problems in application of this legal 
instrument. Generally, the research can potentially be useful and beneficial for 
legal community of Montenegro. 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential?  
Your identity and participation in the study is confidential.  If you join the study, 
it is possible that some of the data collected will be looked at by authorised 
persons from the University of Portsmouth i.e. the data may be looked at by 
authorised people to check that the study is being carried out correctly (for 
example, by researcher’s supervisors). All will have a duty of confidentiality to 
you as a research participant and we will do our best to meet this duty. The data 
collected will be stored securely by the researcher and protected by unique 
password.  
 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study?  
After signing the consent form you may withdraw from the study in the course of 
the interview, and up to the point when the interview data are analysed. If you 
decide to withdraw from the study in the given timeframe, all the data that have 
been collected until then will be destroyed by researcher and yourself.  
 
What if there is a problem? 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should ask to speak to 
the researcher (Ana Grgurevic, tel + 382 69 502 477) or her supervisor (Dr Diana 
Bretherick, tel +44 23 9284 3792) who will do their best to answer your 
questions. If you remain unhappy and wish to complain formally, you can do this 
through the Head of the Department-Institute of Criminal Justice Studies (Dr Phil 
Clements, tel + 44 23 9284 5069). 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
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As for the results of the study, there is a general intention of the researcher to 
publish the study results in Montenegro, after they are translated into Montenegrin 
language. You will not be identified in any report/publication. The researcher will 
inform you about publishing of the research results. 
 
Who is organising and funding the research?  
This research is supported by the University of Portsmouth. Nor the researcher, 
nor the University of Portsmouth will financially benefit from this study.     
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
Research in the University of Portsmouth is looked at by independent group of 
people, called a Research Ethics Committee, to protect your interests. This study 
has been reviewed and given a favourable opinion by the Research Ethics 
Committee. 
 
Concluding statement 
Thank you for taking time to read the information sheet regardless of your 
decision on participation in the research. If you decide to participate you will be 
given a copy of this information sheet to keep and your formal consent to 
participate in the research will be asked. 
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APPENDIX K 
 
 
 
Study Title: Plea Bargaining in Montenegro 
REC Ref No: 09/10:10 
 
Dear Ms. Medenica, 
I hereby request your approval to conduct a number of interviews with judges of 
different Montenegrin courts. The interviews are related to the research on 
application of plea bargaining in Montenegro. I conduct this research as a doctoral 
student at the University of Portsmouth, the Institute of Criminal Justice Studies 
in the UK.  
The research deals with various aspects of application of plea bargaining in 
Montenegro with special focus on recognizing challenges, as well as identifying 
success formulas in practical implementation of this legal institution. Among 
other, in the framework of this research it is planned that relevant views of direct 
participants of this process, judges, prosecutors and lawyers, are taken into 
account and analyzed. This is considered extremely important when it comes to 
quality of the research. Having this in mind, I would be thankful if you could 
consider giving a general approval for conducting the above described interviews 
with Montenegrin judges. The final number and choice of judges will depend on 
their experience with this practice, and willingness and availability for the 
interviews.     
Thank you very much in advance for taking time to read this letter regardless of 
your final decision on this matter. 
Sincerely, 
Ana Grgurevic 
INSTITUTE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STUDIES 
Researcher: Ana Grgurevic 
E-mail: ana.grgurevic@myport.ac.uk  
Supervisor: Dr Diana Bretherick 
E-mail: diana.bretherick@port.ac.uk 
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APPENDIX L 
 
 
 
Study Title: Plea Bargaining in Montenegro 
REC Ref No: 09/10:10 
 
Dear Mr. Stankovic, 
I hereby request your approval to conduct interviews with a number of 
prosecutors in your prosecutorial office. The interviews are related to research on 
application of plea bargaining in Montenegro. I conduct this research as a doctoral 
student at the University of Portsmouth, the Institute of Criminal Justice Studies 
in the UK.  
The research deals with various aspects of application of plea bargaining in 
Montenegro with special focus on recognizing challenges, as well as identifying 
success formulas in practical implementation of this legal institution. Among 
other, in the framework of this research it is planned that relevant views of direct 
participants of this process, judges, prosecutors and lawyers, are taken into 
account and analyzed. This is considered extremely important when it comes to 
quality of the research. Having this in mind, I would be thankful if you could 
consider giving a general approval for conducting the above described interviews 
with a number of prosecutors from your office. The final number and choice of 
prosecutors will depend on their experience with this practice, and willingness 
and availability for the interviews.     
Thank you very much in advance for taking time to read this letter regardless of 
your final decision on this matter. 
Sincerely, 
Ana Grgurevic 
INSTITUTE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STUDIES 
Researcher: Ana Grgurevic 
E-mail: ana.grgurevic@myport.ac.uk  
Supervisor: Dr Diana Bretherick 
E-mail: diana.bretherick@port.ac.uk 
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APPENDIX M 
 
 
 
Study Title: Plea Bargaining in Montenegro 
REC Ref No: 09/10:10 
 
Dear Mr. Begovic, 
I hereby request your approval to conduct a number of interviews with advocates 
from different Montenegrin towns. The interviews are related to the research on 
application of plea bargaining in Montenegro. I conduct this research as a doctoral 
student at the University of Portsmouth, the Institute of Criminal Justice Studies 
in the UK.  
The research deals with various aspects of application of plea bargaining in 
Montenegro with special focus on recognizing challenges, as well as identifying 
success formulas in practical implementation of this legal institution. Among 
other, in the framework of this research it is planned that relevant views of direct 
participants of this process, judges, prosecutors and lawyers, are taken into 
account and analyzed. This is considered extremely important when it comes to 
quality of the research. Having this in mind, I would be thankful if you could 
consider giving a general approval for conducting the above described interviews 
with Montenegrin advocates. The final number and choice of advocates will 
depend on their experience with this practice, and willingness and availability for 
the interviews.     
Thank you very much in advance for taking time to read this letter regardless of 
your final decision on this matter. 
Sincerely, 
Ana Grgurevic 
INSTITUTE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STUDIES 
Researcher: Ana Grgurevic 
E-mail: ana.grgurevic@myport.ac.uk  
Supervisor: Dr Diana Bretherick 
E-mail: diana.bretherick@port.ac.uk 
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APPENDIX N 
The research methods chosen by other plea bargaining researchers 
 
The authors I here refer to are not any plea bargaining authors, or exclusively the 
most well-known authors, but primarily those whose research goals were very 
similar to mine. They were all interested in finding out what is actually happening 
between the participants of plea bargaining process, to “investigate” their motives, 
opinions, and behaviors; and they all used interviews as their research method. 
 
When the previously mentioned Alschuler was doing research with the goal of 
examining plea bargaining as a sentencing device, as well as a form of dispute 
resolution, he wanted to find out the defendants’ positions about plea bargaining 
offers. He questioned defense attorneys about this by using interviews as a 
method. Alschuler says (1981, p. 663.): “In interviews that I conducted on the 
plea bargaining process…I asked defense attorneys why some defendants 
accepted favorable offers while others in the same circumstances refused them.”  
 
Heumann was an author who also used interviews, as well as document analysis 
in his research on the relationship between case pressure and plea bargaining. 
“The data that I shall employ were gathered from published State of Connecticut 
reports, as well as from interviews I conducted with 71 individuals (judges, 
prosecutors, public defenders and private criminal attorneys) …” (Heumann, 
1975, p. 517). 
 
Furthermore, with the more recent author, Emmelman, who was researching 
resolving criminal cases through guilty pleas with a focus on the negotiation 
aspect of the process, interviews were also used together with the method of the 
observation of participants i.e. defense attorneys. As Emmelman says (1996, p. 
337): “Throughout the observation period, I recorded field notes, which I later 
analyzed …To clarify and refine these preliminary research findings, I conducted 
in-depth interviews toward the end of the study.” 
 
The interesting research about the use of plea bargaining in defensive homicide 
cases of Flynn and Fitz Gibbon (2011, p. 909) was also conducted mainly by 
using semi-structured interviews. As they explain: “…the interviews offered a 
mechanism to understand how plea bargaining operates from the perspectives of 
those directly involved in the process.”  
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APPENDIX O 
2009 Criminal Procedure Code of Montenegro 
Plea bargaining provisions 
 
Article 300 
(1) In the case of criminal proceedings for a criminal offence or concurrence of 
criminal offences for which a prison sentence of up to 10 years is envisaged, the 
State Prosecutor or the accused person and her/his defense attorney may propose 
that an agreement on the admission of guilt be concluded.  
(2) When the proposal referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article has been made, 
the parties and the defense attorney may negotiate the conditions of admitting 
guilt for the criminal offence or criminal offences with which the accused person 
is charged.  
(3) The agreement on the admission of guilt shall be made in writing and must be 
signed by the parties and the defense attorney, and can be submitted not later than 
the first hearing for the main hearing before the first instance court.  
(4) If an indictment has not been brought yet, the agreement on the admission of 
guilt shall be submitted to the Chair of the Panel referred to in Article 24 
paragraph 7 of the present Code and after the indictment has been brought, it shall 
be submitted to the Chair of the Panel.  
 
Article 301 
(1) By way of an agreement on the admission of guilt, the accused person fully 
confesses to the criminal offence or concurrence of criminal offences s/he is 
charged with, whereas the accused person and the State Prosecutor agree on the 
following:  
1) on the penalty and other criminal sanctions which will be imposed on 
the accused person in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal 
Code;  
2) on the costs of the criminal proceedings and claims under property law;  
3) on denouncing the right of appeal by the parties and defense attorney 
against the decision of the court made on the basis of the agreement on the 
admission of guilt when the court has fully accepted the agreement.  
(2) Agreement on the admission of guilt shall also contain an obligation of the 
accused person to return the property gain acquired by the commission of the 
criminal offense as well as objects that have to be forfeited under the Criminal 
Code within a certain time limit.  
(3) The accused person may undertake by means of the agreement on the 
admission of guilt to perform the obligations referred to in Article 272 paragraph 
1 of the present Code, provided that the nature of the obligations is such that it 
allows the accused person to perform or start performing them before the 
submission of an agreement on the admission of guilt. 
 
Article 302 
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(1) The court shall decide by a ruling whether an agreement on the admission of 
guilt should be dismissed, rejected or accepted.  
(2) If an agreement on the admission of guilt has been submitted before an 
indictment has been brought, the Chair of the Panel referred to in Article 24 
paragraph 7 of the present Code shall decide on it. In such a case, a special clause 
of the agreement shall contain all the information listed in Article 292 of the 
present Code.  
(3) If an agreement has been submitted after the indictment has been brought, the 
Chair of the first instance panel shall decide on it.   
(4) The Chair of the Panel shall dismiss an agreement on the admission of guilt 
submitted after the expiry of the term specified in Article 300 paragraph 3 of the 
present Code. The decision on rejection shall not be appealable.  
(5) The court shall decide on the agreement on the admission of guilt without 
delay at a hearing attended by the State Prosecutor, accused person and her/his 
defense attorney, while the injured party and her/his proxy shall be informed of 
the hearing.  
(6) Provisions of Art. 313 to 316 of the present Code shall apply on the holding of 
a hearing referred to in paragraph 5 of this Article.  
(7) The court shall dismiss an agreement on the admission of guilt by way of 
ruling if the duly summoned accused person does not appear at the hearing. The 
ruling dismissing the agreement on the admission of guilt cannot be appealed.  
(8) The court shall accept an agreement on the admission of guilt and render a 
decision which is in line with the contents of the agreement, if it establishes the 
following:  
1) that the accused person confessed to the criminal offence or offences 
s/he is charged with voluntarily and consciously, that the confession is in 
line with the evidence contained in the case files and that there is no 
possibility that the confession was made as a consequence of an error;  
2) that the agreement was concluded in accordance with Article 300 
paragraph 1 item 1 of the present Code;  
3) that the accused person understands the consequences of the agreement, 
and particularly that s/he waives the right to a trial and that s/he may not 
file an appeal against the decision of the court rendered on the basis of the 
agreement;  
4) that the agreement does not violate the rights of the injured party;  
5) that the agreement is in line with the interests of fairness and the 
sanction serves the purpose for which criminal sanctions are imposed.  
(9) If one or more conditions referred to in paragraph 8 of this Article have not 
been met, the court shall reject the agreement on the admission of guilt by a 
ruling, and the admission of guilt contained in the agreement cannot be used as 
evidence in criminal proceedings. The agreement and all supporting files shall be 
destroyed by the Chair of the Panel, of which records shall be made. 
(10) The court shall enter into the record the decision accepting, rejecting or 
dismissing the agreement on the admission of guilt. The decision accepting the 
agreement on the admission of guilt may be appealed by the injured party, 
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whereas the decision rejecting the agreement may be appealed by the State 
Prosecutor and by the accused person.  
(11) The Panel referred to in Article 24 paragraph 7 of the present Code shall 
decide on the appeal referred to in paragraph 10 of the present Article, not 
including the judge who rendered the decision referred to in paragraph 10 of this 
Article.  
Art 303 
(1) When a ruling on accepting an agreement on the admission of guilt 
becomes final, the Chair of the Panel shall, without delay, and not later than 
within three days, render a decision to the effect that the defendant is found 
guilty in accordance with the accepted agreement. 
(2) The decision referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be appealable 
insofar as it is not in accordance with the concluded agreement. 
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APPENDIX P 
2015 Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code of Montenegro 
Plea bargaining provisions 
 
Article 300 
(1) For criminal offences which are prosecuted ex officio, except for criminal 
offences of terrorism and war crimes, the suspect, the accused person and the 
defence attorney may be made a proposal for the conclusion of an agreement on 
the admission of guilt, i.e. the suspect, the accused person and defence attorney 
may propose the conclusion of such an agreement to the State Prosecutor. 
(2) When the proposal referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article has been made, 
the parties and the defence attorney may negotiate the conditions of admitting 
guilt for the criminal offence or criminal offences with which the suspect or the 
accused person is charged. 
(3) The agreement on the admission of guilt shall be made in writing and shall be 
signed by the parties and the defence attorney, and may not be submitted later 
than the first hearing for the main hearing before the first instance court. 
(4) The agreement on admission of guilt shall be submitted, if the indictment has 
not been brought, or if the bill of indictment or private action have not been 
submitted to the President of the Panel referred to in Article 24, paragraph 7 of the 
present Code, and after the indictment has been brought or after the filing of the 
bill of indictment or private action, to the President of the Panel. 
(5) If the agreement on admission of guilt was concluded prior to indictment or 
the filing of the bill of indictment or private action, the State Prosecutor shall, 
together with the agreement, submit the court with the indictment or the bill of 
indictment which forms an integral part of the agreement. 
(6) The indictment or the bill of indictment referred to in paragraph 5 of this 
Article shall not be subject to provisions on the control of indictment, or the 
provisions on a preliminary examination of the bill of indictment. 
 
Article 301 
(1) By way of an agreement on the admission of guilt, the accused person fully 
confesses to the criminal offence or concurrence of criminal offences s/he is 
charged with, whereas the accused person and the State Prosecutor agree on the 
following: 
1) on the penalty and other criminal sanctions which will be imposed on 
the accused person in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal 
Code; 
2) on the costs of the criminal proceedings and claims under property law; 
3) on denouncing the right of appeal by the parties and defense attorney 
against the decision of the court made on the basis of the agreement on the 
admission of guilt when the court has fully accepted the agreement. 
(2) Agreement on the admission of guilt shall also contain an obligation of the 
accused person to return the property gain acquired by the commission of the 
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criminal offense as well as objects that have to be forfeited under the Criminal 
Code within a certain time limit. 
(3)  The accused person may undertake by means of the agreement on the 
admission of guilt to perform the obligations referred to in Article 272 paragraph 
1 of the present Code, provided that the nature of the obligations is such that it 
allows the accused person to perform or start performing them before the 
submission of an agreement on the admission of guilt. 
 
Article 302 
(1) The court shall decide by a ruling whether an agreement on the admission of 
guilt should be rejected, dismissed or accepted. 
(2) When an agreement on the admission of guilt has been submitted before an 
indictment has been brought, or before the filing of the bill of indictment or the 
private action, it shall be decided upon by the President of the Panel referred to in 
Article 24, paragraph 7 of the present Code. 
(3)  If an agreement has been submitted after the indictment or the submission of 
the bill of indictment or the private action has been brought, the Chair of the first 
instance panel shall decide on it. 
(4) The Chair of the Panel shall reject an agreement on the admission of guilt 
submitted after the expiry of the term specified in Article 300 paragraph 3 of the 
present Code. The decision on rejection shall not be appealable. 
(5) The court shall decide on the agreement on the admission of guilt without 
delay at a hearing attended by the State Prosecutor, accused person and her/his 
defense attorney, while the injured party and her/his proxy shall be  informed of 
the hearing. 
(6) Provisions of Art. 313 to 316 of the present Code shall apply on the 
holding of a hearing referred to in paragraph 5 of this Article. 
(7)  The court shall dismiss an agreement on the admission of guilt by way of 
ruling if the duly summoned accused person does not appear at the hearing. The 
ruling dismissing the agreement on the admission of guilt cannot be appealed.  
(8)  The court shall accept an agreement on the admission of guilt and render a 
decision which is in line with the contents of the agreement, if it establishes the 
following: 
1) that the accused person confessed to the criminal offence or offences s/he 
is charged with voluntarily and consciously, that the confession is in line 
with the evidence contained in the case files and that there is no possibility 
that the confession was made as a consequence of an error; 
2) that the agreement was concluded in accordance with Article 300 
paragraph 1 item 1 of the present Code; 
3) that the accused person understands the consequences of the agreement, 
and particularly that s/he waives the right to a trial and that s/he may not file 
an appeal against the decision of the court rendered on the basis of the 
agreement; 
4) that the agreement does not violate the rights of the injured party; 
5) that the agreement is in line with the interests of fairness and the sanction 
serves the purpose for which criminal sanctions are imposed. 
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(9) If one or more conditions referred to in paragraph 8 of this Article have not 
been met, the court shall dismiss the agreement on the admission of guilt by a 
ruling, and the admission of guilt contained in the agreement cannot be used as 
evidence in criminal proceedings. The agreement and all the case files forming an 
integral part of the agreement shall be destroyed by the President of the Panel, 
with records being made thereon.. 
(10) The court shall enter into the record the decision accepting, rejecting or 
dismissing the agreement on the admission of guilt. The decision accepting the 
agreement on the admission of guilt may be appealed by the injured party, 
whereas the decision dismissing the agreement may be appealed by the State 
Prosecutor and by the accused person. 
(11) The Panel referred to in Article 24 paragraph 7 of the present Code shall 
decide on the appeal referred to in paragraph 10 of the present Article, not 
including the judge who rendered the decision referred to in paragraph 10 of this 
Article. 
 
Article 303 
(1)When a ruling on accepting an agreement on the admission of guilt becomes 
final, the Court shall, without delay, and not later than within three days, render a 
decision to the effect that the defendant is found guilty in accordance with the 
accepted agreement. 
(2)The decision referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be appealable 
insofar as it is not in accordance with the concluded agreement. 
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APPENDIX Q 
Overview of crimes that were the subject of plea agreements in Montenegro 
 for the period 2010-2015 
 
Criminal Code of Montenegro: 
 
Article 151: Grievous Bodily Injury 
Article 152: Minor Bodily Injury 
Article 153: Participation in an Affray 
Article 168: Endangering Safety 
Article 210: Pandering 
Article 220: Family and Domestic Violence 
Article 239: Theft 
Article 242: Assault and Robbery 
Article 265: Smuggling 
Article 272: Abuse of Position in Business Operations 
Article 284: Illicit Trade 
Article 300: Unauthorized Production, Keeping and Distribution of Narcotic 
Drugs   
Article 301: Enabling the Enjoying of Narcotic Drugs 
Article 326a: Building a Facility without a Building Permit 
Article 327: Causing General Danger 
Article 329: Causing Danger by Failure to Ensure Protection Measures at Work  
Article 338: Grave Offenses against General Safety 
Article 339: Endangering Public Traffic 
Article 347: Failure to Provide Assistance to a Person Injured in a Traffic 
Accident 
Article 348: Grave Offences against the Safety of Public Traffic 
Article 376: Attack on a Person in Official Capacity during Performance of an 
Official Duty 
Article 399: Acts of Violence 
Article 401: Criminal Association 
Article 403: Unlawful Keeping of Weapons and Explosive Substances 
Article 412: Falsifying a Document 
Article 415: Instigation to Authenticate False Content 
Article 424: Active Bribery 
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APPENDIX R 
 
Brief overview  
Other CPC institutions and opportunities available to the accused  
that resemble plea bargaining 
 
The institutions available to the accused under the CPC which are more or less 
similar to plea bargaining are the so-called “cooperating witness” and “postponing 
of the criminal prosecution”. These institutions represent additional options which 
the accused has when it comes to making arrangements with the prosecution. The 
essence of the institution of the cooperating witness is to release the accused, a 
member of a criminal organization, from criminal prosecution if s/he testifies and 
by that testimony assists the prosecution in proving the committed/planned future 
crimes of the organization the accused belongs to. In such cases, the importance 
of her/his testimony in proving the crimes must be larger than the damage caused 
by the crimes s/he is accused of. The leader of a criminal organization cannot be a 
cooperating witness.  As for the institution of postponing the criminal 
prosecution, or as it is commonly called “deferred prosecution”, it is limited to 
crimes where a fine or prison sentence of up to five years is envisaged by law. 
Upon the prosecutor’s estimation on the non-purposefulness of having a criminal 
process, s/he can offer the accused to fulfill one of the duties enumerated in the 
law in the period of six months at the longest; in case that accused accepts this 
offer and fulfills the given duty s/he will be released from criminal prosecution. 
These duties may include, for example, compensation for the damage caused by 
the commission of the crime; payment of a certain amount of money to a 
humanitarian organization; and so on. If the duty is fulfilled in time by the 
accused, the prosecutor will reject the criminal report. Even though these 
institutions are limited to certain types of crime, they do imply the release from 
criminal prosecution. Therefore, there is no negotiation on the criminal sentence. 
However, they both can still be seen as a form of bargaining where the “goods” of 
bargaining are a bit different than is the case with agreements on the admission of 
guilt. 
  
Another two options that the CPC offers to the accused are worth mentioning as 
well. One is the procedure of issuing a criminal sanction without holding a trial. 
This shortened procedure is possible for crimes where a fine or prison sentence of 
up to three years is defined by law. With the consent of the accused, the 
prosecutor may propose to the court that the court decision on the criminal 
sanction is adopted without holding a trial. The consent of the accused is checked 
by the court in this situation, as is the case with plea bargaining. However, the law 
here limits this possibility to only certain types of sanctions that can be ordered 
this way, excluding prison sentences, and those are: a fine, community service, 
probation, and judicial admonition. Therefore, this option merely has the purpose 
of shortening the criminal procedure in less serious cases where the accused, for 
the sake of avoiding a trial, accepts the sentence offered without any kind of 
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bargaining. Furthermore, a standard confession is yet another option for the 
accused. After the accused confesses a crime i.e. all the indictment charges, and 
after the prosecutor and defense attorney provide their confirming statements 
about this, the court may decide not to present evidence related to the crime 
further in the procedure, but only the evidence related to the criminal sanction. 
This is, of course conditioned on the clear and full confession of the accused, 
given willingly and consciously, with the full understanding of all the relevant 
consequences of such an act, in accordance with the available evidence and 
without the existence of any evidence that supports a possible false confession. If 
the confession fulfils all these conditions, no other evidence will be gathered 
further, and the court will decide. The confession is here actually treated as an 
extenuating circumstance for the accused.  
 
This is obviously the case with deferred prosecution, which is much more 
common in practice of the Montenegrin prosecution and courts. This is, however, 
understandable since in these cases the accused fulfills a duty, and by that 
completely avoids a criminal record. For the reasons of comparison with plea 
bargaining statistics, in 2014, the number of cases in Montenegro resolved by 
deferred prosecution was 549.132 Another potentially better option for the accused 
can even be a regular confession in many situations. The issue of a regular 
confession in the criminal procedure v. a confession in the framework of plea 
bargaining is discussed in Chapters III, IV and V. Some of the interviewed 
participants discuss the relationship between the two, and find a regular 
confession to be a simpler way to go for all the actors in the criminal process in 
some cases.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
217 
 
APPENDIX S 
Major research participants’ recommendations related to plea bargaining 
practice which are excluded from the final recommendations presented in 
Chapter VI 
a) To make the court’s sentencing policy more severe, and to opt for the 
introduction of either a fully inquisitorial or fully adversarial criminal 
procedure. These recommendations are quite general and require 
systematic changes. Consequently, they require the long term, versatile 
and complex engagement and effort of the complete legal community of 
the country and the top management structures of the national Criminal 
Justice system.  
 
b) To re-adopt the provisions that existed before the 2015 CC amendments. 
To exclude the requirement that the indictment is a constituent part of plea 
agreement in cases when the agreement is concluded before the formal 
bringing up of the indictment. In my opinion, this change would not affect 
plea bargaining practice to a significant extent. To cancel the mandatory 
defense requirement in the plea bargaining process (further elaborated in 
Chapter IV). In my opinion, the rights of the accused are better protected 
when s/he has a professional legal defense provided. 
 
c) To amend the provisions in a way that the injured party participates in the 
plea negotiation process and is able to express her/his relevant opinion at 
this stage. In my opinion, these changes could reduce the number of plea 
agreements, which is not in line with the intentions and wished of both 
legislators and practitioners in Montenegro. On the other hand, there were 
proposals to amend the legislation in order to remove the opportunity of 
the injured party to complaint against the court ruling on the acceptance of 
the agreement. In my opinion, this change would not affect plea 
bargaining practice to a significant extent. It was, however, briefly 
discussed within the recommendation for the reduction of procedural 
formalism. 
 
d) To try to find a mechanism through the Bar Chamber, likely through its 
Court of Honor, to sentence those attorneys who are unethical in relation 
to plea agreements and their clients. In my opinion, is not possible to 
successfully and easily investigate and determine this type of attorney 
behavior.  
 
e) To make a technical correction to Article 300 of the CPC which says that 
plea bargaining is allowed for criminal offences which are prosecuted ex 
officio, except for criminal offences of terrorism and war crimes.  Here “ 
criminal offenses prosecuted by private complaint” should be added, since 
in other relevant CPC plea bargaining articles private complaint is 
mentioned together with the indictment and indictment proposal that are 
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used by the state/public prosecutor (an indictment proposal is a type of 
indictment used by the state prosecutor in cases of less serious crimes). 
Specifically, according to the CC, some crimes are prosecuted only by 
private complaint/private individuals not the state prosecutor, and the CPC 
actually allows plea bargaining in this situations as well. Crimes 
prosecuted by private complaint should, therefore, be added to Article 300 
to reflect this option which is allowed by other CPC plea bargaining 
articles. This was probably omitted by accident from Article 300. Bearing 
in mind that this is more of a technical suggestion (made by Prosecutor 
P2), it was left out of the research recommendations. As stressed earlier, 
one of the interviewed prosecutors, P3, actually discusses the issues of the 
private prosecutor and whether it fully suits the plea bargaining institution.  
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APPENDIX T 
Suggested form for the plea agreement / agreement on the admission of guilt 
 
OFFICE OF THE BASIC STATE PROSECUTOR 
Kt.br. 110/10 
Podgorica, 10.09.2010. 
 
 Based on Article 301, Par. 1, Points 1, 2 and 3 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code, the Deputy Basic State Prosecutor in Podgorica, P.R. and the accused M.M. 
and his defense attorney D.Dj. from Podgorica, on 10. 09. 2010. concluded the 
following 
 
AGREEMENT ON ADMISSION OF GUILT 
By which basis the State Prosecutor and the Accused agreed about the following: 
 
Article 1 
The Accused M.M. admits that he: 
- On the day 15. 06. 2010, in Podgorica, close to Stadium of the Football 
Club Buducnost, around 10 am, with the intention caused a severe bodily 
injury to the Victim V.M. from Podgorica, hit the victim in his face with 
his fist. This caused the victim to fall down to the ground. The Accused 
then continued to kick him with his legs in the victim’s body, and by this 
he caused Grievous Bodily Harm i.e. a fracture to the upper jaw-bone and 
a fracture to the seventh rib on the left side, as well as several blood 
hematomas and abrasions on the chest and back of the Victim, 
- By which he committed the crime of Grievous Bodily Harm from Article 
151, Par. 1 of the Criminal Code. 
 
Article 2 
 The Deputy Basic Prosecutor and the Accused agree for the Basic Court in 
Podgorica, as the one having subject-matter and territorial jurisdiction in the 
case, to order the Accused M.M. to serve a prison sentence of three months, 
for committing the crime of Grievous Bodily Harm from Article 151,  Par. 1 
of the Criminal Code.  
 
Article 3 
 The Deputy Basic Prosecutor and the Accused agree that the Accused pay 
€100 to the Basic State Prosecution in Podgorica for criminal procedure expenses 
and a €30 lump sum within 15 days from the moment when the judgment based 
on the Agreement on the Admission of Guilt becomes final. 
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Article 4 
 The Deputy Basic Prosecutor and the Accused agree that the Victim V.M 
is to be instructed to claim his property law request in a civil procedure. 
 
Article 5 
 The Accused confirms that he gave his statement about the Admission of 
Guilt voluntarily and consciously, that he was not forced to do this by anybody, 
and that he is fully aware that by this Agreement on the Admission of Guilt he 
recants his right to a fair trial if the judgment based on the Agreement on the 
Admission of Guilt is adopted. 
 
Article 6 
 The Deputy Basic Prosecutor and the Accused jointly recant a right to file 
an appeal against the decision of the court based on this agreement. 
 
Article 7 
 This agreement on the Admission of Guilt was concluded in the premises 
of the Basic State Prosecution in Podgorica, on 10.09.2010., in five identical 
copies, out of which the Accused retains one, while other copies stay in the State 
Prosecution Office for the needs of the criminal procedure. 
 
The Accused  The Accused’s Defense Attorney The Deputy Basic 
Prosecutor 
M.M.   D.Dj.    P.R. 
 
Note: The content and form of the Agreement on the Admission of Guilt are the 
same in the phase after filing the indictment. 
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1The Criminal Procedure Code of Montenegro, 2009, Official Gazette of Montenegro No. 57/2009 
from 18 August 2009; 49/2010 from 13 August 2010; 47/2014 from 7 November 2014; 2/2015 
from 16 January 2015; 35/2015 from 7 July 2015. 
2 Even though the countries involved are close and have a joint legal history and tradition, quite 
often the post-Yugoslav individual legal reforms in each country led to taking slightly different 
positions and approaches when it comes to criminal law and the regulation of the criminal 
procedure. Consequently, this led to the development of slightly different case law and 
experiences. 
3Out of 35 acquie policy fields or chapters, as they are called, that concern the free movement of 
goods, competition policy, fisheries, energy, transport and others, a special focus of the EU when 
it comes to Montenegro is on “the rule of law” Chapter 23: Judiciary and Fundamental Rights and 
Chapter 24: Justice, Freedom and Security. Due to the importance of establishing the rule of law 
and legal stability in the country these Chapters are a special focus of the EU. Through the 
adopted Action Plans for Chapters 23 and 24, Montenegro has overtaken a set of timely limited 
obligations which must be fulfilled in order to reach European and international standards in 
these areas. The Action Plans are predominantly focused on the fight against corruption and 
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organized crime, and strengthening the independence of Criminal Justice institutions. Only by 
fulfilling these duties will the country become eligible for EU membership. Every year the 
country’s progress is marked, and further guidance is given in the European Commission Progress 
Report. During this challenging and dynamic process a whole series of reports, strategies and 
other documents are drafted and adopted. Such a focused EU approach in the negotiations of 
the important Chapters 23 and 24 tells about the importance of the issues covered by these 
chapters from the EU’s point of view. It also demonstrates the importance of Montenegro’s 
efforts that are being put into the improvement of these areas for the pace of Montenegrin 
integration into the EU, and most importantly, for the democratization of society.   
4 These key elements of the plea bargaining process that characterize it today have been equally 
recognized by the authors of different historical periods. It was like that at the end of the 1970s, 
when the practice was explained as “a defendant’s agreements to plead guilty…with the 
reasonable expectation of receiving some consideration from the state” (Miller et al., 1978, cited 
by McDonald, 1979, p.388); later in the 1980s the authors write about the accused who gets 
“lenient treatment” and “inducements” for waiving a right to trial (Feely, 1982, p.338); in the 
1990s they write about “defendant's entry of a guilty plea in anticipation of concessions from the 
prosecutor or judge” (Mary E. Vogel, 1999, p.162); or finally in 2013 Levenson (2013) defines plea 
bargaining as “a process of compromise” in which “Both sides act out of necessity.” (p. 464). 
5 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
6 This will be discussed in Section 1.5. of this chapter. 
7 Perceiving plea bargaining as an “unjust” practice can lead us even further to a discussion about 
the morality of laws and the well-known natural law theory maxima lex injusta non est lex (an 
unjust law is not a law) which promotes the legal non-validity of immoral or unjust law. It was 
largely discussed and to a great extent endorsed by St. Thomas Aquinas (Kretzmann, 1988, cited 
by Vieru, 2012, p. 120). Contemporary natural law theorists do claim that there is a legal 
obligation to follow an unjust law i.e. they approve of the authority which creates laws, but there 
may not be a moral obligation to respect it. (Finnis,1980, cited by Rice, 1981, p. 279). Those who 
see bargaining with guilt as one of those immoral or unjust laws, at the present time obviously 
need to accept the legal regulation of this issue in its existing form. On the other hand, this of 
course does not prevent them from considering it immoral, and even questioning it through the 
available defined legal procedures.  
8 Ritchie, D. (2011). Does Imprisonment Deter? A Review of the Evidence. Available at: 
http://www.abc.net.au/mediawatch/transcripts/1128_sac.pdf   
Blumstein, A. & Wilson, J. (2008). The Impact of Incarceration on Crime: Two National 
Experts Weigh In. Available at: 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2008/the20impact20of20i
ncarceration20on20crimepdf.pdf  
Stemen, D. (2007).  Reconsidering Incarceration: New Directions for Reducing Crime, Available at: 
http://vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/veraincarc_vFW2.pdf  
9 The issue and consequences of the public exposure of plea bargaining will be discussed in 
Chapter IV where analysis of the interviews results is provided. 
10 When it comes to the theoretical underpinnings, the restorative justice approach by natural 
logic seem to be in conflict with the retributive approach which is focused on the harm done and 
which favors a strongly repressive mechanism of sentencing the perpetrator for what s/he did, 
because s/he deserves it. However, a number of authors believe that restorative justice is not 
completely contrary to the retributivist theory since both approaches are “concerned with 
making the wrong right or restoring the justice of the situation”; it is simply the means of 
reaching justice that makes them different (Brunk, 2001, p. 39). Some even think that restorative 
practices “consist of fundamental principles from both a retributive and a utilitarian 
perspective.” (Gabbay, 2005, p. 397).  Gabbay concludes that “if we are going to punish because 
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offenders ‘deserve’ to be punished ….we might as well impose sanctions that aspire to achieve 
other noble goals, namely reducing crime and increasing public welfare” (2015, p. 382). 
11 Plea bargaining in the United Kingdom - England and Wales will be briefly discussed in Section 
1.5. of this chapter. 
12 Public Records Office, Home Office Papers No. 60, Vol. 7. p. 57. 
13 Donald J. Newman, the author of a leading study on plea bargaining from 1966 entitled 
Conviction: Determination of Guilt or Innocence without Trial also claims that "plea agreements 
are not new”. He even goes further claiming that such bargaining has always been part of the 
criminal courts practice, that has existed ever since they began (Newman, 1974, cited by 
Alschuler, 1979, p.2). 
14 In my later discussions, it can be seen that both Montenegrin legislators and practitioners i.e. 
those that I interviewed, amongst others identify these reasons as the main justification for the 
introduction and application of plea bargaining. It is similar in other countries which are familiar 
with this practice. 
15In its analysis, Fisher linked this pressure to the specific social reality of that time i.e. growing 
number of alcohol (due to prohibition) and driving related crimes.   
16 When it comes to the issue of trial complexity, in civil law systems like the Montenegrin one, 
being largely inquisitorial with the key role of the judge during the trial, procedural complexity 
and formalism can definitely be a barrier to efficiency. Exactly because of these reasons, as will 
be discussed later, the Montenegrin system called for the necessary reform of the criminal 
process by the introduction of adversarial elements. In this context, plea bargaining was 
recognized by the Montenegrin legislators as a good way to avoid complex and long trials. Such 
reformatory processes are not limited to Montenegro only but have been happening in different 
forms in a number of European and other civil law countries over the last two decades. This will 
be briefly discussed in Section 1.5. of this chapter. 
17 Known as an author very critically oriented towards plea bargaining which he even 
interestingly compares with the medieval European Law on Torture. 
18 See Section 1.1. of this chapter. As a reminder, by this case nolo contendere pleas were 
introduced in the U.S., where the accused can plead guilty but at same time protest her/his 
innocence. 
19 Fisher claims that he himself followed the suggestions of the “third wave” authors in his own 
detailed study of plea bargaining where he literally analyzed thousands of cases of the Middlesex 
County in the State of Massachusetts from the 1800s to the present time. He emphasizes that his 
focus was not on the larger social setting, but on the courtroom setting which he deems the most 
important for such research. 
20 Over time, plea bargaining has naturally become an essential part of the most relevant U.S. 
criminal legislation and other documents that regulate this area. One of such documents is the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (file:///C:/Users/BluePerL/Downloads/rules-of-criminal-
procedure%20(2).pdf) and it’s Rule 11 which was first time adopted in 1944 and has been 
amended many times since then. All the changes over this long period of time have been in the 
direction of further strengthening this practice through defining more exact and detailed 
procedures and the roles of all sides involved in the process, as well as having the purpose of 
reflecting the passage of time and modern trends. These rules represent the main source of plea 
bargaining law in the U.S. Federal Criminal Justice system, and are proof of the continuously 
stable position of this legal institution in the system. Furthermore, another such document is the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines (http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-
manual/2015/GLMFull.pdf) first adopted in 1987. Even though it was decided by the Supreme 
Court in the Brooker v. Unites States case (543 U.S. 220 (2005)) that these Guidelines are of an 
advisory and not obligatory character, they are still very relevant in judicial decisions on 
sentences. Part of the Guidelines refers to the plea bargaining process and the role of the court 
in the process, with a focus on sentencing issues. Today, plea bargaining is part of numerous 
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Department of Justice (DOJ) policy documents as well. For example, “the Ashcroft  Memorandum 
… sets out specific guidance for both charge bargaining and plea bargaining.” (Taylor Shannon, 
2007, p. 9). Memorandums are documents announced by U.S. Attorney Generals or their 
deputies. Plea bargaining is also an important part of the U.S. Attorney Manual 
(https://www.justice.gov/usam/united-states-attorneys-manual). Additionally, it was not just 
Government that formalized the significance and usage of plea bargaining through its legislation, 
documents and policies, but it was also done by other participants in this process. Specifically, in 
1969, the American Bar Association (ABA) for a first time issued a set of so-called Standards for 
Criminal Justice (http://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards.html)  that 
amongst other elements include an elaboration of plea bargaining issues. Finally, it is worth to 
mention that plea bargaining was also strongly incorporated into the Uniform Rules of Criminal 
Procedure 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/rules%20of%20criminal%20procedure/urcp_final_87.
pdf) which were initially promulgated in 1954, and then amended a few times. These rules are 
adopted by the Uniform Law Commission, whose main role is to provide legislation and take 
other steps which contribute to the uniformity of state laws. 
21 United States Courts, Federal Courts Statistics. (n.d.). Table D-4. Retrieved August 31, 2015, 
from http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary-december-
2014 and Table 5.5. Retrieved August 31, 2015, from 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/2012/Table505.pdf  
22 Delaware State Courts. 2014 Statistical Information. (n.d.). 2014 Annual Report Statistical 
Information for the Delaware Judiciary. Retrieved August 31, 2015, from 
http://courts.delaware.gov/AOC/AnnualReports/FY14/2014StatisticalReportR.pdf  
23 California Courts. Court Statistics Report. (2014). 2014 Court Statistics Report, Statewide 
Caseload Trends, 2003-2004 Through 2012-2013. Retrieved August 31, 2015, from 
http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/2014-Court-Statistics-Report.pdf   
24 397 U.S. 742 (1970). 
25 404 U.S. 257 (1971). 
26 434 U.S. 357 (1978). 
27 132 S.Ct. 1376 (2012). 
28 132 S.Ct. 1399 (2012). 
29 When it comes to Montenegro, two additional observations are worth mentioning. Specifically, 
a cost of Montenegrin court proceedings is generally not high for the parties involved, and also 
the threatened criminal sentences seem to be much lower than it is the case in the U.S. These 
factors that may potentially have a significant influence on the application of practice in any legal 
system will be discussed later in my work from the Montenegrin perspective. 
30 See Section 1.1. of this chapter. 
31 See Section 1.4. of this chapter, sub-section: The U.S. Supreme Court’s Affirmation of and 
Support for Plea Bargaining. 
32 This was clearly stated in their Report on the Courts (I did not have direct access to this report). 
Davis and Griffiths mention this report in their work and cite its most relevant part in this sense 
(1979-1980, p.319): “Its condemnation of plea bargaining was as unequivocal as it was explicit: 
‘[The Commission] condemns plea bargaining as an institution and recommends that within 5 
years no such bargaining take place. The only concession the Commission is willing to make is 
that total elimination of the practice will take appreciable time.’” 
33 The research is concluded with the statement that “Plea bargaining is an inherent part of the 
criminal justice system. An official ban on plea bargaining is therefore impractical.” However, 
some reformatory actions in this area are proposed for future consideration: “Limiting plea 
bargaining to certain types of charges, such as less serious crimes; limiting prosecutorial 
discretion by creating policy and legislation that calls for firmer guidelines when choosing 
sanctions for specific crimes; and” with referral to Bibas (2004) “Involving both judges and 
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defense attorneys in the charge bargaining process so that there is more of a balance of power 
among all legal participants.” 
34 ICTY. (2016). Cases. Retrieved May 25, 2016, from http://www.icty.org/en/cases/key-figures-
cases  and  http://www.icty.org/en/cases/guilty-pleas  
35 ICTR. (2016). Key Figures of ICTR Cases. Retrieved May 25, 2016, from 
http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/publications/ictr-key-figures-en.pdf  No available 
statistics for plea agreements. 
36 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2002, can be downloaded from the web-
site: http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/legal%20texts%20and%20tools/official%20journal/Pages/rome%20statute.
aspx  
37 Natsvlishvili and Togonidze v. Georgia, Application no. 9043/05, Judgment of 29 April 2014. 
Before discussing the position of ECoHR in this case it is important to stress that Georgia 
introduced plea bargaining practice in 2004. Since then, plea bargaining has been used more and 
more each year in this country. However, many controversies follow the application of plea 
bargaining in this country; many human rights defenders claim that the process is non-
transparent, and that legislation and legal institution are being misused in practice. Thomas 
Hammarberg, Commissioner for Human Rights of the CoE, visited Georgia in April 2011 , and the 
visit resulted in a report which amongst other things includes a section on plea bargaining 
(CommDH[2011]22. The report can be downloaded from the web-site: 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1809789). According to the report: “The Chairman of the 
Supreme Court informed the Commissioner that in 2010 plea agreements were applied in around 
80% of all criminal cases.” Commissioner Hammarberg stresses one peculiarity of the Georgian 
plea bargaining system which: “…relates to Article 42 of the Criminal Code, which provides that 
fines can be imposed in the context of plea agreements even for violations of the Criminal Code 
for which this form of punishment is not foreseen.” He further notices that safeguards of proper 
application of the institution may be provided in the legislation itself, but the practice is strongly 
criticized. He stresses the importance of free and voluntarily pleas, insists that judges should 
have stronger control over the process, and calls for a larger role of the defense in negotiations, 
as well as greater process transparency. In line with the above mentioned, the Natsvlishvili and 
Togonidze v. Georgia case involves two Georgian citizens, a husband and a wife, Mr. Natsvlishvili 
and Ms. Togonidze. Natsvlishvili was the director of one of the largest public companies in 
Georgia. He and his wife together owned 15.55% of shares in the factory, and were the largest 
shareholders after the state. Natsvlishvili was arrested in 2004 and charged with: “making 
fictitious sales, transfers and write-offs, and spending the proceeds without regard for the 
company’s interests.” (ECoHR Press Release on the Judgment issued by the Registrar of the Court 
on 29 April, 2014). In the same year, after negotiations with a prosecutor he accepted a plea 
bargain and was fined € 14,700 in exchange for a reduced sentence. Before the ECoHR, amongst 
other things, Natsvlishvili claimed that plea bargaining as applied in his case was an abuse of the 
process by the prosecution, that there was no possibility of appeal, and that it breached Article 6 
of the ECHR. In addition, both applicants claimed that the financial penalties imposed upon them 
as part of plea bargaining violated their property rights under Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR. 
In short, the ECoHR position in this case was that there were no violations of the named articles 
by the Georgian institutions, since, according to the court, Natsvlishvili voluntarily pleaded guilty 
and was fully aware of the consequences and content. 
38 Recommendation No. R (87) 18 of the Committee of Minister to Member States concerning 
the Simplification of the Criminal Justice, 17 September, 1987. The recommendation can be 
downloaded from the web-site: 
https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&Instrane
tImage=608011&SecMode=1&DocId=694270&Usage=2  
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39 Plea bargaining was not originally foreseen in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of this ad-
hoc tribunal which date from February 1994 (all versions starting from 1994 can be read at the 
web-site: http://www.icty.org/sections/LegalLibrary/RulesofProcedureandEvidence). Only in 
November 1997 was a plea of guilty as such regulated through Rule no 62bis, and in December 
2001 a real plea bargaining procedure including agreement between the prosecutor and accused 
was regulated through Rule no. 63ter. In 1996 Drazen Erdemovic (Prosecutor v. Erdemović, TC, 
Case No. IT-96-22-T, 7 October 1997) was the first accused to plead guilty before this Court. He 
was a low level soldier charged with committing killings at one of the execution sites near the 
village of Srebrenica, and he was convicted for murder after he pleaded guilty. Even though it led 
to the adoption of the above-mentioned Rule 62bis and the definition of the conditions which 
must be fulfilled for a valid guilty plea, this guilty plea was not the result of negotiations. The first 
case of real plea bargaining before this international tribunal was the case of Stevan Todorovic 
from 2000 (Prosecutor v. Todorović, TC, Case No. IT-95-9/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, 31 July 
2001. Todorovic was Chief of Police in the town of Bosanski Samac charged with crimes against 
humanity consisting of persecution on political, racial and religious grounds in the form of 
beating, ordering torture, humiliating, discrimination against non-Serb civilians and so on.. He 
was convicted of persecution after negotiating a guilty plea. Ferioli writes that (2013, p.6): 
“…between 2001 and 2003, thirteen more defendants did the same”, meaning pleaded guilty. 
ICTY generally allows for sentence and charge bargaining. Ferioli further refers (2013, p.9-10) to 
Turner J.I. and Weigend (2013) and says: “ ‘ a prosecutor’s decision to drop charges at the ICTY 
and ICTR must typically entail the dropping of factual allegations as well, because the withdrawal 
of charges might not have any effect on the ultimate sentence, unless the parties also negotiate 
to exclude certain facts from the indictment”. As can be concluded, a type of fact bargaining is 
allowed before the ICTY as well. One of the best known and most illustrative cases when it comes 
to the ICTY and plea bargaining which caused lots of controversy and criticism by the victims’ 
families is the case of Biljana Plavsic (Prosecutor v. Plavšić, TC, Case No. IT-00-39&40/1, 
Sentencing Judgment, 27 February 2003. Plavsic was President of the Republic of Srpska, which is 
one the two entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina. She succeeded the accused Bosnian war criminal 
currently on trial, Radovan Karadzic, in this position. Plavsic was charged with crimes against 
humanity and genocide by being involved in planning and enforcing the ethnic cleansing of 
Muslims during the Bosnian war.) She pleaded guilty to crimes against humanity, and because of 
this plea the genocide charge was dropped by the prosecution. 
40 Prosecutor v. Momir Nikolić, Case No. IT-02-60/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, 2 December 2003. 
41 University of Wisconsin Law School web-site: http://law.wisc.edu/law-in-action/  
42 Another division between research methodologies that is well explained and useful is provided 
by Gray (2014). He recognizes the following research methodologies: experimental and quasi-
experimental research, phenomenological research, analytical surveys, action research and 
heuristic inquiry. In his work Gray (2014) also provides readers with advice which additionally 
helped me to choose the direction of my research. Specifically, after stressing the importance of 
connecting all the research elements and taking the epistemological standpoint into account at 
the very beginning of research he says: “What is important, is that whatever philosophy, 
approach and methodology you adopt for your research, you should be able to justify your mix in 
relation to your research philosophy and research question(s).” In line with all the above, my 
final general choice was a qualitative research approach. The goals of my research especially 
those related to identifying the problems and success formulas within plea bargaining application 
in Montenegro, as well as those related to the usefulness of this practice, cannot be fulfilled 
without the deeper involvement of the actors in this process themselves. Any other road that 
would imply excluding the actors in the process would lead to repetitive results that are neither 
reliable nor credible, and which are not based on the authentic experiences and realistic 
circumstances in which this practice takes place.   
43 Judicial Training Center of Montenegro. (2015). List of Judges.  
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44 Judicial Training Center of Montenegro. (2015). List of Prosecutors.  
45 The number is found on the web-site of the Bar Chamber of Montenegro: 
www.advokatskakomora.me  
46 All statistical data is gathered from the official web-site of the Courts of Montenegro: 
www.sudovi.me 
47 The reason for not having a precise percentage for these two groups is because their names in 
the judgments are not always provided in full, but only their initials. I did not consider further 
research in relation to this necessary since by the total number of agreements concluded and 
analogy with judges, it can be concluded that the percentages of prosecutors and defense 
attorneys who possess some experience in this area are small as well. 
48 Plea bargaining possibilities were like that at the time of research; the most recent legislative 
changes in this regard which do not have any effect on the previous practice will be discussed 
later. 
49 More about ethical considerations later in this chapter. 
50 I did this in my capacity as the Official Court Interpreter for the English Language appointed by 
the Minister of Justice of Montenegro (Decision number 03-11039/14). 
51 I did this in my capacity as the Official Court Interpreter for the English Language appointed by 
the Minister of Justice of Montenegro (Decision number 03-11039/14). 
52 Details of all the documents are contained in the end notes with references to their sources. 
53 Montenegro had first been internationally recognized as an independent country, a monarchy 
at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century; it had its Constitution dating from 1905 
and all the relevant legislation; after this initial independence period it became part of different 
federations. 
54 Government of Montenegro. Ministry of Justice. (2012). Information about the Implementation 
of the Criminal Procedure Code.  Podgorica.   
55The application of the new regulations was practically another large undertaking itself which 
was preceded by the preparation of the whole Criminal Justice system for such changes. 
Amongst other things, this included the adoption of the Plan of Implementation of the Criminal 
Procedure Code (Government of Montenegro. Ministry of Justice. [2009]. Plan of Implementation 
of the Criminal Procedure Code. Podgorica) by the Government in 2009, and the establishment of 
the Commission for Monitoring the Implementation of the Criminal Procedure Code and the 
Analytical-Operational Team as its assistance body.   
56 Before going into specific plea bargaining provisions, it is useful to mention that plea 
bargaining as a legal institution is not a novelty of just a criminal procedure in Montenegro. In 
almost the same format, in 2011 this possibility was introduced in the Montenegrin Law on 
Misdemeanors as well. Misdemeanors are, however, not considered crimes in Montenegro and 
they do not imply criminal responsibility, but a much lower level of responsibility which is called 
misdemeanor responsibility. They are linked not just to the small violations of public order, but 
also to a great number of administrative violations. Bearing in mind these facts, the significant 
lack of reliable statistics, and the large spectrum of misdemeanors and institutions that process 
this type of petty violations including specialized misdemeanor courts, various administrative 
inspections and others, this issue will not be treated in my research. It is worth noting that 
through informal communication with the officials of the misdemeanor courts, I was informed 
that plea agreements in this area are definitely not regular, but rather a sporadic, almost non-
existent phenomena. 
57 For quoting the Criminal Procedure Code articles in my work, I used the unofficial translation of 
this law from the Montenegrin into English provided by the Ministry of Justice of Montenegro. In 
some places, I did make small corrections to the text in order for it to be of a better quality and 
more precise. I did this in the capacity of the Official Court Interpreter for the English Language 
appointed by the Minister of Justice of Montenegro (Decision number 03-11039/14). 
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58 After the adoption of the CPC on 18 August 2009, not all the provisions came into force eight 
days after the law was published in Official Gazette of Montenegro, as is the common practice in 
the Montenegrin legal system. Specifically, the law itself defined a so-called vacatio legis of one 
year for most of the law provisions, meaning that the majority of provisions were to become 
applicable one year after the law came into force. As for plea bargaining provisions, their 
application deadline was six months. Vacatio legis, as the legislator explained “…was defined 
with the purpose of more efficient application of law, by which possibility was given to all the 
actors of criminal procedure to prepare themselves for implementation of the new legal 
solutions, as well as to create conditions for their better acceptance in a psychological 
sense.”(Ministry of Justice. (2013). Report on the Needs for Modifications and Additions to the 
Criminal Procedure Code. Podgorica)   
59Limiting plea bargaining to these crimes was explained by the legislator as an optimal solution 
at that particular moment, bearing in mind that it was a completely new legal institution. “Such 
limiting of the agreement enables that a large number of crimes are its subject, but that it is still 
not possible for the most serious crimes; this is justified, on the one hand, by the fact that this is 
a completely new legal mechanism which requires certain necessary caution, while on the other 
hand, such a solution is generally acceptable”. This is written in the Government of Montenegro-
Ministry of Justice and Human Rights Information on the Implementation of the Institution of 
Agreements on Admission of Guilt from 2012. It is obvious that the legislator was careful when 
deciding about the scope of application of these agreements, and opted for limited application 
and a potential “trial period” for this legal practice.   
60 The “accused” implies a higher level of certainty that a person did commit a crime, and by that 
the prosecutor’s success at trial is more likely. This may affect both the prosecutor’s and the 
accused’s motivation to enter the agreement in one way or another.  
61 This article also allows for agreement on the costs of the criminal proceeding, as well as on 
waiving the right to appeal after the court fully approves the agreement. Furthermore, the article 
defines the obligation of the accused to return a property gain acquired by crime, and objects 
that have to be forfeited under the CC. The article also provides the possibility for the accused to 
agree about the fulfillment of a certain obligation in the framework of the plea agreement. This 
can include, for example, eliminating the consequences of a crime or compensating damage 
caused by a crime, paying a certain amount of money to a humanitarian organization, carrying 
out some community service or humanitarian work, and so on.  
62 When it comes to the acceptance of the agreement, the article enumerates the specific 
conditions which all cumulatively must be fulfilled in order for the court to accept the 
agreement. The confession of the crime by the accused must be given “voluntarily and 
consciously” in line with the available evidence and without the possibility that it was made “as a 
consequence of an error”. The crime for which the confession is given must be one of the crimes 
for which plea agreements are allowed. The accused must be aware of all the consequences of 
signing the agreement, particularly waiving the right to trial and the right to appeal. The 
agreement cannot “violate the rights of the injured party”, it must be in line with “the interests 
of fairness”, and the sanction should serve “the purpose for which criminal sanctions are 
imposed.” If only one of these conditions is not met, the court will reject the agreement, and the 
admission of guilt cannot be used as evidence in any further criminal proceeding. There are two 
situations in which the court will dismiss the agreement, and that is if the accused does not come 
to the hearing scheduled for the purpose of deciding on the agreement, even though s/he was 
regularly summoned to the court, and if the agreement is not submitted to the court in a timely 
way i.e. not later than the first session of the main hearing. The legislator did explicitly take care 
of the injured party’s interests. Specifically, apart from the violation of injured party interests 
being one of the particular reasons for the rejection of an agreement, the article defines that the 
injured party and her/his proxy will be informed by the court about the plea bargaining hearing. 
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Additionally, the injured party is given the possibility to appeal against the court’s ruling on the 
acceptance of the agreement.  
63 The article says that there is just one situation in which the court’s judgment on accepting the 
plea agreement can be appealed and that is when the judgment itself does not correspond to the 
agreement reached. This is, however, expected to happen extremely rarely or probably never in 
the court’s practice. 
64 Kojovic, R., Stojanovic, P., Kapuci, P. & Mugosa, M. (2010). The Manual for Application of the 
Criminal Procedure Code of Montenegro - Explanation of Basic Institutions, Court Practice and 
Practical Forms. Podgorica: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe-OSCE and 
Judicial Training Center of Montenegro. 
65 Government of Montenegro. Ministry of Justice and Human Rights. (2012). Information on the 
Implementation of the Institution of Agreements on Admission of Guilt. Podgorica. 
66 Ministry of Justice. (2013). The Report on the Needs for Modifications and Additions to the 
Criminal Procedure Code. Podgorica.  
67 Government of Montenegro. Ministry of Justice. (2012). The Information about the 
Implementation of the Criminal Procedure Code.  Podgorica. 
68 Government of Montenegro. (2013). The Conclusions. Podgorica.  
69 It seems that the legislator believed that the “test” period for this legal instrument was over, 
and that it should be possible to apply it to all crimes with the exception of the most serious 
ones. The justification for such an approach may be found in the potential position of the 
legislator that resolving complex cases, like organized crime and high level corruption cases, by 
using this institution releases the prosecutor from hard and long lasting work which quite often 
does not have a certain and positive outcome at the trial. The question that can be asked is: why 
was this approach not taken at the very beginning? It may be that the “fear” of such novelty 
prevailed at that starting moment. As for terrorism related and war crimes cases, it can be 
presumed that the high sensitivity of these cases led to the legislator’s determination to disable 
“bargaining about guilt” in such situations. 
70 Extending the possibility to the suspect to conclude an agreement can be seen as a step 
forward that might open the doors to greater implementation of the practice. Depending on the 
type of charges, the strength of evidence, the prosecutor’s position in relation to the sentence, 
as well as the forecasted judicial decision in each particular case, it may be motivating both for 
the prosecutor and the suspect. 
71 The novelty related to the submission of the indictment together with the plea agreement can 
be potentially explained by the position of the legislator that the criminal procedure must 
formally start with the indicting act. However, by eliminating indictment control in plea 
bargaining cases, the court is less burdened and the prosecutor is released from this obligation 
which slows down the process. 
Articles 293 to 297 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Montenegro regulate issues of the control 
of the indictment. This is a standard obligation that arises from the CPC. It represents a form of 
initial judicial control and serves as a tool for initial corrections to the key indictment act with the 
purpose of preventing improper indictments from initiating a trial, or their poor quality affecting 
the quality of the trial. Additionally, it serves as a checking mechanism in the context of the rights 
and freedoms of the accused. 
72 Government of Montenegro. (2015). Law Proposal for Modifications and Additions to the 
Criminal Procedure Code. Podgorica.  
73 There is a general terminological change present in the new plea bargaining articles that 
should be mentioned for the sake of clarity. The “indictment proposal” and “private complaint” 
were added to the articles after the word “indictment”. This is a reflection of the new reality that 
agreements are now allowed for all crimes except the previously mentioned ones. Specifically, in 
the cases of more serious crimes, the prosecution brings up a classical indictment. With the less 
serious crimes a simpler type of indictment called an “indictment proposal” is brought up. 
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Moreover, the CPC defines that certain types of crimes may be prosecuted by a private complaint 
which is submitted by a private individual. This means that a “private prosecutor” can negotiate a 
plea agreement with the suspect/accused. It is an interesting new solution which will be 
discussed later in Chapter IV. With the extended application of plea bargaining to almost all 
crimes, these two other types of indicting acts had to be inserted into the relevant articles 
accordingly.  
74 In the earlier 2009 CPC, these issues were not clearly and explicitly regulated which provided 
space for confusion. Both of these issues were actually discussed as problematic by some of 
participants in my research. The legislator obviously “felt” the need to clarify these issues, 
probably based on input from practitioners. 
75 All the statistical data is gathered from the official web-site of the Courts of Montenegro: 
www.sudovi.me  
76 This and all the other percentages below for each given year are the percentages of the cases 
completed by plea agreements out of the total number of completed criminal cases for that year. 
77 Judicial Council of Montenegro. (2012). Annual Report on Work of the Judicial Council and the 
Courts for 2011. Podgorica.  
78 Judicial Council of Montenegro. (2012). Annual Report on Work of the Judicial Council and the 
Courts for 2011. Podgorica.  
79 Judicial Council of Montenegro. (2013). Annual Report on Work the Judicial Council and the 
Courts for 2012. Podgorica. 
80 Judicial Council of Montenegro. (2014). Annual Report on Work the Judicial Council and the 
Courts for 2013. Podgorica. 
81 Judicial Council of Montenegro. (2015). Annual Report on Work the Judicial Council and the 
Courts for 2014. Podgorica.  
82 Judicial Council of Montenegro. (2016). Annual Report on Work of the Judicial Council and the 
Courts for 2015. Podgorica 
83 Montenegro. Statistical Office. (2011). Release - Census of Population, Households and 
Dwellings in Montenegro. Podgorica.  
84 For example, in 2014, the number of indictments at the Podgorica Basic Prosecution Office 
were 992, while the largest number of indictments in the North of Montenegro was at the Basic 
Prosecution Office in Berane, 259, and in the South at the Basic Prosecution Office in Kotor, 435 
(Office of the Supreme State Prosecutor. (2015). Report on Work of the State Prosecution for 
2014. Podgorica). Furthermore, as an illustration of the differences between the courts of 
different regions, the influx of all types of cases at the Basic Court in Podgorica for 2014 was 
18,601, while the influx of cases at the largest courts in the North and South of Montenegro was 
much lower, at the Basic Court of the northern town of Bijelo Polje 6,336, and at the Basic Court 
of the southern town of Kotor 5,414 (Judicial Council of Montenegro. (2015). Annual Report on 
Work the Judicial Council and Courts for 2014. Podgorica).  
85 Montenegro. Statistical Office. (2011). Release - Census of Population, Households and 
Dwellings in Montenegro. Podgorica.  
86 The information is a result of the analyses of the content of all the plea bargaining agreements 
retrieved from the official web-site of the Courts of Montenegro: www.sudovi.me  
87 It is worth noting that even though agreements on the admission of guilt have been part of the 
Montenegrin legal system for almost six years now, not that many practitioners or academics 
have written about this institution. I identified only two articles on this topic in Montenegro, 
interestingly both written by judges (both authors are included in the References). The authors 
write about the agreements on the admission of guilt, but both have entirely opposite 
standpoints. While Vujanovic (2012), even though referring to some practical problems, favors 
the institution, Bogicevic (2010) is completely against it and believes that it should not be part of 
the Montenegrin legal system. Vujanovic does express criticism in relation to the different 
segments of the plea bargaining process in Montenegro that include: prosecutors being inactive 
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when it comes to proposing negotiations; judges not being good at estimating the quality of 
confessions; and the low level of involvement of defense attorneys when it comes to the 
confession of their clients (2012, p. 120-136). Another interesting critical comment by this author 
concerns the previously mentioned forms for CPC application published by the Judicial Training 
Center of Montenegro. Specifically, in the author’s opinion: “The manual of forms for the 
practical application of the CPC hindered more than assisted in the practical application of 
agreements on the admission of guilt. Prosecutors and judges stuck to the published forms 
without thoroughly studying  the institution of the agreements on the admission of guilt and 
their role in it, which in most cases led to standard minutes and rulings based on a system of 
copy-paste” (Vujanovic, 2012, p. 15.). However, regardless of these observations, Vujanovic 
encourages further application and even suggests the introduction of the possibility to negotiate 
about the legal qualification of a crime: “…I believe that it would be purposeful to enable … to 
negotiate about the key characteristics of the essence of the crime as well, and in connection 
with that about the legal qualification too.” (Vujanovic, 2012, p. 15). Additionally, one more 
legislative change was proposed by this author, and that is to introduce an obligation of the 
prosecutor to submit the indictment together with the agreement (in cases when the agreement 
is concluded before formal bringing up of the indictment). Otherwise, as she explains, it means 
that there is a conviction without an accusation i.e. formal indictment87 On the other hand, 
Bogicevic has an extremely negative opinion about plea agreements which is strongly expressed 
in his work: “This is a new institution in our criminal procedural system…taken over from the 
Anglo-Saxon tradition. It is attack on the Montenegrin moral codex and legal tradition, and 
jeopardizes moral axiology as rational self-consciences in the essence of Kant’s categorical 
imperative, the foundations of justice and truth; and that is because it is based on benefits and 
privileges which the accused gets in the procedure which favors him in comparison to the 
confession of crime by the accused which is not included in the agreement.” (Bogicevic, 2010, p.1 
9). It seems that the everlasting discussion of U.S. authors about this issue that I wrote about in 
Chapter I can equally be applied even in a small country like Montenegro. 
88 For contextual purposes, I will briefly refer here to the issue of public interest in plea 
bargaining. This institution is always an attractive one in Montenegro, bearing in mind that 
country is historically known for worshipping the cult of the so-called “blood revenge”, the 
concept of “an eye for an eye” justice. There are many examples of murders in Montenegrin 
court practice that are result of this traditional phenomenon. In this sense, the attitude of the 
public towards plea agreements can be subject of separate research. When it comes to specific 
media articles devoted to plea bargaining, there have been some published in Montenegro. In 
2014, the main daily newspaper published a series of articles about plea bargaining and deferred 
prosecution for the first time which served to introduce the public to the legal provisions, and 
explain the nature and purpose of these practices. (Prosecutors Unwilling to Negotiate because 
of Fear of the Public. [2014, July 13]. Vijesti, p. 2; Guilty the Most Common Plea by the Accused in 
Traffic Accidents.  [2014, July 14]. Vijesti, p. 10; Alibi for the Prosecutor with Weak Evidence. 
[2014, July 21]. Vijesti, p. 15; Agreement on Admission of Guilt Rare-A Million Euros Spent Dally. 
[2014, July 26]. Vijesti, p. 11; Accused Don’t Want to Make a Deal with the Prosecutors. [2014, 
July 29]. Vijesti, p. 9; Who Paid not to go to Prison?. [2014, July 30]. Vijesti, p. 14; Unusual Deal of 
the Prosecution-Why Didn’t the Country React Differently?. [2014, July 31]. Vijesti, p. 9; Pleading 
Guilty Because of a More Lenient Sentence. [2014, August 1]. Vijesti, p. 11.) From the political 
perspective the articles also questioned some of existing deferred prosecution agreements in 
terms of the individuals with whom they were signed. The titles of some of the articles were 
quite bombastic like: Who paid not to go to prison? In 2015, on two occasions, the media 
introduced the public to the CPC 2015 amendments by which the agreements’ application was 
extended to all crimes, except terrorism related ones and war crimes (in May and September of 
2015 two articles were published in two different daily newspapers: Bargaining with the 
Prosecutor for All Crimes. [2015, May 11]. Dnevne novine, pp 12, 13; No Bargaining only for 
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Crime of Terrorism and War Crimes. [2015, September 7]. Pobjeda, p. 7.). It is noticeable that 
from the beginning of 2016 the media have regularly started to follow a few specific cases where 
plea agreements have been concluded. The reason is that those are high level corruption cases 
involving state officials. Due to the quite large number of such articles I am not able to track 
them all. The general observation is that they are primarily of an informative character, 
occasionally questioning the sentences as being too small and the return of illegally gained 
assets. Most of the agreements that have been in the focus of media attention in 2016, however, 
have still not been finally confirmed by the court. They can be considered the result of the 2015 
CPC amendments – the extension of plea bargaining to almost all crimes. These processes are 
discussed in Chapter VI, in the framework of the recommendations for future research.  
89 Public Prosecution of the Republic of Serbia. (2015) Work of Public Prosecutor’s Offices in 
Combatting Crime and Protection of Constitutionality and Legality in 2014. Belgrade. 
90 Supreme Cassation Court of the Republic of Serbia. (2015). Statistical Data on Work of All the 
Courts in the Republic of Serbia for the period 1. January to 31. December, 2014. Belgrade. 
91 Public Prosecution of the Republic of Serbia. (2015) Work of Public Prosecutor’s Offices in 
Combatting Crime and Protection of Constitutionality and Legality in 2014. Belgrade. 
92 Criminal Procedure Code of the Republic of Serbia. (2011). Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Serbia No. 72/2011; 101/2011; 121/2012; 32/2013; 45/2013; 55/2014.  
93The standpoint of the Montenegrin legislator was possibly related to efficiency i.e. the accused 
missed using the institution at the very beginning, and entered the phase of trial where all the 
evidence has practically been gathered and the chances of the prosecution winning are much 
larger. However, sometimes the trial, presentation and elaboration of evidence convincingly 
demonstrates the reasons for the conclusion of the agreement. This is especially so, bearing in 
mind that some cases involve a large number of accused and witnesses which might be not just 
time consuming and long lasting, but can also provide a new perception of the whole situation. 
The existence of trial related psychological pressure as a motivating factor for the accused to 
conclude an agreement cannot be neglected in this context either.   
94 In practice, the prosecutor will likely be willing to give up the prosecution of less serious crimes 
that are not included in the agreement which can serve as an incentive for the accused to accept 
the sentence offered. Montenegrin legislation does allow the giving up of criminal prosecution 
under certain conditions, like for example, cooperating witness and deferred prosecution 
situations. 
95 The Serbian Special Prosecutor for Organized Crime, Miljko Radisavljevic, and the Senior 
Advisor in the Serbian Prosecution for Organized Crime, Predrag Cetkovic, refer to this in their 
article entitled Experiences of the Prosecution for Organized Crime in Application of the 
Institution of Agreement on Admission of Crime published in 2013 in the book Simplified Forms of 
Acting in the Criminal Matters. For more details see References, under Radisavljevic. 
96 When it comes to the first agreement, apart from the testimony of the accused about relevant 
individuals and crimes, it includes her/his confession of the crime and the negotiation of the 
sentence. The Montenegrin provisions on cooperating witnesses leave the prosecutor with only 
one option in giving up a criminal prosecution against the accused if s/he decides to become a 
cooperating witness and by her/his testimony helps the prosecutor in prosecuting other 
organized crime individuals. The Serbian prosecutor obviously has more options, not just to give 
up the criminal prosecution, but also to release the accused from sanction, to negotiate the type, 
measure and range of sanction, and to negotiate about the confiscation of all the accused’s 
assets. The Montenegrin CPC does not require a confession from the accused, just relevant 
testimony about the organized crime(s) in question, it does not anticipate the signing of any kind 
of agreement between the prosecutor and the accused, nor do the Montenegrin provisions allow 
any kind of negotiations with cooperating witness. The principle of witness cooperation that 
exists in Montenegro in these cases is ‘give and take”.  
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As for the agreement on the testimony of the convicted envisaged by the Serbian CPC, which 
does not exist in Montenegrin law, it is limited to convicted individuals in cases of organized 
crime and war crimes. The “goods for trade” in this situation is the testimony of the convicted in 
relation to relevant individuals and crime(s) which assists the prosecutor in further criminal 
prosecutions. For providing such testimony, the prosecutor mitigates the sentence, or even 
releases the convicted party of the sentence through a special procedure defined in the CPC as 
well. Sentence negotiation is also a key element of this agreement.  
97 In this context, it is important to stress that both the Montenegrin and Serbian legislation do 
not allow for the leader of a criminal organization to enter such arrangements with the 
prosecutor. Additionally, unlike in Serbian law, according to Montenegrin law, the court is also 
explicitly forbidden from proclaiming somebody guilty solely based on the statement of a 
cooperating witness. 
98 It exists in Montenegro as well, and it is different from the earlier practice of both countries 
when the investigation was led by an investigative judge. 
99 State Prosecution of the Republic of Croatia. (2015). Work Report of the State Prosecution of 
the Republic of Croatia for 2014. Zagreb. 
100 Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia. (2015). Report of the Supreme Court President on 
Situation in Judicial Branch of Power for 2014. Zagreb. 
101 Special Prosecution Office for Organized Crime and Corruption acts before the Zagreb Country 
Court. 
102 State Prosecution of the Republic of Croatia. (2015). Work Report of the State Prosecution of 
the Republic of Croatia for 2014. Zagreb. 
103Criminal Procedure Code of the Republic of Croatia. (2008). People's Gazette, No 152/2008; 
76/2009; 80/2011; 121/2011; 91/2012; 143/2012; 56/2013; 145/2013;  152/2014.  
104 This solution seems to be the most appropriate one since both the Montenegrin and Serbian 
experience proved that this solution was also the final choice of the legislators in these countries 
after having test periods with the institution of plea bargaining.  
105 It is obvious that the Croatian legislator wanted to keep regular judicial control of the 
indictment in the process of plea bargaining as well. The court i.e. the indictment panel in the 
Croatian system, must first check whether the parties agree with the statement on the 
agreement, then it conducts a check of the indictment, and then based on that it adopts a 
judgment on the acceptance of the agreement. The Croatian Judge Cambj explained the motives 
of the legislator behind this decision (2013, p. 672): “… criminal procedure…starts by confirming 
of indictment, and judgment can be adopted only by the authorized court, in the court 
proceeding defined by law, so it is completely logical that indictment must be confirmed before 
adoption of judgment, because if opposite, the judgment would be adopted while court 
proceeding hasn’t started yet.” It is the same justification that the Montenegrin legislator and 
some authors used for making the indictment part of the plea agreement in the earlier described 
cases. In both Montenegro and Serbia, control of the indictment is excluded in cases when the 
indictment is submitted together with the agreement. The solution in the Croatian system is not 
a huge obstacle in the whole process, but it can take time especially when serious and complex 
crimes are in question.  
When it comes to the injured party, Croatian law is the most protective of the injured party’s 
interests. The consent of the injured party is required for concluding the agreement. Additionally, 
in the framework of the regular appellate procedure, the injured party, for a certain number of 
reasons, has the right to file an appeal against the court’s decision based on the plea agreement. 
This solution can realistically be an obstacle for concluding the agreement in quite a significant 
number of cases.  
In terms of the accused’s waiving of the right to appeal against the judgment based on the plea 
agreement, unlike in Croatia, in both Montenegro and Serbia this right to appeal practically does 
not exist. In Montenegro, there is just one exception when this right will exist regardless of 
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accused’s waiver, and that is when the judgment is not in accordance with the concluded 
agreement; this is a situation that can occur almost only at a theoretical level. In Serbia, the 
situation is essentially the same. The Croatian solution of allowing the right to appeal can 
legitimately be questioned, taking into account the purpose of plea bargaining, and that is to 
reach a just final judgment in a fast and efficient way. 
Just like the court in Serbia, the Croatian court decides on the acceptance of the plea agreement 
in the form of a judgment only, without the adoption of any previous ruling. The probable wish 
of the Montenegrin legislator to provide the injured party with the right to appeal against the 
acceptance of the plea agreement, resulted in the court’s two-level decision process (first by a 
ruling and then a judgment). The injured party in the Croatian system is, however, even more 
strongly protected through the possibility to act in the regular appellate procedure. The 
Montenegrin solution seems more adequate, bearing in mind nature and purpose of plea 
bargaining.  
106 State Prosecution of the Republic of Croatia. (2010). Guidelines for Negotiation and 
Agreement with the Accused about the Confession of Guilt and the Sanction. Zagreb.   
107 Rules on Deferred Prosecution, 2010, Official Gazette of Montenegro No. 60/2010 from 15 
October 2010. 
108 To remind the reader, deferred prosecution is possible for crimes where the envisaged prison 
sentence is up to five years, and it represents the postponing of the criminal prosecution with 
the possibility of cancelling it under the condition that the accused fulfils certain obligation in a 
given period of time. 
109 Interestingly, the possibility of concluding an agreement between a so-called “private 
prosecutor” and the accused is found confusing by the same prosecutor, P3, but s/he did not 
have any particular suggestions in this regard. S/he was simply questioning this solution: “I’m not 
quite clear about this. How will the agreement be concluded here? We have the injured party 
as a private prosecutor. If they want to agree about anything, the accused and the injured 
party, then they will agree out of court. I don’t think that there will be cases of this type. But I 
guess they wanted to make the position of the private prosecutor and the state prosecutor 
equal.” 
110 This is even though the CC/CPC allows a much higher sentence for this crime, particularly if 
the accused is a recidivist. 
111 This is for the least serious form of this crime, where no juveniles are involved and where 
everything was done voluntarily. 
112 A few other interesting participant’ comments about barriers or worries when it comes to 
plea bargaining practice are worth mentioning.  
Some of the participants’ answers revealed specific, more technical reasons why they were not 
able to conclude agreements. Based on her/his own cases, Attorney A4 emphasizes that the non-
functionality of the prisoners’ electronic surveillance system in the country was a clear barrier to 
concluding the agreement: “I had this case, I represented a man in Serbia, in Cacak, and it was 
for misuse of official position in commercial business. The sentence we agreed on was home 
detention, for him to wear an electronic bracelet. Unfortunately, this agreement could not 
have been realized because there are no conditions for this in Montenegro. Really, it’s a pity.”  
On the other hand, Attorney A2 talks about another type of barrier to concluding the agreement. 
S/he stresses that from her/his own experience, those accused who are members of organized 
criminal groups sometimes do not want to conclude plea agreements because they would then 
need to reveal the leader of the group which they do not want: ”What I noticed as a problem is 
that the accused don’t want to confess or conclude agreements, actually they don’t want to 
‘spy’ on the leader of an organized criminal group, and this is when they are together in the 
same indictment. They have a dilemma when we have these big organized criminal groups 
because if they want to describe their role [in the group] they would reveal the leader of the 
group. This is where problem lies.” 
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Some participants express the worry that plea bargaining may be misused. As Judge J4 believes, 
sometimes it can be misused: “The question of fairness may be asked here, a person and his 
statement may be used as somebody’s arms and based on that somebody innocent may be 
proclaimed guilty.” The Judge calls for more detailed regulation of using plea bargaining 
confessions as evidence in other cases. In line with this, s/he talks about one of her/his cases and 
shares her/his thinking about that case: “I’m thinking why they [the prosecutor and the 
accused] actually agreed [in this particular case], whether the prosecutor did this so that 
through one person he reaches another group of criminals. I accepted this agreement. And 
then…later I see this person reported himself to be a witness in another case against this 
group. The prosecutor won’t say anything and the accused says’ I did it for my own reasons’, so 
the accused won’t say anything either. So the accused may possibly be the arms of the 
prosecutor. The sentence [in this case] is of course within the legally defined framework and … 
the judgment is adopted.” 
113 This was discussed and quoted earlier. And in addition, as a reminder, the same judge, J4, 
suggests the detailed legal regulation of how the prosecutor can use the confession of the 
accused given in the framework of plea bargaining in her/his [prosecutor’s] other, separate cases 
(see endnote 112 for this).  
114 In relation to this issue. 
115 This was presented earlier as well. 
116 In connection with the already discussed unprofessionalism of attorneys in the context of plea 
bargaining, Attorney A3 has the very general and quite unrealistic proposal of sentencing her/his 
unethical colleagues: “I think that with attorneys it would not be bad to form ‘something’ to 
control their practice when it comes to agreements, maybe within the Court of Honor of the 
Bar Chamber or somewhere; however, it is very hard in practice, to prove that the prosecutor 
offered and this one rejected, and so on…”   
117 Criminal Procedure Code of Montenegro, 2009, Official Gazette of Montenegro No. 57/2009 
from 18 August 2009; 49/2010 from 13 August 2010; 47/2014 from 7 November 2014; 2/2015 
from 16 January 2015; 35/2015 from 7 July 2015. 
Article 16 - Principle of Truth and Fairness  
(1) The court, State Prosecutor and other public authorities participating in the criminal 
proceedings shall truthfully and completely establish all the facts relevant to render a lawful and 
fair decision, as well as examine and establish with equal attention the facts that incriminate the 
accused person and the ones in her/his favour. 
(2) The court shall ensure equal terms to the parties and to the defence attorney as regards 
the offering, accessing and presenting of evidence.  
118 As s/he said, in the past the typical sentence ordered for the crime of grievous bodily harm 
was probation i.e. releasing the accused after conviction under condition that s/he does not 
commit any crime in a certain given period of time, while now it is predominantly a prison 
sentence. Exactly for this crime, s/he managed to conclude a plea agreement for her/his client 
with the probation agreed. 
119 Criminal Justice Act, 2003, can be read at the web-site: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/44/contents  
Possible relevant legislative updates can be found at the web-site: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/  
120Sentencing Guidelines Council - Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea, 2007, can be 
downloaded from the web-site: https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/Reduction_in_Sentence_for_a_Guilty_Plea_-Revised_2007.pdf  
121 Code for Crown Prosecutors, 2013, can be downloaded from the web-site: 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/code_2013_accessible_english.pdf  
122 Ministry of Justice’s Consolidated Criminal Practice Direction, Horne referred to the 2011 
edition, the 2013 edition can be downloaded from the web-site: 
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http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Practice+Directions/Consolidated-criminal/criminal-practice-
directions-2013.pdf 
Possible relevant updates can be found at the web-site: https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/  
123 Criminal Procedure Rules, 2012, can be read at the web-site: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2012/1726/contents/made   
Possible relevant legislative updates can be found at the web-site: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/  
124 Regina v. Turner [1970] 2 QB 321. In this case, the Court of Appeal said that the council must 
be completely free to give the accused the best advice; and this can potentially include advice 
that a plea of guilty, which shows an element of remorse, is a mitigating factor which may make 
the court give a lesser sentence than would otherwise be the case. 
125 The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, Report, 1993, can be downloaded from the web-
site: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/271971/2263.
pdf  
126 Daniele Alge, Lecturer at University of Surrey, elaborates on the negotiated plea agreements 
introduced for serious fraud cases by the Attorney General in 2009. Specifically, power was 
granted to the Serious Fraud Office to negotiate plea agreements in cases of serious fraud. Alge 
writes that these are the first formalized plea bargaining agreements in England and Wales. The 
article dates from 2013, and is entitled Negotiated Plea Agreements in Cases of Serious and 
Complex Fraud in England and Wales: A New Conceptualization of Plea bargaining?. It can be 
found on the web-site of the Web Journal of Current Legal Issues: 
http://webjcli.org//article/view/203/272  
127 Gesetz zur Regelung der Verständigung im Strafverfahren, BGBl. I.S. 2353, adopted in May 
2009. 
128 BGH (GS) [2005] 58.4 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 1440.  
129 Codice di procedura penale, GU n.250 del 24-10-1988. 
130 Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation, 2001, can be downloaded from the web-
site: http://legislationline.org/documents/section/criminal-codes/country/7  
131 The Code of Criminal Procedure of India, 1973, can be read at the web-site: 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex_browse.details?p_lang=en&p_country=IND&p_classificati
on=01.04&p_origin=COUNTRY&p_sortby=SORTBY_COUNTRY  
132 Office of the Supreme State Prosecutor. (2015). Report on Work of the State Prosecution for 
2014. Podgorica. 
